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1 Introduction 
 
Researchers of decision making agree in considering bounded rationality as the best way to describe 
what really happens during a decisional process. Among many sources of ambiguity that affect this 
process (attention limitation, time limitation, change in preferences,…) identity and more 
specifically organizational identity captured my interest. Each of us has an identity and our way and 
level of identification with the organization where we work or live change continuously. These 
changes are more radical when special events occur: for instance, an acquisition and a new owner 
are sources of identity ambiguity that causes change in human behavior. 
This kind of events interests many people and organizations. In many industries, the size of the firm 
in terms of market share is a source of competitive advantage and for this reason, M&A‟s relevance 
is improving. Over 37,000 M&A were transacted in 2006 (Thompson Financial, 2007). The global 
value of M&A improved from US$ 462 billion in 1990 to   US$ 3.5 trillion in 2000 (Stahl and 
Mendenhall, 2005). Studies about the rate of success of M&As have ambiguous results depending 
on the measures that were used.  A recent research shows that 83% of all deals fail to deliver 
shareholder value and 53% actually destroy value (Cartwright and MacCarthy, 2005). Anyway, 
cultural aspects seem to have a high impact on success likelihood. A longitudinal study of 10,000 
US employees shows that those coming from companies that had been engaged in M&A reported 
significantly less favorable results (Wiley and Moechnig, 2005).  
Among these cultural aspects, organizational identity has a primary role. There are many reasons to 
study what can produce changes in organizational identity. Organizational identity represents an 
asset for companies in order to achieve a high commitment of people. There are different typologies 
of change in the environment that can require a change of identity: change in business model, 
change in market boundaries, change in regulatory prescription, change in technology, change 
management in M&A. The role of identity has been deeply analyzed in some paper describing 
people that refuse technological change as in Oticon case (Foss, 2003) and the role of managers‟ 
cognition (Polaroid in Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). Therefore, in order to contribute to a better 
comprehension of M&A phenomenon, seems to be important to describe its “cultural side”: the 
process of de-identification and re-identification that takes place after an M&A.  
 
The evolution of organizational identity is often represented as a combination of an intentional 
management (sensegiving) and a more social negotiated sensemaking. 
According to these representations, this work is organized in three parts: 
 in the first part (chapter 4),  a case study about an acquisition in pharmaceutical industry 
provides an analysis of the relationships among strategic conditions following an M&A and 
the appropriateness of the managerial response; 
 in the second part (chapter 5), a case study about an acquisition in banking industry 
provides an analysis, based on cognitive maps, of the evolution of organizational identity; 
 in the last part (chapter 6), is analyzed a possible link between the intentional response and 
the social negotiation based on the adoption of an IT solution. 
   
The first and the third parts are based on a case study about the acquisition of Serono by the German 
company Merck. The second part is based on the acquisition of Banca Nazionale del Lavoro by the 
French financial company BNP Paribas. 
In this way, even if the qualitative approach of this work has the well-known limitation in 
generalization of findings, it is possible to underline at least three main results: 
 the necessity to manage deliberately the organizational identity as a variable that can affect 
the success of post merger integration; 
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 the necessity to consider that the evolution of organizational identity is a social negotiation 
and a process of sensemaking; 
 the necessity to implement tools (for example a new information system) that help a 
concrete linkage between managerial response and social negotiation. 
 
This document is articulated as follows: after an overview of theoretical approaches (chapter 2) and 
the formulation of the research questions (chapter 3), the three parts described above are deeply 
analyzed in chapters 4, 5 and 6. Finally, chapter 7 provides conclusions identifying limitation, 
practical and theoretical implications of this study and possible future researches. 
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2 Theoretical background 
 
The aim of this study is to contribute to a deeper comprehension of Organizational Identity 
evolution after an M&A. This aim required an effort in order to review the literature that deals this 
subject. 
In this chapter, I give two main point of view (theories about M&A and theories about 
Organizational Identity with a focus on its evolution). 
Theories about M&A can be founded in financial, strategic and organizational change with different 
focus. In organizational change research, a more dynamic perspective was proposed in a case study 
on Olivetti (a technological Italian firm) with a recombination of elements into a “platform” that is a 
meta-organization (Ciborra, 1996). 
Theories about Organizational Identity can be shared into two approach (Social Actor perspectives 
versus Social Constructionist perspectives (Ravasi and Schultz, 2006). The theoretical interest of 
this study required a ―strategic‖ focus on managerial response to multiple identities (Pratt and 
Foreman, 2000) ―balanced‖ by a ―social‖ focus on sensemaking process based on Weick studies 
(1995, 2001).   
  
 
2.1 Theories about Merger and Acquisitions 
 
Many studies consider Merger and Acquisitions as synonymous even if there are differences in 
normative regulation and in accounting. From a strategic and organizational point of view, these 
differences have a lower relevance. 
While in a “merger” two or more firm are joint in order to “create” a new entity, an acquisition is the 
result of a take-over. According to Cartwright and Cooper there are three typologies of take-over 
(friendly, debated or hostile) depending on the level of conflict between bidder and target firms 
(Cartwright and Cooper, 1996).  
When the focus of the study is on the integration process following the M&A is possible to consider 
merger and acquisition in the same way because the phases of the integration process are similar 
(Hussey, 1999). 
 
M&A has been studied by financial, strategic and organizational scholars with different goals and 
points of view. 
 
Financial researchers have examined returns to acquirers and targets and are interested in the 
market for corporate control: if present management team underperforms, then a more competent 
team takes its place (Manne, 1965; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). There is empirical evidence that there 
are positive gains (most of which as advantage for acquired firm) from the combination of the 
acquiring and acquired firms‟ assets. Most of these financial studies are focused on the performance 
of corporate acquisitions. Even if conclusions are heterogeneous (for instance about the definition of 
performance or its measurement), evidence shows a positive returns for stockholders of the acquired 
firms and no acquirers‟ abnormal returns. Scholars agree about the average of value created, not 
about the explanation of the variance around the mean. Some authors argued that average abnormal 
returns to the acquiring firm are zero (Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter, 1988; Franks, Harris, and 
Titman, 1991; Loderer and Martin, 1992; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000) or 
negative (Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker, 1992). 
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Scholars in the field of strategic management analyzed M&A as linked to diversification of business 
portfolio (Ansoff et al., 1971; Walter and Barney, 1990). Other studies are focused on market share 
as target of M&A decisions (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). 
Strategic researchers have used the resource-based view of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984; Rumelt, 
1984; Barney, 1988; Dierickx and Cool, 1989) to verify the impact of resource relatedness on 
performance (Chatterjee, 1986; Singh and Montgomery, 1987; Lubatkin, 1987; Shelton, 1988; Seth, 
1990; Healy, Palepu, and Ruback, 1992; Chatterjee et al., 1992). Their results suggest that there are 
no clear relationship between resource relatedness and performance. 
 
Organizational studies analyzed psychological effects (Asrtachan, 1990; Marks, 1982), 
communication (Sweiger and De Nisi, 1991; Sinetar, 1981) and HR development (Hambrick and 
Cannella, 1993; Walsh, 1988). An M&A re-defines the psychological contract between people and 
organization and generates cares about job security and future (Hubbard, Purcell, 2001). An early 
involvement of HR management with a task of human due diligence has been underlined (Hardling 
and Rouse, 2007) and some authors has identified the phases in which HR involvement is important 
(Antile, 2001). 
Some studies have analyzed the fit between HR management and strategy and identified a “double 
fit”: a horizontal fit among HR tools and a vertical fit between HR tools and strategy (Youndt, 1996; 
Delery and Doty, 1996). For these reasons, a strategic scenario following an M&A could be 
considered as an alignment problem. In innovative industry M&A could be a strategic way to 
achieve innovation and a solution for the reducing life cycle of products (an example is CISCO that 
did 62 acquisitions). In these contexts retention policy and talent management are the main people 
issues (Aguilera and Denken, 2004).     
Most of these studies are focused on ex-post performances. In order to analyze the Organizational 
Identity evolution, studies about the post-merger integration seem to be more useful. 
 
Theories about integration process after Merger and Acquisitions 
 
Even if ambiguity about organizational identity begins before the date of merger, its evolution 
pertains the cultural side of integration process that takes place after the merger. Therefore, in this 
paragraph we‟ll focus on the strategies of management of the integration process following the 
merger or the acquisitions.  
These studies (about integration process) use both strategic and organizational approach (Haspelagh, 
Jemison, 1991; Pablo, 1994) and they are based on the assumption that it is possible to generate 
value from M&A with an appropriate management of integration process (Larsson, Finkelstein, 
1999).  
In these approaches, the success of mergers is linked with the concept of relatedness among 
business in order to obtain sameness economies (common management of same activities) and 
fitness economies (complementarity in other resources). Relatedness has three degree of intensity: 
constrained (the same set of resources), linked (different but related resources) and unrelated 
(Rumelt, 1974). 
The success of post merger integration process depends on the capability to manage the tradeoff 
between level of integration and the disruption of acquired firm‟s resources (Zollo and Singh, 2004).  
Shared activities can be a source of competitive advantage if the combined resources are relevant in 
value chains of merged companies (Porter, Millar, 2001). Other studies underline the risk of cost of 
coordination post merger that can arise if the merger was not accurately planned (Porter, 1987). 
Relatedness has been analyzed not only from this point of view. Organizational variables like 
leadership, culture, evaluation systems have been studied (Chatterjee et Al., 1992). 
A critical view to relatedness came from Resource Based View scholars. They argued that 
companies have to share related resources but also valuable, rare, inimitable and not substitutable 
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(Barney, 1998). In this approach M&A are the way (for the bidder company) to achieve 
idiosyncratic resources. 
Among several sources of competitive advantage, many merger and acquisition researchers have 
argued that acquisition failures depends on the  problems of combining the different cultures during 
the integration process.  
Opportunities for inter-unit learning can be lost if different organizational values and practices in the 
merging organizations cause an ‗us vs them‘ war among the employees (Cartwright and Cooper, 
1996; Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1988; Schweiger, 2002).  
In cross border M&A problems can be higher for language problems, different legal systems and 
national cultural barriers (Olie, 1994; Vaara, 2003; Aguilera and Dencker, 2004; Shimizu et al., 
2004). 
Not all empirical findings about the effects of cultural differences on post-acquisition integration 
have the same results. A positive relationship between cultural differences and performance post-
integration has sometimes been reported (Weber et al., 1996; Larsson and Risberg, 1998; Morosini 
et al., 1998).  
A recent analysis of previous research (Stahl and Voigt) suggests that cultural differences account 
for only a small proportion of the variance in post-acquisition integration outcomes. According to 
According to Vaara et Al, the mechanisms through which cultural differences affect the transfer of 
the merging companies‘ capabilities and destroy or create value in acquisitions is related to ―social 
integration‖ and ―Potential  Absorptive Capacity‖ both mediated by two dynamic variables (the use 
of social integration mechanisms and the degree of operational integration of acquired unit). They 
started with a focus on acquirer–target cultural differences, which encompass differences in beliefs, 
values, and practices between the combining organizations or units, (Vaara et Al, 2007).  
Also according to Zollo and Singh, the level of integration has a significant effect on performance 
while replacing top management has negative effects on it (Zollo and Singh, 2004). The level of 
integration is defined according to Thompson as “the extent to which the functions of acquired unit 
are linked to, aligned with, or centralized in, the equivalent function of the acquiring organization” 
(Thompson, 1967). Evidence of positive relationship between performance and level of integration 
(in terms of resources redeployment and knowledge transfer) has been reported by Capron (Capron, 
1999). Recently, Kim and Finkelstein investigate in the context of all 2,204 acquisitions made by 
publicly traded U.S. commercial banks during the 12-year period from 1989 to 2001 and found that 
complementarity is an important antecedent of acquisition performance (Kim and Finkelstein, 
2009). 
Many authors argued that the degree of acquired firm‟s top managers replace has effects on 
integration process‟ success. Cannella and Hambrick found evidence of a negative relationship 
between top mangers turn over and performance (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993) and Miller and 
Judge found positive effects of complementarity among mangers of acquired and acquiring company 
(Miller and Judge, 1997).  
 
Studies about the role of the experience in M&A have ambiguous results finding a positive 
relationship (Bruton, Oviatt and White, 1994), no relationship (Baum and Ginsberg, 1997) or a U-
shaped relationship (Gick and Holyoak, 1987). Zollo and Singh proposed a knowledge-based 
perspective on managing acquisitions showing that “the lack of consistency in empirical tests of the 
learning curve hypothesis might be due to incomplete theoretical treatment of the underlying 
organizational learning processes, rather than to anomalies of the M&A context or broader 
unobserved heterogeneity”.  
They found that the level of knowledge codification has a strong and positive influence on 
acquisition performance. Firms can codify more or less knowledge (given a level codifiability for 
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each business) and a high degree of codified knowledge helps learning process (Zollo and Singh, 
2004). 
  
In sum, we can say that performance of acquisition depends on capability to manage the integration 
process and that this capability is related to the following variables: 
 Cultural differences (evidence of negative effects); 
 Level of integration (evidence of positive effects); 
 Degree of managers replacement (evidence of negative effects at certain conditions);  
 Experience in dealing M&A (ambiguous evidence); 
 Knowledge codification (evidence of positive effects). 
 
In the following sections, we analyze literature about the Organizational Identity and the 
frameworks explaining OI evolution.  
 
 
 
2.2 Theories about Organizational Identity (OI) 
 
The study of organizational identity found interest among management researchers not only for the 
topic of strategic change (Gioia and Thomas, 1996), but also for motivation (Elsbach, 1999, Dutton, 
Dukerich and Schultz, 2003), mergers and acquisitions (Empson, 2004), knowledge sharing 
(Empson, 2001). 
These studies, starting from the Albert and Whetten‘s contribute (Albert and Whetten, 1985), found 
a renewed interest in empirical research after the special issue of Academy of Management Review in 
2000 that stimulated a fertile debate among scholars coming from different fields (psychology, 
organization, sociology, marketing, …). This interdisciplinary debate didn‘t actually lead to a real 
shared analyze of the concept. After a decade rich of several contributions, in 2008 another special 
issue on Organizational Identity (edited by Corporate Reputation Review) provided an update of this 
effort and demonstrates the interest about OI studies (Van Rekom et al, 2008).   
Ravasi and Schultz propose to group theories about organizational identity into two perspectives: 
Social Actor perspectives versus Social Constructionist perspectives (Ravasi and Schultz, 2006). 
Social Actor perspectives refers to Institutional theoretical background, gives a definition of 
organizational identity that resides in institutional claims, gives emphasis on sensegiving deliberate 
and directive process (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Tajfele and Turner, 1986; Abrams and Hogg, 
1990). 
Social Constructionist perspectives refers to  Social Constructivism approach,  gives a definition of 
organizational identity that resides in collective shared beliefs,  gives emphasis on sensemaking 
process as a negotiated process among members (Gioia et al., 2000; Oswick et al., 2000; Svenigsonn 
and Alvesson, 2003; Kuhn, 2006). 
Organizational identity is a concept close to others like organizational culture, legitimacy and 
reputation. According to Hatch and Schultz, culture is a contextual concept, tacit and emergent 
while the identity appears as text, explicit and instrumental (Hatch and Schultz, 2002). Legitimacy is 
defined as externally perceived conformity to taken-for-granted standards, while reputation is 
defined as externally perceived distinction within a reference group (King and Whetten, 2008). 
Identity definition is not unique even if often it is defined using its principal dimensions: for 
example, Albert and Whetten suggest distinctiveness, endurance and centrality (Albert and Whetten, 
1985). A wider analysis of identity effects was recently provided by White (H.C. White, 2008). 
According to the Social Identity Theory, people define themselves and others using different social 
categories, one of them is their organization (Tajfele Turner, 1985; Ahsforth e Mael, 1989). 
Organizational identification is the intensity of the link between sense of belonging and self-
definition of individuals (Dukerich et al, 2002). 
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„The concept of identity helps capture the essence of who people are and, thus, why they do what 
they do –it is at the core of why people join organizations and why they voluntarily leave, why they 
approach their work the way they do and why they interact with others the way they do during that 
work‟ (Ashforth, 2008). 
 
2.3 Theories about Organizational Identities evolution 
 
The above-mentioned plurality of ―static‖ identity definitions implies higher difficulty in describing 
how identity changes. According to Empson ―very little is known about the process by which OI 
emerges and changes over time‖ (Empson, 2004). The need of empirical longitudinal studies into OI 
change has been recently argued (Gioia et al, 2000, Hogg & Terry, 2000). 
During organizational changes (for instance after an M&A) managers should put attention to 
identity evolution: this process has been defined ―identity regulation‖ (Alvesson and Willmott, 
2002). 
A different point of view is the Empson‘s one. She proposed a framework to analyze the process of 
identity regulation: it is viewed as an alignment process among Managers‘ aspirational 
organizational image, evolving organizational identity and organizational members‘ self-concepts 
(Empson, 2004). 
Identity studies gives answers to questions about central organization‟s reason of existing such as 
"Who are we as an organization?" or "Who do we want to be as an organization?" (Albert and 
Whetten, 1985). From a methodological point of view, the research questions are “why” questions 
(Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Gioia, Schultz, and Corley, 2000). There is a 
gap regarding researches answering to “how” questions. 
Most research on organizational identity change has analyzed mergers and acquisitions (Barney, 
1998), the creation of a new organizational structures (Brown and Gioia, 2002), organizational 
identity change in a subtractive change context as a spin-off. Corley and Gioia argue that corporate 
spin-off are often analyzed in relation to the financial and that a case study of the spin-off of a 
Fortune 100 firm's top-performing unit into its own wholly independent organization can contribute 
to solve a literature gap (Corley and Gioia, 2004). 
Albert and Whetten argued that change occurred over long periods of time and Dutton and 
Dukerich's, examining the case of New York/New Jersey Port Authority, argued that there is a 
relationship between members' sense of outsiders' perceptions (named "construed external image") 
of the organization and organizational identity perceptions. When these two perceptions differ 
people will questioned about identity (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991). 
Another empirical study about the relationship between organizational identity and change analyzes 
a large public research university and demonstrates that identity was fluid and capable of rapid 
change. Managers were able to project a desired future image destabilizing current perceptions of 
identity and motivating people to support strategic change (Gioia and Thomas, 1996). 
The introduction of a total quality management (TQM) system and its effects on organizational 
identity was provided by Reger et al. This study is important because emphasizes the role of identity 
regulation in a change management process (Reger et al., 1994). 
The importance of the perceived level of dissonance between the identity and the reputational 
feedback as a motivation to re-define self-organizational identity, finds another confirmation in a 
study regarding members of top-20 business schools (Elsbach and Kramer, 1996). 
An explication of identity change as an alignment between organizational identity and construed 
external image was provided in 2000. Authors argued that from this comparison can emerge a sense 
of discrepancy (and motivation to change) or a sense of alignment that tends to strengthen 
organizational identity (Gioia, Schultz, and Corley, 2000). 
Recently, the evolution of organizational identity after a merger has been defined as transitional 
identity (an interim sense held by members about what their organizations were becoming) (Clark, 
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Gioia et Al., 2010). Authors adopted a grounded theory approach to study the merger between two 
rival healthcare organizations. Their investigation revealed that the emergence of a transitional 
identity was critical to moving the change process forward. The transitional identity allowed 
suspending preexisting organizational identities and work toward creating a new identity. The 
transitional identity was ambiguous enough to allow multiple interpretations, but not so ambiguous 
as to be threateningly unfamiliar. They presented a process model of organizational identity change 
during the merger (see following figure). 
 
 
 
Figure 1 (Clark et Al., 2010, pag. 426) 
 
According to this model, the effort of creating a new, shared identity is balanced between ―Sources 
of identity Inertia‖ and ―Enablers of identity changes‖. 
 
2.4 The intentional management of Multiple Organizational 
Identities after a Merger and Acquisition 
 
According to Pratt and Corley, ―…mergers and acquisitions are likely to increase the number of 
identities that characterize the combined organization‖ (Pratt and Corley, 2007). Many authors 
consider Organizational Identity as ―multiple‖ in all organizations and their management as a key 
managerial challenge for modern organizations (Cheney, 1991). Pratt and Foreman classify four 
ways to manage multiple organizational identities: deletion (one or more identities are removed), 
integration (OIs are fused into one), compartmentalization (OIs are maintained but separately) and 
aggregation (OIs are maintained but linked) (Pratt and Foreman, 2000). Pratt and Corley argued that 
the management of multiple organizational identities could be driven by identities conflicts and 
ambiguity at the organizational level (Pratt and Corley, 2007). Evidence of conflicts among 
members generated by the existence of multiple organizational identities is reported (Golden-Biddle 
and Rao, 1997; Pratt and Rafaeli, 1997). Pratt and Foreman suggested that is critical how multiple 
organizational identities are managed and not their mere existences (Pratt and Foreman, 2000).  
Albert and Whetten suggest that organizational identity is at least ―dual‖ and explained how is 
possible to analyze the organizational identity way of changing from a starting point ―normative‖ (as 
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a church) to an ―utilitarian‖ (as a business) evolution (and vice versa) using the life cycle of 
organization as a framework and that in the whole life of companies co-exist several, multiple 
identity (Albert and Whetten, 2000). 
They argue that all organizations (―normative‖ or ―utilitarian‖) tend to assume a dual identity even if 
the evolution is different in at least 5 environmental contexts.  
Albert and Whetten suggest that identity will be salient when organizations are forming, if the 
organization loses a sustaining element (for instance the founder), when the organization loses itself 
reason for existing, when the organization has a extremely rapid growth, when a relevant change (as 
M&A) happens, in a retrenchment period (Albert and Whetten, 2000). 
In the following figure are described only paths that start form a ―Normative‖ status of organization. 
 
 
Figure 2 Organizational Identity Change and life cycle (Albert and Whetten, 2000, pag. 100) 
 
It‟s clear from this chart that during the whole organization‟s life cycle two different identities co-
exist. Authors distinguish two forms of duality: holographic and ideographic. While in holographic 
duality “each unit within the organization exhibit both identities, in ideographic duality “each unit 
within the organization exhibit only one identity that differs from unit to unit. 
According to Albert and Whetten, “the ideographic dual identity is analogous to Thompson‟s 
concept of buffering an organization‟s core technology with support systems in that the central 
mission of the organization is sheltered from external demands by a cadre of specialist who are only 
marginally involved in the core activities and ideology of organization”. These people have a 
commitment on their professional role more than on central values of organization. 
The ideographic form has the advantage of being better prepared to monitor diverse environmental 
conditions but also the disadvantage of higher difficulties in gaining commitment from 
organization‟s members. 
 
The following matrix tries to draw graphically four different situation form mono-identity to 
multiple identities. One of the case studies‟ results could be understand how the evolution of 
organizational identity after a merge can move among these different situations.   
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Figure 3: Holographic and ideographic identities 
 
A recent study analyzes what happens when an organization begin to exist and 
how is possible to forge an identity illustrating a case study about a distinctive 
new college (Gioia et Al, 2010). The process (as appears in the figure below) is 
the result of a grounded approach and is articulated in 8 steps: (1) articulating a 
vision, (2) experiencing a meanings void, (3) engaging in experiential contrasts, 
and (4) converging on a consensual identity—plus four recurrent processes that 
were associated with two or more of the sequential stages: (5) negotiating identity 
claims, (6) attaining optimal distinctiveness, (7) performing liminal actions, and 
(8) assimilating legitimizing feedback. The four more sequential steps (see figure 
below) reflect a parallel with individual process of identity formation. The 
findings of this paper suggest that ―Organizational identity is progressively, even 
continuously, negotiated by organization members—via their interactions with 
each other and with external stakeholders‖ and that ―internal and external, as well 
as micro and macro influences affected the forging of an organizational identity‖. 
Authors argued also that industry categorization and vision act to constrain the 
range of possible identities. 
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Figure 4 (Gioia et Al, 2010) 
 
Ambiguity of organizational identity 
 
The integration process after an acquisition includes hence an intentional management of different 
organizational identities. The co-existence of multiple organizational identities causes ambiguity in 
combined firm‟s members. 
Corley and Gioia defined identity ambiguity, as “a collective state wherein organization members 
found themselves without a good sense of who they were … or a sense of what the future held for 
them as an organization”. In their case study, new identity was the independent organization that 
arises during and after the spin-off (Corley and Gioia, 2004). The interesting framework proposed in 
that paper to describe identity changes (after a spin-off) is shown in the following figure. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Organizational Identity change process (Corley and Gioia, 2004, pag. 185) 
 
In the framework above the organizational identity change process describes how pre-spin-off 
identity becomes post-spin-off identity. It happens in three phases: triggers of identity ambiguity (1), 
identity change context (2), leaders‟ responses to sensegiving imperative (3). The central phase 
describes the way of transformation of an ambiguous situation in a sensegiving one. 
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This framework was obtained by authors in an inductive way: they interviewed managers that led 
spin-off and asked to them who could give interesting information about identity evolution. So they 
did new interviews and asked new advises and so on. In this way they obtained 1
st
 order concepts, 
grouped in 2
nd
 order themes, grouped in three aggregate dimensions (Corley and Gioia, 2004). 
 
 
Figure 6: 1
st
 and 2
nd
 order Concepts (Corley and Gioia, 2004, pag. 184) 
 
Ambiguity in identity also depends on the strength of “old” identity. When organizational identity of 
former company is strong, it causes a high ambiguity and persists for a long period after 
formalization. In a recent case study is reported the acquisition of Digital Equipment operated by 
Compaq and later by Hewlett-Packard Company. After a decade, the original organizational identity 
was still alive and persisted in the collective memory (Walsh and Glynn, 2008). They define legacy 
organizational identity as the shared claim by former organizational members to “who we were as 
an organization”. 
The response to ambiguity came from a socially negotiated sensemaking or from a deliberate 
sensegiving action. 
 
Sensegiving and sensemaking: intentionality versus social negotiation 
 
Ambiguity can be reduced with a specific effort on language clarification and meaning sharing. 
Change in organizational identity is a process that has a dual nature: language and meanings (Gioia, 
Schultz, and Corley, 2000). Members answer the question "Who are we?" using identity labels but 
each identity label can have multiple meanings associated with it (Corley and Gioia, 2003). So 
change in identity can have two explications: through a change in the labels used to express identity 
or through a change in the meanings of those labels (Gioia, Schultz, and Corley, 2000). 
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Change in the labels emphasizes the importance of managing rhetoric during planned change as 
reported by Fiol's (Fiol, 2002), Ashforth, and Humphrey (Ashforth and Humphrey, 1997). By 
introducing the possibility of a meaning-based identity, change emerges the need of definition of 
sensegiving and sensemaking. Sensegiving can be defined as different from sensemaking: according 
to Weick, by “sensemaking” we define the act of constructing interpretations of ambiguous 
environmental stimuli (Weick, 1995). 
Weick tries to explain the sense of sensemaking using two analogies. First with the game of 
Mastermind, Weick suggests “Mastermind is precisely what sensemaking is not”. In sensemaking, 
people cannot be sure there is a mastercode to be discovered. (Weick, 1995). “What the world is 
made of is itself a question which must be answered in terms of the available conceptual resources 
of science at a particular time” (Fay, 1990). Weick suggests that an analogy that better describes 
sensemaking is the activity of cartography (Weick, 1995). According to Monmonier, (Monmonier, 
1991) “There is some terrain that mapmakers want to represent, and they use various modes of 
projection to make this representation. What they map, however, depends on where they look, how 
they look, what they want to represent, and their tool for representation.”  
In order to clarify the differences between sensemaking and “sensegiving”, we need to define it, for 
example as: “the deliberate attempt to shape the interpretations of others” (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 
1991). These authors proposed a framework to analyze strategic change initiation in a paper that 
reports an ethnographic study in a large public university.  A 4-phases process emerges from the 
study “whereby the CEO and top management team first tried to figure out and ascribe meaning to 
strategy relevant events, threats, opportunities, etc. and then to construct and disseminate a vision 
that stakeholders and constituents could be influenced to comprehend, accept, and act upon to 
initiate desire changes”. The four phases (envisioning, signaling, re-visioning and energizing) show 
that a sensegiving phase follows each sensemaking phase. In the first phase (envisioning) the new 
president collect information about the University that he was going to lead, in the second phase 
(signaling) the new president produced ambiguity and inspiring a positive vision for the future 
(became a top-10 university), in the third phase the president is “a vivid symbol for the change 
effort” and make sense of different realities of the University, in the last “energizing” phase a wider 
commitment for the strategic change take place and this is the moment when the initiation stage ends 
and change starts.   
 
 
Figure 7: Sensemaking and sensegiving (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991, pag. 444) 
 
A similar sequence of sensemaking and sensegiving is shown, in a recent case study about Bang & 
Olufsen, a Danish producer of audio-video systems, Ravasi and Schultz propose an alternative 
framework to explain changes in identity that includes sensegiving. 
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Authors present a longitudinal study that find evidence of the role of organizational culture in 
supporting sensemaking action carried out by leaders and in sensegiving actions. 
 
 
Figure 8 Organizational Response to Identity Threats: A Theoretical Model (Ravasi and 
Schultz, 2006) 
 
This framework suggests that in situation of perceived identity threat a collective recognition of the 
internally and externally directed dynamics of identity. How organization is perceived externally 
(construed external image) and beliefs about idiosyncratic patterns of behavior (organizational 
culture) influence the redefinition of “What we are as an organization” (Ravasi and Schultz, 2006). 
In this study, the sensegiving phase is characterized by the interaction of two deliberate managers‟ 
initiatives: “projecting desired images” in order to energizer members (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991) 
and “embedding claim in organizational culture” illustrating and discussing new identity claims. 
Authors define sense making phase (that comes before sensegiving one in the model) as the process 
by which managers make a revision of the official identity claims.  
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3 Research questions 
 
Previous studies about organizational identity evolution covered explications of how it evolves after 
external threats (Ravasi and Schultz, 2006), after spin off (Corley and Gioia, 2004) or how it is 
forged in new business (Gioia et Al, 2010). Recently transitional identity has been studied using 
M&A as a change context (Clark at Al., 2010). M&As have also been studied, because they 
represent a situation in which multiple identities are merged together and an evolution takes place. 
This plurality of identities is so obvious after an M&A that it should be managed in explicit way. 
The most cited paper on multiple identities (Pratt and Foreman, 2000) provides a classification of 
four managerial responses to these multiple identities.   
This work has the aim to contribute in understanding the evolution of multiple organizational 
identities after an M&A addressing the followings research questions: 
 
How the specific strategic conditions generated after an acquisition can affects 
the appropriateness of managerial responses that consider multiple identities as 
a strategic value? 
 
In order to find evidence to this question I conducted a case study in pharmaceutical industry. 
 
Even if the opportunity and the possibility to manage organizational identity during the integration 
post acquisition should be addressed by the above question, the evolution of organizational identity 
is a social process that takes place during the interaction among people. An acquisition creates a 
condition in which differences among identities are emphasized. So, it becomes important a 
comprehension this social process addressing the following question. 
 
How a managerial response to ambiguity of multiple identities generated after an 
M&A can influence the effectiveness of sensemaking process? 
 
In order to find evidence to this question, I conducted a case study in banking industry described in 
the second part of this work. 
 
The intentionality of this managerial response requires understanding which managerial tools are 
more appropriate. Therefore, I focused on a specific context that often takes place after an 
acquisition and that can be used as a “tool” to help sensemaking. The third case study is based the 
following research question: 
       
How Information Systems adoption, implementation and assimilation contribute 
to sensemaking in Organizational Identity evolution process following an M&A?  
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4 Appropriateness of an “aggregation” managerial response to 
multiple Organizational Identities after Merger & Acquisition in 
pharmaceutical industry.  
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to find evidence of strategic conditions that make appropriate an 
―aggregation‖ managerial response to multiple organizational identities after an M&A. Analyzing 
deeply a case study regarding an acquisition in pharmaceutical industry, I found evidence that an 
aggregation response is appropriate when both high plurality and high synergy are appropriate. 
Using a framework by Pratt and Foreman, I verified that identity plurality was appropriate because 
powerful stakeholders supported the current identities of companies, various stakeholders 
legitimated current identities of companies, current identities had a future strategic value and 
companies hadn‘t strictness of resources constrains. I also verified that identity synergy was 
appropriate because there were compatibility among identities, high interdependence among 
stakeholders and high diffusion of multiple identities across the organizations. These findings can 
contribute to better understand the appropriateness of managerial responses to multiple identities 
that is a need of both scholars and managers in order to improve success likelihood of cultural 
integration between acquired and acquiring firms.  
 
 
 
4.2 Literature review 
 
 
Regarding the strategy of merging the organizational identities of acquiring and acquired, we can 
adopt the classification proposed by Pratt and Foreman (2000): 
 deletion (one or more identities are removed); 
 integration (OIs are fused into one); 
 compartmentalization (OIs are maintained but separately); 
 aggregation (OIs are maintained but linked). 
 
Authors identify these four managerial responses matching two dimensions (plurality of 
Organizational Identities and synergies between Organizational Identities). 
If the appropriateness of plurality of Organizational Identities is low and appropriateness of 
synergies between Organizational Identities are low the resulting managerial responses is the 
deletion (one or more identities are removed). If the appropriateness of plurality of Organizational 
Identities is low and appropriateness of synergies between Organizational Identities are high the 
resulting managerial responses is the integration (OIs are fused into one). If the appropriateness of 
plurality of Organizational Identities is high and appropriateness of synergies between 
Organizational Identities are low the resulting managerial responses is the compartmentalization 
(OIs are maintained but separately). If the appropriateness of plurality of Organizational Identities is 
high and appropriateness of synergies between Organizational Identities are high the resulting 
managerial responses is the aggregation (OIs are maintained but linked). 
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Figure 9 (Pratt and Foreman, 2000, pag. 27) 
 
Literature gap and Research Question 
 
The integration process after an M&A has been studied also in its cultural issues. From a point a 
view of Organizational Identity, an M&A is an interesting opportunity to study the appropriateness 
of managerial responses to merging multiple identities.  Even if previous studies have analyzed 
managerial responses to multiple identities, those responses have received less attention from OI 
researchers in an M&A context.   
In order to achieve a better knowledge of this specific managerial response we address the following 
research question: 
 
“How the strategic conditions following an M&A can affect the appropriateness of a managerial 
response to multiple identities?”      
 
The concept of appropriateness of managerial responses has been studied by Pratt and Foreman. 
Their model identifies four managerial responses to different level of organizational identity 
plurality and synergy and it is based on four variables that have effects on appropriateness of a high 
plurality and three variables that have effects on appropriateness of a high synergy. Within an 
approach that considers M&A as a situation of multiplicity of Organizational Identities, it is possible 
to utilize that model as a framework that explains the appropriateness of the specific managerial 
response during the integration process. 
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Figure 10 Personal interpretation on Pratt and Foreman’s model 
 
 
Different managerial responses to multiple identities are more or less appropriate after an M&A 
combining the seven propositions mentioned above. Therefore, it is possible to re-formulate the 
seven propositions in two groups. 
 
Four propositions describe conditions for identity plurality appropriateness as follows: 
 
P1 The more current identities of companies involved in an M&A are supported by powerful 
stakeholders, the more organizational identity plurality is appropriate. 
 
P2 The more current identities of companies involved in an M&A are legitimated by various 
stakeholders, the more organizational identity plurality is appropriate. 
 
P3 The more current identities of companies involved in an M&A have a future strategic value, 
the more organizational identity plurality is appropriate. 
  
P4 The more the companies involved in an M&A have strictness of resources constrains have a 
future strategic value, the less organizational identity plurality is appropriate. 
  
Three propositions describe conditions for identity synergy appropriateness as follows: 
 
P5 The more current identities of companies involved in an M&A are compatible, the more 
organizational identity synergy is appropriate. 
  
P6 The more interdependence among stakeholders of companies involved in an M&A are high, 
the more organizational identity synergy is appropriate. 
 
P7 The more the diffusion of multiple organizational identities across the company is high, the 
more organizational identity synergy is appropriate. 
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4.3 Methodology 
 
As usual in organizational identity change studies, we chose to do our investigation using a 
qualitative approach.  
Organizations prefer to declare stability in their identity (Whetten and Godfrey, 1998) and therefore 
it can be difficult to observe change in organizational identity. There are no secondary data on 
integration process post-merger, therefore, a direct access to the organizations is necessary. 
According to Yin, case studies methodology is useful for contemporary process (Yin, 2003).  
 
Data Collection 
 
Organizational Identity case studies often use qualitative research instruments. For instance, in Bang 
& Olufsen case study authors use, for each ―step‖ of the model and for each phase of the story, 5 
instruments: semi-structured interviews, Identity Seminars, House Magazine and other internal 
communication tools, Annual Reports and other external communication tools, Corporate histories 
and other archival material (Ravasi and Schultz, 2006). They conducted 50 interviews with 40 
organizational members.  
In order to describe the integration process post-acquisition, we realized 10 semi-structured 
interviews to managers, 20 interviews from employees working in the company and to collected 
internal and external archival data. We used a software for qualitative research to collect and analyze 
data (Nvivo sw). After we upload all transcripts of interviews and all secondary data, we linked each 
sentences or paragraph to a ―node‖. A node is a sort of concept and a paragraph can be linked to one 
or more nodes. A model has been uploaded into the software using the 7 variables that Pratt and 
Foreman proposed and linking them to managerial response through the construct of identity 
plurality and synergy. Then each node has been linked to both variables and managerial response of 
the model, if it made sense. When some node did not find linkages in the model, we try to 
understand if new variable can be added to the model. Therefore, data collection process helps us to 
complete two main tables. A first two-dimensions table (Table 1) that matches nodes emerging from 
interviews or documents and data sources (managers‘ interviews, employees‘ interviews and 
secondary data). A second two-dimensions table that matches those nodes with Pratt and Foreman‘s 
theoretical model (Table 2).  
 
 
4.4 A case study on managerial response to multiple identities 
after an M&A 
 
Merck: a company founded in 1641 
 
In 1641, Friedrich Merck, following an apprenticeship in a pharmacy in Schweinfurt, leaved his 
home. After having managed the court pharmacy in Danzig and having owned a pharmacy in 
Wesselburen, Schleswig-Holstein, he moved to Darmstadt in the 1660s. In 1654, with permission 
from Landgrave Georg II, the court pharmacist Samuel Bockler sets up Darmstadt‟s second public 
apothecary on Schlossgraben. In 1668, Friedrich Merck acquires the “Angel Apotheke”. Here lie the 
roots of Merck, the world oldest pharmaceutical-chemical company. In the 17
th
 century, pharmacists 
used plants, animals and minerals to prepare medicinal products. Quality and price control were 
regulated by pharmacy order and taxes. In 1678, Friedrich Merck, who died without an heir, was 
succeeded by his nephew Georg Friedrich Merck. In 1682 he received permission from the 
landgrave to continue operating the Angel Pharmacy, Darmstadt‟s second public pharmacy and 
competitor to the older “Hof-Apotheke”. At the turn of the 18th century, major changes are made to 
drug legislation. Government regulation of medical professions is increased, institutional supply of 
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the population is regulated, standardized and professionalized by social and health policy measures 
of the Medical Police. The sale of medicines by “charlatans, barber surgeons and mongers” is highly 
restricted. This strengthens the position, image and profits of pharmacies, primarily in cities with 
more wealthy inhabitants, provided that entrepreneurial farsightedness is used to apply the new 
rules. The young “Angel Pharmacy enterprise” can lay the foundations for its future.  In the mid-19th 
century, the pharmacy becomes an industrial company. The multinational development had a break 
due to the world wars. As a German company, Merck suffers the lost of many companies including 
the US assets. During the 50s Merck realizes re-acquisitions in some countries. In 1972, the interest 
in the Italian Bracco Company increased and the equity owned by Merck is at 50% level. In 1995, 
Merck KGaA was founded: it was one of the largest chemical global companies. Merck family 
maintains the ownership. In 2000, Merck leave it interest in Bracco. Merck did a spin off from a 
middle size Italian company based in Florence area (MOLTENI). So, Merck Pharma spa was 
founded in the same area. During 2000s years pigments facilities are developed and oncological 
treatment are registered. In 2006, Merck KGaA tried to acquire with a hostile offer, the German 
Company Schering for 14,6 billions of euro but that offer failed. On June 2007, after acquisition of 
Serono, Merck was included in DAX index that groups the 30 largest companies of the German 
Stock Exchange. In June 2010, Merck KGaA completes Millipore Acquisition and Launches New 
Merck Millipore Division. This transaction creates EUR 2.1 billion (US$2.9 billion) world-class 
partner for the Life Science sector. Merck Chemicals today comprises two new divisions: Merck 
Millipore and Performance Materials, 
 
 
Serono: a company founded in 1906 
Professor Cesare Serono, was born in a noble family in Torino on October 19
th
 1871. I worked as a 
professor at Torino University within the chemical faculty. His studies were published in 1897. He 
was a pioneer in the field of biological medicine, a methodology that uses treatments extracted from 
animals. Professor Serono founded a large laboratory in Torino. In 1906, he moved to Rome and 
there he founded a new company: Istituto Farmacologico Serono. In 1911, Bioplastina had a large 
commercial success. Professor Serono was also elected in the Parliament. In 1952, when Professor 
Serono died, Vatican took the control of the Company and his assistant Pietro Bertarelli became 
CEO. In 1965, Serono produced Pergonal, a treatment against infertility registered in USA. In the 
same year died Pietro Bertarelli. In 1971, a factory was opened in Boston. The company, owned by 
Bertarelli family moved in 1977 to Genève. In 1992, a factory was opened in Bari and in 1993, 
Ernesto Bertarelli, at the age of 31, became the CEO. In 2001 SERONO placed on US market a drug 
against sclerosis: Rebif. After a litigation with Biogen (producer of a similar drug Avonex) the US 
Food & Drug Administration decided that Serono‟s Rebif was more effective. Sales grow of 12.4%. 
In 2005, Serono paid a sanction of 704 million dollars in order to avoid a lawsuit due to a litigation 
against US Justice Department, about the way of selling Serostim. This expansive drug, based on the 
growth hormone, was used by HIV patient to fight weight losing. Serono was accused to provide a 
software not approved by Food and Drug Administration in order to improve Serostim sales. Serono 
was excluded by all federal programs except Medicare e Medicaid. At the end of 2005, Bertarelli 
offered the company to prospects buyers. On December 27
th,
 the SonntagsZeitung reports rumors 
about an interest of Novartis. Nine months later, on September 20th 2006, Merck announced the 
acquisition of Serono for 10,6 billion of euro. 
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Merck‟s acquisition of Serono 
 
On September 20
th
 2006, Merck offered CHF 1,100 per share in cash with an agreement with the 
Bertarelli family members who gave Merck access to 64.5% of the capital of Serono and 75.5% of 
the voting rights. A public tender offer at the same price followed. The acquisition price valued 
Serono at €10.6 billion equity value with a 20% premium over share price as of September 20th. 
The group Merck is organized in pharmaceutical and chemical activities. Its pharmaceutical 
activities are shared in three divisions: Ethicals (now Merck Serono division), Generics, Consumer 
Health Care. In ethical division, treatment against cancer and cardio-metabolic diseases were the 
core products. The chemical business is organized in two divisions: Liquid Crystals and 
Performance and Life Science (where Laboratory Business, Life Science Solutions and Pigments are 
grouped since 2006). 
After the acquisition, Merck Serono S.A. has been combined with Merck Ethicals division and 
operates as the new Merck Serono division within the Pharmaceuticals business sector of Merck 
KGaA. The headquarters of this division has been moved to Geneva, Switzerland. This move has 
created a leading global supplier of biopharmaceutical products with sales (2005) of around EUR 
3.6 billion and about 14,500 employees worldwide. The R&D budget amounts to about EUR 1 
billion. 
 
4.5 Findings 
 
In this section, we report evidences from case study. The analysis of different data (secondary data, 
interviews to managers and to employees) has been conducted in three phases. First, in each 
transcript, different statements have been linked to different 1
st
 order concepts (nodes). Then, each 
1
st
 order concept has been linked to a more general 2
nd
 order concept. Finally, 2
nd
 order concepts 
have been linked to one or more Pratt and Foreman‘s model. Findings are described using quotes 
from interviews and secondary data in order to explain (i) the Organizational Identity evolution, (ii) 
the managerial response to multiple identities, (iii) the appropriateness of plurality, (iv) the 
appropriateness of synergy.  
 
4.5.1 Content analysis 
 
The following table summarized findings of that process. Narratives from interviews are reported in 
Italian language because in organizational identity definition words are important. Therefore, it is 
better to avoid any form of translation.  
In order to allow a comprehension of results each narrative has been identified in the third column 
by a node that is reported in English language. 
In pharagraphs that follow these tables (4.5.2, 4.5.3 and 4.5.4), each node and concepts is analyzed 
in detail in order to give an interpretation of these high number of narratives that have been collected 
with ―open‖ interviews as usual in this kind of studies.  
 
Source Narrative Node 
employees 
interview 
Il "noi" lo utilizzo spesso per identificare la Merck Serono e qualche 
volta l'intero gruppo Merck Italia e worldwide. In ogni caso "noi" non è 
il dipartimento dove lavoro, ma semmai l'intera azienda. 
"we" boundaries 
employees 
interview 
Se Lei parlando dell'azienda usa il "noi" si riferisce al suo 
Dipartimento, comprende anche i colleghi di altri siti (commerciali, 
produttivi, di ricerca), comprende anche il gruppo Merck worldwide o 
solo l'Italia? Generalmente con "noi" mi riferisco alla divisione farma 
"we" boundaries 
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(mserono) ma mi sono accorta di aver detto a degli amici  che" il 
magnum gold è fatto con un colore nostro". 
employees 
interview 
Se Lei parlando dell'azienda usa il "noi" si riferisce al suo 
Dipartimento, comprende anche i colleghi di altri siti (commerciali, 
produttivi, di ricerca), comprende anche il gruppo Merck worldwide o 
solo l'Italia? Al gruppo Merck Serono Italia. 
"we" boundaries 
employees 
interview 
Se Lei parlando dell'azienda usa il "noi" si riferisce al suo 
Dipartimento, comprende anche i colleghi di altri siti (commerciali, 
produttivi, di ricerca), comprende anche il gruppo Merck worldwide o 
solo l'Italia? Mi riferisco all'azienda nella sua globalità: le nostre 
vicende "nazionali" sono così legate alle scelte internazionali che non 
si potrebbe fare altrimenti.  
"we" boundaries 
employees 
interview 
Se Lei parlando dell'azienda usa il "noi" si riferisce al suo 
Dipartimento, comprende anche i colleghi di altri siti (commerciali, 
produttivi, di ricerca), comprende anche il gruppo Merck worldwide o 
solo l'Italia? Solitamente lo associo all' entità legale MercK Serono. Lo 
sento in ogni caso mio, come un senso di appartenenza e di 
riconoscimento nell' organizzazione. 
"we" boundaries 
employees 
interview 
Parlando del noi mi riferisco alla MerckSerono, Italia prima e 
gruppo poi, più difficilemte al gruppo Merck in generale. 
"we" boundaries 
employees 
interview 
Se Lei parlando dell'azienda usa il "noi" si riferisce al suo 
Dipartimento, comprende anche i colleghi di altri siti (commerciali, 
produttivi, di ricerca), comprende anche il gruppo Merck worldwide o 
solo l'Italia? Tendenzialmente mi riferisco ai prodotti, quindi 
all'azienda worldwide anche se parlando di operatività è più facile che 
mi riferisca prevalentemente all'Italia. 
"we" boundaries 
employees 
interview 
Di solito uso il “noi” per riferirmi a tutti i dipartimenti che si 
trovano presso la nostra sede. In un contesto più allargato posso 
comprendere anche gli stabilimenti produttivi, ubicati sul territorio 
nazionale. Raramente utilizzo il “noi” per intendere Merck worldwide.    
"we" boundaries 
employees 
interview 
Personalmente quando parlo di noi intendo rappresentare TUTTI 
coloro che, quali dipendenti piuttosto che consulenti, outsourcer etc, 
si adoperano per raggiungere la mission del Gruppo a livello mondiale. 
"we" boundaries 
employees 
interview 
Si respirava da tempo un'aria di cambiamento imminente, qualcosa 
doveva succedere. La notizia l'ho vista da agenzie di comunicazione su 
internet prima che fosse diffusa internamente. 
Ambiguity 
employees 
interview 
Sono venuta a conoscenza dell'acquisizione prima attraverso canali 
informali, poi ufficiali. All'inizio ero un po' preoccupata in merito alla 
scelta della sede italiana. In ogni caso tra i possibili acquirenti, la Merck 
Kgaa era sicuramente la migliore dal punto di vista della gestione  delle 
acquisizioni. 
Ambiguity 
employees 
interview 
Nel dettaglio il giorno dopo la notizia la sales force è stata 
convocata in sede e rassicurata sui loro posti di lavoro, mettendolo in 
prima priorità rispetto a tutto il resto. Un gesto che denota 
un'attenzione alle persone non comune. 
Ambiguity 
management 
interview 
Siamo rimasti perplessi. E' vero che sono prodotti specialistici ma i 
margini sono molto più alti. Capivamo che la nostra realtà si sarebbe 
modificata. 
Ambiguity 
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management 
interview 
L'ambiguità era nel fatto che non sono state dichiarate queste cose 
in modo esplicito, ma il lavoro è stato fatto bene per ottenere il 
risultato atteso. 
Ambiguity 
management 
interview 
Stavamo facendo un corso di formazione e le persone volevano 
sospendere il corso. La perplessità veniva dal fatto che poco prima 
Bertarelli aveva detto che voleva acquistare come Serono nuove 
realtà. Poi è stato il contrario. Non sapevamo quale Merck era, tedesca 
o americana. Poi si sono chiariti i ruoli. 
Ambiguity 
management 
interview 
Il processo di integrazione è andato bene, le criticità si sono 
verificate quando la comunicazione non arrivava a tutti i livelli 
aziendali. Ciò creava un'ambiguità ed un "vociare" e talora il panico 
(andremo a Milano? Chi sarà l'AD?). 
Ambiguity 
management 
interview 
Quando è arrivata la notizia non era chiaro a chi eravamo stati venduti. 
Sono usciti vari nomi. L'informativa non era precisa. Dopo alcuni mesi 
è uscita fuori la notizia ufficiale. Essere acquisiti da Pfizer … Dipende 
dalla nazionalità della acquirente. L'approccio è stato soft, di 
condivisione, di ricerca di valori sia dell'una che dell'altra. 
Ambiguity 
management 
interview 
C'erano da tempo voci di acquisizioni da fare o subire. Ambiguity 
management 
interview 
All'inizio la scelta di Roma aveva portato un po' di paura. La gente ha 
continuato a lavorare serenamente anche quando erano voci. 
Ambiguity 
management 
interview 
A Bari c'è stato timore di perdere posti di lavoro. Ambiguity 
management 
interview 
Noi abbiamo saputo dell’acquisizione in modo “divertente” dalla 
stampa. Divertente perché io ero con un collega di Ginevra e al 
momento questo collega ha ricevuto una mail e ha detto “ci hanno 
acquisito”. Sembrava all’inizio che fosse la Merck americana e quindi la 
preoccupazione c’era. Poi nella giornata si è chiarito che era la Merck 
tedesca.  
Ambiguity 
management 
interview 
Partecipare ad un processo di acquisizione è interessante ma non è 
facile, non sai chi c’è dall’altra parte. 
Ambiguity 
employees 
interview 
Ci sono state diverse occasioni che mi hanno fatto pensare al binomio 
"me e azienda" in questi due anni e mezzo. 
me and the 
company 
employees 
interview 
Per la verità sapevo solo che era l'azienda a cui era stata tolta la parte 
americana dopo la guerra mondiale, andando a costituire un'altra 
multinazionale del farmaco. 
People didn't 
know Merck 
employees 
interview 
Conosceva il gruppo Merck prima dell'acquisizione? Se sì, in cosa si 
distingueva rispetto alle altre aziende del settore?  Conoscevo 
l'Azienda Merck per la realtà generici. 
People didn't 
know Merck 
employees 
interview 
Ho preso parte a numerose Task Force internazionali e ho avuto 
modo di lavorare per un periodo presso la sede centrale in Svizzera: 
questo è il vantaggio di lavorare in un contesto veramente 
internazionale.   Conoscevo Merck Chemical per il mio background di 
Chimico Farmaceutico. Non posso affermare che conoscessi il settore 
farmaceutico Merck. Nel contesto nazionale non è cambiato nulla. In 
quello internazionale la proprietà è meno presente, rispetto alla realtà 
Serono, in quanto rappresentata da altre figure di top management.  
People didn't 
know Merck 
employees 
interview 
Conosceva il gruppo Merck prima dell'acquisizione? Se sì, in cosa si 
distingueva rispetto alle altre aziende del settore? No, purtroppo no. 
People didn't know 
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employees 
interview 
Conosceva il gruppo Merck prima dell'acquisizione? Se sì, in cosa si 
distingueva rispetto alle altre aziende del settore? Ad essere sincera 
non molto, per le sue aree terapeutiche storiche non era tra i nostri 
diretti competitors. Ho iniziato a raccogliere informazioni a seguito 
delle prime voci sui possibili acquirenti 
People didn't 
know Merck 
employees 
interview 
Conosceva il gruppo Merck prima dell'acquisizione? Se sì, in cosa si 
distingueva rispetto alle altre aziende del settore? Ne conoscevo il 
nome ma non avevo informazioni particolari 
People didn't 
know Merck 
employees 
interview 
Può raccontare come e quando è venuto a conoscenza 
dell’acquisizione e se il suo parere in merito è mutato nel corso del 
tempo? Indirettamente, da articoli in materia di fusioni-acquisizioni in 
ambito farmaceutico, su riviste specializzate. 
People didn't 
know Merck 
employees 
interview 
Conosceva il gruppo Merck prima dell’acquisizione? Se sì, in cosa si 
distingueva rispetto alle altre aziende del settore?No non lo 
conoscevo. 
People didn't 
know Merck 
employees 
interview 
Non conoscevo il gruppo Merck prima dell'acquisizione ma 
conoscevo "per sentito dire" la Serono, che è sempre stata 
all'avanguardia e precorrente i tempi rispetto alle altre aziende in 
termini di organizzazione e di strategie di marketing. 
People didn't 
know Merck 
management 
interview 
Io non conoscevo Merck. Perché in Italia era piccola. Una realtà da 
50 dipendenti contro 800 di serono. L'approccio Merck è un approccio 
misto in termini di sviluppo e di obiettivi di sviluppo perché continua a 
mantenere un occhio sul mercato più consumer del farmaco. Posso 
dedurre che avesse un'identità chimico farmaceutica. Produrre 
pigmenti o cristalli liquidi è diverso da produrre farmaci. E'stato un 
impatto importante, anche se in alcune regioni questo mix è stato più 
forte da noi è separato. 
People didn't 
know Merck 
employees 
interview 
Può raccontare come e quando è venuto a conoscenza 
dell'acquisizione e se il suo parere in merito è mutato nel corso del 
tempo? Sono venuta a conoscenza dell'acquisizione a settembre 2006, 
mentre ero in ferie……ho appreso la notizia dal superiore di allora e dai 
giornali. Mi sono tenuta costantemente aggiornata sul processo di 
integrazione e il mio parere non è mutato. 
Surprise 
employees 
interview 
Può raccontare come e quando è venuto a conoscenza 
dell'acquisizione e se il suo parere in merito è mutato nel corso del 
tempo? Come gran parte dei dipendenti, l'acquisizione è stata 
comunicata attraverso una mail nel settembre del 2006 da parte della 
proprietà di Serono.  
Surprise 
employees 
interview 
Può raccontare come e quando è venuto a conoscenza 
dell'acquisizione e se il suo parere in merito è mutato nel corso del 
tempo? Dalle conoscenze appartenenti al mondo farmaceutico. Il mio 
parere non è mutato. 
Surprise 
management 
interview 
Alla fine del 2006 in realtà per quanto mi riguarda (sono in Serono 
dal 2004 con uno stage nelle RU, ho avuto la fortuna di seguire il 
processo di integrazione nel 2006 con un ruolo trasversale, venivo 
dall'Università, mi sono occupata di sindacato, trasferimenti) l'ho 
saputo per email il giorno stesso che è stata pubblicata la notizia. 
Surprise 
management 
interview 
A Valencia Bertarelli ha affermato che voleva acquisire e noi 
abbiamo rassicurato tutti. 
Surprise 
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management 
interview 
L'acquisizione è stata improvvisa. La trattativa è stata tra Bertarelli 
e la famiglia Merck. 
Surprise 
management 
interview 
La cessione è stata comunicata via mail poi Ernesto ha presentato i 
nuovi proprietari. Ci sono stati anche 13 miliardi di dollari per 
Bertarelli. 
Surprise 
management 
interview 
In realtà noi ci aspettavamo di acquisire quindi ci ha colto un po’ di 
sorpresa. 
Surprise 
management 
interview 
Una caratteristica comune alle due aziende è la forte UMANITA'. I 
risultati sono importanti ma le due aziende valorizzano le persone. 
Anche le uscite sono state seguite da vicino. Abbiamo vissuto il ritiro di 
un prodotto dal mercato e le persone sono state ricollocate. Il turn 
over resta basso, quindi forse le persone sentono l'azienda "vicina". 
Common aspects 
management 
interview 
Qui parliamo di un settore dove le identità sono similari. Lo stile 
potrebbe essere diverso ma passare da una all'altra nel farmaceutico, 
le persone si aspettano di verificare se l'identità cambia. Spesso non 
sono cambiamenti sconvolgenti. Sono più i valori che grandi 
trasformazioni. La salute del paziente ed un branding è l'obiettivo di 
ogni azienda farmaceutica. Il paziente non ha interesse per il profitto. 
Common aspects 
management 
interview 
I business erano complementari e questo ha favorito. Complementariety 
of business 
management 
interview 
Quando è arrivata la notizia non era chiaro a chi eravamo stati 
venduti. Sono usciti vari nomi. L'informativa non era precisa. Dopo 
alcuni mesi è uscita fuori la notizia ufficiale. Essere acquisiti da Pfizer … 
Dipende dalla nazionalità della acquirente. L'approccio è stato soft, di 
condivisione, di ricerca di valori sia dell'una che dell'altra. 
National 
compatibility 
management 
interview 
E' da apprezzare questo pragmatismo tedesco: le linee guida sono 
chiare ed irrinunciabili, le scelte operative, se opportunamente 
supportate, possono essere localmente differenziate. 
National 
compatibility 
management 
interview 
Componente tedesca, concentrazione sui risultati senza 
penalizzare dipendenti. C'è una grande attenzione al rispetto delle 
procedure. 
National 
compatibility 
management 
interview 
Noi abbiamo saputo dell’acquisizione in modo “divertente” dalla 
stampa. Divertente perché io ero con un collega di Ginevra e al 
momento questo collega ha ricevuto una mail e ha detto “ci hanno 
acquisito”. Sembrava all’inizio che fosse la Merck americana e quindi la 
preoccupazione c’era. Poi nella giornata si è chiarito che era la Merck 
tedesca.  
National 
compatibility 
management 
interview 
Merck era un’azienda più chimica tedesca quindi pragmatico con 
un concetto di prendere decisioni più lentamente ma con una storia ed 
una cultura solida. 
National 
compatibility 
management 
interview 
Tra i diversi siti  c’è separazione, non solo fisica: è la nostra sfida. 
Prima in Serono la separazione era forte, ora ci viene richiesta una 
maggiore autonomia. E’ un processo difficile perché ognuno vuole la 
sua autonomia.  
Departement are 
still separated 
employees 
interview 
Ho pensato molto a questa domanda ma sinceramente non ho 
sono riuscito ad identificare dei gruppi sociali all'interno della Merck 
Serono. 
Internal 
differences 
management 
interview 
Sono state create delle fonti informative sull'acquisizione ed alla 
trasparenza. Ognuno era affezionato al proprio modello organizzativo. 
Erano profondamente diversi. La capacità nei confronti dei dipendenti 
Internal 
differences 
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è stata quella di dare l'impressione di fare qualcosa di trasparente. 
management 
interview 
All'interno delle SBU in Merck c'erano tutte le funzioni tranne 
business access e HR ma per le paghe. Ora queste funzioni sono state 
centralizzate anche perché sono di più i business. Ancora i meccanismi 
non funzionano bene. Noi dobbiamo sopperire a carenze delle funzioni 
trasversali. 
Internal 
differences 
management 
interview 
Gradualmente l'integrazione avviene e quindi più passa il tempo e 
meno si sentono differenze. Ci sono state all'inizio perché erano realtà 
diverse come modello organizzativo come dimensioni. Se in Merck 
potevo prendermi dei rischi, ora una divisione non può correre lo 
stesso rischio perché gli altri business sono connessi. Questa 
dimensione dell'azienda comporta un cambiamento di prospettiva. 
Abbiamo dovuto adattarci a questa nuova realtà: corretta ma nuova.  
Anche se Serono era più agile nella decisione, sugli aspetti operativi ci 
sono maggiori procedure, ma questo è corretto. 
Internal 
differences 
employees 
interview 
Marketing e vendite, esterni (forza vendita sul territorio) , 
Carrieristi come gruppo c'è ma non credo sia distintivo dell'azienda 
(esiste un'azienda dove non ci sono?) e amministrativi sono tre gruppi 
sociali in azienda 
Multiple identities 
employees 
interview 
Se dovesse definire i principali gruppi sociali esistenti in MERCK-
SERONO "Conservatori" (ancora ancorati all'Azienza Serono) ed Gli 
"Innovatori" (aperti al cambiamento) 
Multiple identities 
employees 
interview 
Se dovesse definire i principali gruppi sociali esistenti in MERCK-
SERONO quali indicherebbe? (ad esempio ricercatori, commerciali, 
"vecchia guardia", "carrieristi", …) Marketing-Commerciale, 
Ricercatori, Informatori, Personale Amministrativo. 
Multiple identities 
employees 
interview 
Se dovesse definire i principali gruppi sociali esistenti in MERCK-
SERONO quali indicherebbe? (ad esempio ricercatori, commerciali, 
"vecchia guardia", "carrieristi", …) Non ho percezione di gruppi 
particolarmente caratterizzati. 
Multiple identities 
employees 
interview 
I principali gruppi sociali esistenti: ci sono tutte le tipologie, in 
generale non mi sembra di notare eccessi (tipo il carrierista senza 
scrupoli...) 
Multiple identities 
employees 
interview 
Non sono a conoscenza della presenza di particolari gruppi “sociali” 
in azienda.  
Multiple identities 
employees 
interview 
I principali gruppi sociali esistenti in MERCK-SERONO: Personale 
viaggiante, Ricercatori, “Vecchia guardia”, “Carrieristi Rampanti” 
Multiple identities 
management 
interview 
I ricercatori non sono in questo building, loro sono ad Ivrea, a 
Tiburtina e produzione a Bari, ma noi non abbiamo rapporti con LORO. 
Può capitare una volta all'anno che ci incontriamo. E' vero che 
formalmente sono coordinati dal Country manager Antonio Messina 
che è anche il mio capo, ma per i loro progetti riportano anche a casa 
madre. 
Multiple identities 
management 
interview 
Le due identità si sono integrate con equilibrio. Le identità si 
stanno amalgamando senza grossi conflitti. 
Multiple identities 
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management 
interview 
Certamente i ricercatori hanno priorità diverse dai commerciali e 
dal personale di supporto. In fondo per un commerciale se un 
prodotto viene fabbricato a Bari o altrove non cambia granché. Le 
persone del mio settore (amministrazione, finanza e controllo) sono 
più abituate anche perché se, per esempio, accade un infortunio a 
Bari, il primo ad essere informato sono io per via di assicurazioni e via 
dicendo. 
Multiple identities 
management 
interview 
Non è facile integrare i vari siti con le funzioni centrali. Forse è 
ancora più difficile perché le identità e le culture sono diverse. 
Multiple identities 
management 
interview 
 I nostalgici ci sono sempre la ormai il cambiamento è irreversibile. Multiple identities 
employees 
interview 
L'organizzazione in silos delle Business Unit e la presenza di medici 
solo all'interno della business unit. 
Serono had 
separated 
Departments 
management 
interview 
Nel momento in cui era Serono c'era una particolarità. In Italia nel 
2004 c'erano 2 direzioni RU (una marketing ed una di shared services 
ed erano separati con due general manager ). Dal 2006 questo non c'è 
più ma con grande autonomia tra marketing produzione e ricerca. Con 
l'acquisizione Merck ha voluto un solo referente. Questo è stato un 
primo messaggio forte di cambiamento. 
Serono had 
separated 
Departments 
management 
interview 
E' vero che prevale la separazione. Forse dipende più dai 
responsabili di sito che vedono come una minaccia la centralizzazione 
di alcune competenze. Devo dire che per ciò che riguarda 
l'amministrazione ed il controllo o l'assistenza legale o le relazioni 
sindacali la necessità di unità centrali è abbastanza condivisa. Per l'HR 
meno perché il responsabile di sito non vuole delegare questa forma di 
potere e ritiene che la vicinanza fisica con i collaboratori giustifichi la 
gestione delle risorse decentrata. Questo è vero ma vi sono attività 
che necessariamente una grande azienda deve centralizzare per 
garantire possibilità di sviluppo alle persone anche al di fuori della 
divisione di appartenenza. Sarà forse più difficile arrivare ad una 
responsabilità HR Italia per via degli equilibri personali. Ma ci 
arriveremo … 
Serono had 
separated 
Departments 
management 
interview 
E’ stata una scelta mirata, nel giro di un anno Merck ha riassorbito i 
debiti derivanti dall’acquisizione. 
Good cash flow 
employees 
interview 
Non sono stato direttamente coinvolto nell'integrazione dei sistemi 
informativi ma credo che sia uno dei modi per migliorare ancora di più 
l'integrazione all'interno del gruppo Merck. Sicuramente comporterà 
un dispendio di energie importante ma alla fine, secondo me, ne varrà 
la pena in termini di integrazione tra le persone. 
Information 
systems integration 
employees 
interview 
A Suo avviso in che modo l'integrazione dei sistemi informativi 
(SAP, …) ha contribuito al processo di integrazione post-acquisizione? 
Ritengo che la standardizzazione/integrazione dei sistemi informativi 
favorisca lo stesso linguaggio in azienda. 
Information 
systems integration 
employees 
interview 
Il sistema operativo è stato un grosso ostacolo all'integrazione fino 
ad oggi. Il grosso sforzo che l'azienda sta compiendo per migrare ad un 
unico sistema informativo favorirà il processo integrativo. 
Information 
systems integration 
employees 
interview 
Stiamo attualmente integrando il nuovo ERP SAP, quindi mi sembra 
ancora prematuro dare un giudizio. Sicuramente faciliterà l' 
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integrazione anche se ritengo che la differenza poi la facciano le 
persone, il team work e non tanto i sistemi ERP. 
employees 
interview 
L'integrazione informatica è' ancora in fase di assestamento, mi 
aspetto difficoltà iniziali ma un progressivo beneficio. Dal mio punto di 
vista, essendo da poco in azienda, non dovrebbe essere traumatico il 
cambio. 
Information 
systems integration 
employees 
interview 
Pur non essendo coinvolta nell’utilizzo specifico di SAP, credo che i 
sistemi informativi tendano ad organizzare i flussi delle attività, 
consentendo una corretta gestione e un efficace coordinamento delle 
divisioni coinvolte. Giocano quindi un ruolo rilevante nell’integrazione 
tra le aziende. 
Information 
systems integration 
employees 
interview 
Ciononostante, può succedere che il flusso informativo, che esula 
da un “sistema informatico”, possa subire qualche inevitabile “perdita” 
durante il “percorso”.  
Information 
systems integration 
employees 
interview 
L’integrazione dei sistemi informativi (SAP, …) è ancora in fase di 
lavorazione ma contribuisce fortemente all’integrazione, oltre che da 
un punto di vista pratico, anche da un punto di vista psicologico. 
Information 
systems integration 
management 
interview 
I sistemi informativi hanno portato SAP ma solo dopo due anni 
perché l'Italia era complessa. La migrazione avverrà a metà 2010. Non 
mi è semrato un messaggio del tipo: questo è il mio sistema, dovete 
usarlo. E'stato un passaggio lento e ragionato. Non si è adottato SAP 
perché l'aveva Merck. 
Information 
systems integration 
management 
interview 
La prima cosa che è stata fatta è stato la compensation, come pure 
i grading. Da Oracle a SAP stiamo finendo la componente italiana per 
fine luglio. E' stato un bagno di sangue. Però avevamo - anche 
nell'ambito di Merck - 15 sistemi ed stata presa la palla al balzo per 
uniformare. Ci sono task force dedicate. Questo ha un effetto facilita le 
attività a livello giornaliero. 
Information 
systems integration 
management 
interview 
L’adozione di sistemi informativi credo che possono facilitare ma le 
persone fanno le fortune di un’azienda e possono portare il 
cambiamento. 
Information 
systems integration 
management 
interview 
I sistemi che avevamo erano diverso Oracle a SAP. In realtà Merck 
aveva in ogni paese un proprio sistema con difficoltà enormi. In 
occasione dell’acquisizione si è approfittato per andare su un unico 
sistema, non solo per Serono. 
Information 
systems integration 
management 
interview 
Un unico Sistema Informativo faciliterà un linguaggio comune. Information 
systems integration 
management 
interview 
Da una realtà con un governo molto forte con Oracle centralizzato 
si è passato a SAP e ciò facilità la governante. 
Information 
systems integration 
management 
interview 
Bertarelli era più un finanziere che un uomo di azienda ed ha 
venduto nel momento migliore. Qualche mese dopo sarebbe stato 
differente. 
Bertarelli is a 
financial man 
employees 
interview 
Non conosco la situazione prima dell'acquisizione ma ho molta 
fiducia nei leader aziendali attuali 
Confience 
management 
interview 
La sensazione è che questo fosse voluto dai vertici. Alcune 
posizioni chiave sono state attribuite ad ex Serono. Avendo conosciuto 
i difetti di Merck, forse l'obiettivo principale era quello di rimuovere 
proprio questi ostacoli. Serono era abituata a tempi rapidi più di Merck 
e una famiglia che è proprietaria ma non è presente nel management. 
Merck has a 
managerial 
governance  
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management 
interview 
L'approccio del management non è padronale perché AD  e 
Presidente sono manager, dipendenti "come voi". C'è la famiglia 
Merck ma è una famiglia di azionisti ma noi non la sentiamo 
direttamente. 
Merck has a 
managerial 
governance  
management 
interview 
Anche con vertici si può parlare, con Bertarelli non accadeva. Merck has a 
managerial 
governance  
management 
interview 
 Fondamentalmente la presenza della famiglia Merck non è legata 
a cariche operative, la gestione è fatta da manager. 
Merck has a 
managerial 
governance  
management 
interview 
Nel board Serono c’era Marchionne, le persone Bertarelli le sapeva 
scegliere. 
Serono had a good 
governance 
management 
interview 
L'aspetto padronale precedente seroniana era sinomino di 
VELOCITA': si sapeva chi prendeva le decisioni. 
Serono had a 
governance 
"padronale" 
management 
interview 
 Bertarelli era il padrone di casa, le chiavi, … entrava.  Serono had a 
governance 
"padronale" 
management 
interview 
In Serono c'era uno stimolo imprenditoriale ma un controllo 
assoluto. Ora il processo è più evoluto. Obiettivi a lungo termine. Però 
ora ognuno di noi ha un corridoio non molto stretto. Prima c'erano 
decisioni talora incomprensibili perché Bertarelli non aveva ricevuto 
tutte le info è poi decideva da solo. 
Serono had a 
governance 
"padronale" 
management 
interview 
Prima l’immagine era di una persona: Bertarelli. Serono had a 
governance 
"padronale" 
employees 
interview 
In cosa sono diversi i leader aziendali ora e prima dell'acquisizione? 
Non credo vi siano differenze particolari, l'approccio dei leader 
dipende molto dal momento storico che l'Azienda vive.  
Situational 
leadreship 
management 
interview 
Gradualmente l'integrazione avviene e quindi più passa il tempo e 
meno si sentono differenze. Ci sono state all'inizio perché erano realtà 
diverse come modello organizzativo come dimensioni. Se in Merck 
potevo prendermi dei rischi, ora una divisione non può correre lo 
stesso rischio perché gli altri business sono connessi. Questa 
dimensione dell'azienda comporta un cambiamento di prospettiva. 
Abbiamo dovuto adattarci a questa nuova realtà: corretta ma nuova.  
Anche se Serono era più agile nella decisione, sugli aspetti operativi ci 
sono maggiori procedure, ma questo è corretto. 
A good managerial 
response 
management 
interview 
La scelta di "imporre" Serono in Italia era quasi obbligatoria: per le 
dimensioni molto maggiori e per il presidio della filiera ricerca - 
produzione - commerciale che Merck Italia non aveva essendo 
esclusivamente un presidio commerciale. E' stata una questione di 
buon senso: perché spostare tutto a Milano? Solo perche il 
compratore era posizionato lì? Si è preferito spostare le attività 
milanesi (farmaceutiche) a Roma. Buon senso che non fu applicato 
nella mia precedente esperienza in Goodyear quando trattammo 
l'acquisizione di Dunlop. Il manager di allora, pur essendo un rapporto 
di personale 2/3 a Roma in Goodyear e 1/3 a Milano in Dunlop, voleva 
spostare tutto a Milano. Io, che venivo dagli USA e in quel momento 
lavoravo nell'head quartier europeo a Bruxelles, mi opposi chiedendo: 
A good managerial 
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quanti pneumatici in più vendiamo se facciamo questa operazione di 
spostare le attività romane a Milano? Spesso fare il manager è 
questione di buon senso. Ma altrettanto spesso la scelta razionale 
viene superata da logiche individuali. 
management 
interview 
La risposta manageriale alle identità multiple è stata quella di 
cercare di crearne una nuova. Merck doveva cambiare, manager solido 
ma poco dinamico. 
A good managerial 
response 
management 
interview 
In Italia, Serono ha di fatto preso il posto di Merck Italia. Anche la 
sede di Roma. La struttura Serono aveva diverse aree terapeutiche. 
Molte funzioni non c'erano in Merck Italia, le aree terapeutiche erano 
diverse. Chi ha voluto trasferirsi l'ha potuto fare. Altrimenti l'uscita è 
stata agevolata. Le doppie figure sono state messe a confronto. 
A transapert 
comparation 
management 
interview 
La gestione del cambiamento è stata trasparente ed obiettivo. A transapert 
comparation 
management 
interview 
Io credo che l'aggregazione sia quella più pertinente perché noi 
perché pur avendo aree molto diverse stiamo cercando di creare dei 
ponti che le colleghino. 
Aggregation 
management 
interview 
Quindi forse possiamo parlare di fusione di identità per uno strato 
alto relativo ai valori ed una aggregazione per quel che attiene aspetti 
operativi. 
Aggregation 
employees 
interview 
Se dovesse definire "chi siamo come organizzazione" in questo 
momento quali termini utilizzerebbe e perché? Siamo 
un'organizzazione ETICA, RESPONSABILE, ORIENTATA AI VALORI 
AZIENDALI. Questi termini sono esplicativi di cosa è oggi Merck 
Serono, un'organizzazione attenta ai propri dipendenti, al rispetto 
delle regole del mercato in cui opera, che fonda la sua mission nei 
valori di cui si fa portatrice.  
Common values 
employees 
interview 
Se dovesse definire "chi siamo come organizzazione" in questo 
momento quali termini utilizzerebbe e perché? Società strutturata con 
una chiara definizione-ripartizione delle responsabilità e degli obiettivi. 
Gruppo coeso fondato sui valori Merck. 
Common values 
employees 
interview 
Direi che l'identità del gruppo Merck Serono è fortemente legata ai 
valori che il gruppo stesso si è dato. 
Common values 
employees 
interview 
Trovo che in questa azienda si venga animati da valori molto sentiti 
e positivi: questo è un aspetto fortemente sottolineato dal top 
management, che continua a comportarsi come esempio, e che fa la 
differenza principale tra la mia esperienza qui rispetto a quella fatta in 
altre realtà. 
Common values 
management 
interview 
L'attuale identità è rimasta una farmaceutica con l'obiettivo di 
identificare la priorità della salute del paziente. La cosa che si è 
aggiunta è stato innalzare i valori di lealtà, coraggio, persone. 
Common values 
management 
interview 
Quando è arrivata la notizia non era chiaro a chi eravamo stati 
venduti. Sono usciti vari nomi. L'informativa non era precisa. Dopo 
alcuni mesi è uscita fuori la notizia ufficiale. Essere acquisiti da Pfizer … 
Dipende dalla nazionalità della acquirente. L'approccio è stato soft, di 
Common values 
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condivisione, di ricerca di valori sia dell'una che dell'altra. 
management 
interview 
Quindi possiamo dire che la soluzione è stata quella di creare dei 
valori condivisi in tutto il gruppo che ne identificano l'identità comune. 
Poi, a livello di country o di business si sono fatte scelte 
contestualizzando i criteri. 
Common values 
management 
interview 
Piano piano la prevalenza Serono in italia si andata attenuando. I 
più abili sono stati quelli che hanno capito che il contesto era cambiato 
sostanzialmente. 
Context 
understanding 
management 
interview 
Erano cambiati i modelli, i valori e chi lo ha capito si è trovato 
meglio. 
Context 
understanding 
management 
interview 
La volontà ed i messaggi sono stati quelli di creare una sintesi delle 
realtà precedenti. E'stato creato un nuovo sistema di competenze. Il 
percorso è però molto lungo. 
Create a new 
identity 
management 
interview 
Ci sono state delle imposizioni ma banali. Few mandatory 
decisions 
management 
interview 
I processi sono mappati e comuni in tutto il gruppo. Le procedure 
descrivono sia le macro fasi (con le linee guida di casa madre tedesca) 
che il dettaglio operativo definito dal Country che traduce le linee 
guida in procedure operative.  
Group guide lines 
management 
interview 
Il dimensionamento organici viene fatto con un sistema ed un 
processo che è basato su una business review annuale, Vengono 
definiti obiettivi articolati per area terapeutica e per servizi. Una 
sezione del piano è dedicata all'organizzazione. Le RU raccolgono il 
fabbisogno ed elaborano un piano annuale e triennale. Per calcolare il 
fabbisogno le proposte seguono linee guida comuni e poi segue una 
revisione della Direzione RU. Il processo dipende dagli obiettivi del 
business:  se l'obiettivo è di lancio di un nuovo prodotto si può 
aumentare il fabbisogno, altrimenti si riparte dallo storico. Oppure se il 
business è solido si può provare al diminuire con operazioni di 
razionalizzazione.  
Group guide lines 
management 
interview 
Una linea guida comune è quella di avere piccoli numeri, grandi 
responsabilità e grandi risultati.  
Group guide lines 
management 
interview 
L’azienda ha dato le linee guida, il modello, i valori. Poi ha lasciato 
ai singoli paesi l’applicazione locale. 
Group guide lines 
employees 
interview 
Domanda ardua a cui rispondere visto che abbiamo avuto 
l'opportunità di vedere confermata la totalità del management serono 
italia 
In Italy managerial 
response "deletion" 
management 
interview 
La dichiarazione in Italia è stata integrazione ma in realtà si è 
trattato di una deletion. Negli altri paesi non lo so dire. In Italia la filiale 
italiana era la principale Serono.  
In Italy managerial 
response "deletion" 
management 
interview 
 Tutto è stato fatto in maniera molto professionale ma Serono ha 
inglobato - in Italia - Merck. 
In Italy managerial 
response "deletion" 
management 
interview 
Una volta deciso chi tra i due country manager fosse il nuovo DG, a 
fine febbraio, la fase operativa e partita ed a settembre 2007 eravamo 
già tutti qui. Pochi dei miei colleghi son venuti. Della mia BU siamo 
venuti in due. Altre persone che avrei voluto portare non hanno 
ottenuto condizioni adeguate. 
In Italy managerial 
response "deletion" 
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management 
interview 
Un altro collega che si occupava di servizi generali e trading è 
venuto. La rete esterna è stata mantenuta. 
In Italy managerial 
response "deletion" 
management 
interview 
In Italia, Serono ha di fatto preso il posto di Merck Italia. Anche la 
sede di Roma. La struttura Serono aveva diverse aree terapeutiche. 
Molte funzioni non c'erano in Merck Italia, le aree terapeutiche erano 
diverse. Chi ha voluto trasferirsi l'ha potuto fare. Altrimenti l'uscita è 
stata agevolata. Le doppie figure sono state messe a confronto. 
In Italy managerial 
response "deletion" 
management 
interview 
Il nostro attuale AD è un ex direttore Serono ed anche il CFO. In Italy managerial 
response "deletion" 
management 
interview 
Pertanto a livello Italia, per il farmaceutico, Serono ha soppiantato 
la precedente Merck-Italia integrando le persone che hanno scelto di 
rimanere.  
In Italy managerial 
response "deletion" 
management 
interview 
Nel contesto italiano era particolare per le dimensioni che hanno 
avuto il loro ruolo. 
In Italy managerial 
response "deletion" 
management 
interview 
L’italia è un punto di riferimento in termini di risultati post 
acquisizione anche perché il cambiamento è stato adottato. Abbiamo 
ancora sfide ma i risultati ci sono. 
Italy as an example 
of success 
management 
interview 
Il gruppo Merck era più proceduralizzato l'aspetto è più 
manageriale. Ma viene favorita l'imprenditorialità perché re iniziative 
locali sono favorite, non solo i blockbuster ma anche opportunità 
locali. E' stat creata la funzione business development. 
Local autonomy 
management 
interview 
Il dimensionamento organici viene fatto con un sistema ed un 
processo che è basato su una business review annuale, Vengono 
definiti obiettivi articolati per area terapeutica e per servizi. Una 
sezione del piano è dedicata all'organizzazione. Le RU raccolgono il 
fabbisogno ed elaborano un piano annuale e triennale. Per calcolare il 
fabbisogno le proposte seguono linee guida comuni e poi segue una 
revisione della Direzione RU. Il processo dipende dagli obiettivi del 
business:  se l'obiettivo è di lancio di un nuovo prodotto si può 
aumentare il fabbisogno, altrimenti si riparte dallo storico. Oppure se il 
business è solido si può provare al diminuire con operazioni di 
razionalizzazione.  
Local autonomy 
management 
interview 
Un altro elemento importante è che il management Serono era più 
rigido ed accentrato. Non c'era la possibilità di allargare il portafoglio 
prodotti. Con Merck abbiamo istituito un servizio di business 
development (co-marketing, …). Questo è una differenza forte, il 
management locale seguendo procedure e regole di approvazione può 
proporre di acquisire piccole aziende o iniziative di co-branding. C'è 
un'apertura maggiore.  
Local autonomy 
management 
interview 
Quindi possiamo dire che la soluzione è stata quella di creare dei 
valori condivisi in tutto il gruppo che ne identificano l'identità comune. 
Poi, a livello di country o di business si sono fatte scelte 
contestualizzando i criteri. 
Local autonomy 
management 
interview 
Merck ha ceduto i suoi due farmaci storici ad un'azienda 
giapponese (confermando che l'attenzione alla propria storia non 
impedisce il cambiamento) ma in Italia uno dei due prodotti è stato 
mantenuto perché è stato dimostrato con un business plan che nel 
nostro paese esistevano ancora opportunità di sviluppo. 
Local autonomy 
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management 
interview 
In Serono c'era uno stimolo imprenditoriale ma un controllo 
assoluto. Ora il processo è più evoluto. Obiettivi a lungo termine. Però 
ora ognuno di noi ha un corridoio non molto stretto. Prima c'erano 
decisioni talora incomprensibili perché Bertarelli non aveva ricevuto 
tutte le info è poi decideva da solo. 
Local autonomy 
management 
interview 
In Merck l’approccio è legato al fatto che voi siete imprenditori. 
Quindi potete sviluppare localmente il business. C’è più managerialità 
locale ed autonomia. 
Local autonomy 
management 
interview 
Qui il concetto è di sviluppare la leadership in modo più distribuito 
anche localmente. 
Local autonomy 
management 
interview 
Ogni paese ha una realtà diversa. Local autonomy 
management 
interview 
La strategia è sicuramente non di separare le identità. Né di 
imporne una. Siamo nella fase in cui si sono ricercate sinergie. Dopo 
secondo me sarà un merge bilanciato. Abbiamo acquisito cose di 
Merck e lasciato cose di Serono. Merck ha accettato alcune cose di 
Serono. Contando 2008 e 2009, si è lavorato in modo equilibrato sulle 
due identità. Anche se è arrivata una piccola voce che forse il brand 
Serono sarà eliminata ma non lo so. Gli opinion leader continuano a 
chiamare Serono i prodotti. Fuori nel mercato viene ancora usato il 
brand Serono. Il processo è lento.  
Synergy 
management 
interview 
Si sta cercando di fare è quello di integrare le due realtà. Entrambe 
avevano caratteri positivi. Si son formati gruppi di lavoro misti. Per 
capire cosa si poteva prendere dalle due aziende. 
Take the best from 
each part 
management 
interview 
La strategia è sicuramente non di separare le identità. Né di 
imporne una. Siamo nella fase in cui si sono ricercate sinergie. Dopo 
secondo me sarà un merge bilanciato. Abbiamo acquisito cose di 
Merck e lasciato cose di Serono. Merck ha accettato alcune cose di 
Serono. Contando 2008 e 2009, si è lavorato in modo equilibrato sulle 
due identità.   
Take the best from 
each part 
management 
interview 
Cercare di prendere il meglio dalle due parti. Take the best from 
each part 
management 
interview 
Prendere il meglio nelle due realtà (mantenere) ma cambiare per 
adattarsi al contesto. 
Take the best from 
each part 
management 
interview 
Merck sembra solido, con più burocrazia. Merck era solo marketing 
in Italia con ogni area terapeutica che lavoravano in modo non 
integrato. 300 anni di storia, un colosso. 
Merck has a long 
history 
employees 
interview 
Se dovesse definire "chi siamo come organizzazione" in questo 
momento quali termini utilizzerebbe e perché? Realtà farmaceutica 
multinazionale. 
Merck is 
multinational 
employees 
interview 
In modo molto semplice mi ritrovo appieno con la definizione: "Noi 
in Merck Serono facciamo quello che diciamo". 
Merck is reliable 
management 
interview 
Il livello qualitativo delle persone molto buono. Qui si vede che 
l’azienda ha dato linee guida chiare e questo è stato mantenuto. Si è 
preso il meglio delle due realtà. 
Merck is reliable 
employees 
interview 
Il gruppo Merck ha una lunga tradizione chimico-farmaceutica, la 
cui solidità trae forza dalla ricerca, dall’innovazione, dal rispetto della 
normativa. Da sottolineare, anche, l’ampio range “applicativo” (che 
include ad esempio la tecnologia dei cristalli liquidi) e una strategia 
Merck is solid. 
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oculata nelle acquisizioni di solidi gruppi (si è recentemente conclusa 
anche quella con il gruppo Millipore).   
employees 
interview 
La mia esperienza lavorativa nel campo della ricerca mi ha portato 
ad utilizzare (ed apprezzare) i reagenti chimici della Merck.       
Merck is solid. 
management 
interview 
Merck sembra solido, con più burocrazia. Merck era solo marketing 
in Italia con ogni area terapeutica che lavoravano in modo non 
integrato. 300 anni di storia, un colosso. 
Merck is solid. 
management 
interview 
Merck è un'azienda che ha una storia molto lunga ed un mercato 
solido. 
Merck is solid. 
management 
interview 
MERCK era stabile, principi molto forti. Merck is solid. 
management 
interview 
Io non conoscevo Merck. Perché in Italia era piccola. Una realtà da 
50 dipendenti contro 800 di serono. L'approccio Merck è un approccio 
misto in termini di sviluppo e di obiettivi di sviluppo perché continua a 
mantenere un occhio sul mercato più consumer del farmaco. Posso 
dedurre che avesse un'identità chimico farmaceutica. Produrre 
pigmenti o cristalli liquidi è diverso da produrre farmaci. E'stato un 
impatto importante, anche se in alcune regioni questo mix è stato più 
forte da noi è separato. 
Merck was 
chemical 
management 
interview 
Le opportunità perse per la lentezza o perché nessuno aveva 
potere decisionale hanno portato a cambiare le cose. 
Merck was slow 
employees 
interview 
 Mi sento di dire comunque che l'elemento che ha distinto 
storicamente questa azienda è il suo  essere tecnologicamente 
avanzata. Si ha la sensazione di lavorare con mezzi, processi e standard 
sempre al passo con i tempi. 
Serono has ever 
been a leading 
company 
management 
interview 
Serono era una grande famiglia, c'erano figli di padri, qualcuno 
conosceva Bertarelli direttamente. Turn over molto basso. Critica forte 
come avviene nelle famiglie. 
Serono was a 
family 
management 
interview 
L'azienda trasformava le urine femminili e non era biotech. La 
vecchia guardia aveva un'esperienza diversa . ma dal 90 è andata in 
quella direzione. Nel 2003 ha dismesso la produzione urinaria, con 
coraggio perché inizialmente ha perso una fetta di mercato. Alcuni 
ancora prescrivono l'urinario. Serono voleva però anticipare il 
cambiamento. 
Serono was 
anticipatory with 
regard to change 
management 
interview 
Si è capito subito che il messaggio era cambiato da quello Serono: 
era massimizzate i nostri prodotti. 
Serono was 
focused on their 
actual products 
management 
interview 
Il confronto con i numeri dei competitor (ad esempio per gli 
informatori scientifici del farmaco) evidenzia questa capacità di Merck 
Serono di produrre ottimi risultati con relativamente poche risorse. 
Serono was lean 
employees 
interview 
Nell'organizzazione che ho incontrato quando sono arrivato in 
Serono era molto evidente l'orientamento al raggiungimento di 
obiettivi commerciali nel breve-medio termine.   
Serono was short 
term oriented 
management 
interview 
Serono  si connotava per essere un’azienda “blu” orientata al 
risultato veloce nel prendere decisioni che operava in settori di nicchia 
con un’attenzione alla qualità molto forte. 
Serono was short 
term oriented 
40 
employees 
interview 
Se dovesse definire "chi eravamo prima dell'acquisizione come 
organizzazione" quali termini utilizzerebbe e perché? Eravamo una 
azienda farmaceutica leader nel settore del biotecnologie. Il nostro 
listino prodotti era caratterizzato da prodotti ad alta profittabilità nel 
settore specialistico della medicina.  
Serono was 
specialized 
management 
interview 
 Prima dell'acquisizione Serono era una multinazionale con 
un'identità legata alla specializzazione alla biotecnologia legata 
all'innovazione. Calandoci all'interno della realtà italiana, l'identità era 
quella dell'innovazione dell'alta specializzazione con prodotti di nicchia 
per patologia importante. Un'identità di livello non prodotti da banco. 
Serono operava per curare malati gravi. Lo slogan era biotech and 
beyond. 
Serono was 
specialized 
management 
interview 
La struttura di informazione medico scientifica è molto 
differenziata perché occorre visitare pochi medici specialisti nel caso 
dei prodotti Serono e molti nel caso dei prodotti ex 
Serono was 
specialized 
management 
interview 
Le patologie trattate da Serono sono molto gravi e gli aspetti etici 
assumono un peso rilevante. Questo vale di meno per i farmaci di 
Merck che sono prodotti a prezzo più contenuto e rivolti a patologie 
meno gravi. Business e ricerca sulla salute devono andare insieme, 
SERONO ha sempre messo in prima linea i malati. Tratta problemi e 
patologie gravi e questo fa avere attenzione ad aspetti di attenzione 
del malato. La percezione della sostenibilità del business è condivisa. 
Anche perché i nostri farmaci non possono essere usati dive non 
servono perché possono avere conseguenze gravi. L'ormone della 
crescita veniva usato per i malati di HIV per ripristinare la massa 
muscolare. Negli USA è successo che questi malati le rivendevano alle 
palestre. 
Serono was 
specialized 
employees 
interview 
Se dovesse definire "chi eravamo prima dell'acquisizione come 
organizzazione" quali termini utilizzerebbe e perché? Nel mio caso 
eravamo è Serono. Ancora una volta prendo un immagine a sintesi: un 
felino. Scattante, aggressivo ma che necessitava di cibo ad alta 
frequenza (nuovi prodotti,…). E per questo motivo con una durata 
della vita più breve. 
Serono was Quick 
employees 
interview 
Se dovesse definire "chi eravamo prima dell'acquisizione come 
organizzazione" quali termini utilizzerebbe e perché? Eravamo 
un'organizzazione ORIENTATA AL RISULTATO. Serono era 
maggiormente dinamica, probabilmente perché una realtà più piccola, 
in cui la sfida era l'obiettivo quotidiano. 
Serono was Quick 
employees 
interview 
Se dovesse definire "chi eravamo prima dell'acquisizione come 
organizzazione" quali termini utilizzerebbe e perché? Eravamo una 
organizzazione ben strutturata, snella, veloce e che necessitava di una 
pipeline più solida. 
Serono was Quick 
management 
interview 
La sensazione è che questo fosse voluto dai vertici. Alcune 
posizioni chiave sono state attribuite ad ex Serono. Avendo conosciuto 
i difetti di Merck, forse l'obiettivo principale era quello di rimuovere 
proprio questi ostacoli. Serono era abituata a tempi rapidi più di Merck 
e una famiglia che è proprietaria ma non è presente nel management. 
Serono was Quick 
management 
interview 
L'aspetto padronale precedente seroniana era sinomino di 
VELOCITA': si sapeva chi prendeva le decisioni. 
Serono was Quick 
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management 
interview 
SERONO era particolare, nel 70 si è buttato come innovatore nelle 
biotecnologie. Connotazione di nicchia. Livello stretto di governance. 
Focalizzata sulla proprietà. Un uomo una decisione. 
Serono was Quick 
management 
interview 
In Serono c'era uno stimolo imprenditoriale ma un controllo 
assoluto. Ora il processo è più evoluto. Obiettivi a lungo termine. Però 
ora ognuno di noi ha un corridoio non molto stretto. Prima c'erano 
decisioni talora incomprensibili perché Bertarelli non aveva ricevuto 
tutte le info è poi decideva da solo. 
Serono was Quick 
management 
interview 
E’ stata una famiglia che ha venduto ad una famiglia. A family 
acquistions 
management 
interview 
Il fatturato è comunque cresciuto ma non avevamo prospettive su 
prodotti nuovi. Si sentiva l'esigenza di acquisizioni. Nel 2005 il vertice 
Merck è cambiato Sholble ha lasciato a suo posto è stato nominato un 
manager esperto di tradizione Merck, era Klein attuale presidente 
esperto in M&A (fece KLM e …).  
Differentiation 
management 
interview 
Ci fu un'OPA stile su Shering nel 2006. Non andò a buon fine (vinse 
un'offerta Bayer). A fine 2006 avviene l'acquisizione di Serono. Si 
sapeva che era sul mercato. Francamente, non ritenevamo Serono 
un'acquisizione possibile perché c'erano voci di prezzo esorbitante e 
perché Serono era focalizzata in business biotech, diversi dalla 
tradizione Merck. 
Differentiation 
management 
interview 
Merck è un'azienda che ha una storia molto lunga ed un mercato 
solido. Tuttavia, alcuni segnali potevano allarmare la famiglia 
relativamente al medio periodo. Infatti, dal lato della Divisione chimica 
i cristalli liquidi stanno diventando un prodotto che trova competitor 
anche in Cina, dall'altro lato i farmaci che sono stati di punta per 
Merck cominciano a rientrare tra i generici ed a perdere margine. La 
famiglia doveva pertanto decidere se "godersi" la ricchezza accumulata 
in questi 300 anni di storia o invece cercare nuovi sbocchi. Ha scelto la 
seconda ipotesi, praticandola prima con l'acquisizione di Serono e in 
questi giorni con l'acquisizione di una azienda americana che fornisce i 
laboratori farmaceutici. Anche dal punto di vista geografico esisteva 
una complementarietà: con Serono ci si rafforzava in Italia e si entrava 
negli USA dove opera Merck & Co. (uscita dal gruppo dopo la prima 
guerra mondiale) e Merck non può operare con il proprio marchio. 
Differentiation 
management 
interview 
Dal lato Merck l’azienda voleva rafforzare l’area farmaceutica (che 
ora rappresenta più del 70% del business totale) andando a fare 
un’acquisizione di una realtà di nicchia. 
Differentiation 
management 
interview 
Abbiamo ceduto il cardiologico per concentrare nelle aree 
specialistiche. 
Differentiation 
management 
interview 
La nuova acquisizione è stata fatta nel settore chimico per 
riequilibrare un po’. 
Differentiation 
management 
interview 
In Italia era quasi tutto Serono e poco Merck. Si tratta di 
un'integrazione. In altri paesi più problemi per le forze in campo. In 
Francia le componenti erano forti e ci sono stai problemi sindacali. In 
Spagna è stato subito messo insieme anche il chimico. Negli USA dopo 
aver perso gli asset come danni di guerra.  IMB di Serono negli USA è 
stata importante nella strategia di Merck di rientrare nel mercato 
statunitense.  
Enter in USA 
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management 
interview 
Serono era un pò in stallo. Merck era forte sul chimico meno sul 
farmaceutico. Ma Merck dopo la cessione forzata della componente 
americana ha sempre avuto un vincolo nelle strategie di sviluppo. 
Enter in USA 
management 
interview 
L’altro elemento è crescere nei business dove già operiamo. Growth 
management 
interview 
Merck come farmaceutica è entrata in italia direttamente solo nel 
2001. Dalla Merck tedesca ha costituito la filiale USA che poi è stata 
nazionalizzata come danni di guerra. Era in Italia rappresentata da 
Bracco. Nel 2001 per entrare direttamente non potendo acquisire 
Bracco, Merck operò uno spin off da Molteni che aveva in licenza un 
prodotto Merck e fece lo sviluppo dell'organizzazione commerciale. 
Nel 2001 viene costituita Merck Pharma Italia e gradualmente 
vengono organizzati degli uffici a Firenze ed a Milano. Alcune attività 
vengono cedute e viene invece organizzata la parte chimica di Merck 
sempre a Milano. 
Merck in Italy 
management 
interview 
L'unificazione di queste attività avviene verso la fine del 2002. Io 
entro nel febbraio 2002 prima a Firenze poi a Milano. 
Merck in Italy 
management 
interview 
La gran parte dei prodotti Merck tradizionali sono fuori brevetto. 
C'era una esigenza di acquisire o di co-marketing. Questi accordi non 
sono andati a buon fine. Abbiamo dovuto ridimensionare i nostri piani. 
Avevamo due reti di informatori, ne abbiamo tenuta una sola 
rafforzandola. 
Merck in Italy 
management 
interview 
La crisi ha sicuramente eliminato le "vacche grasse". In Italia c'è 
sempre stata anche da parte del sistema sanitario è più facile 
risparmiare sulla spesa farmaceutica che è tracciata dall'inizio alla fine 
e che ha meno impatti politici. Quindi restrizioni sui prezzi (erano 
esagerati ma ora …). Le aziende piccole si sono salvate vendendosi, le 
aziende che assorbivano personale di altre più grandi insieme a panieri 
di vecchi farmaci. Ora tutto questo non regge più. Le grosse 
multinazionali sbaraccano i centri di ricerca: i brevetti si sono ridotti da 
30 a poche unità. La legge sulle patent ha ridotto la durata delle 
restrizioni che in Italia con le lentezze si riducono ancora di più. 
Shorter 
profitability of patents 
management 
interview 
La multa degli USA non era inaspettata ma credo che la decisione 
di vendere sia  stata dovuta più al fatto che non sembrava possibile più 
una crescita a doppia cifra. Non riuscendo ad acquisire altre società 
allora ha venduto. 
Size as a 
competitive 
advantage 
management 
interview 
Le motivazioni di Bertarelli, che gestiva l’azienda, quelle vere non si 
sapranno mai. Alcuni elementi sono legati a valutazioni soggettive.  
Strategy 
management 
interview 
Il mantenimento delle identità precedenti anche nel marchio è 
stata un'operazione che ha aumentato il valore percepita dalla classe 
medica. Serono ha una fortissima loialty interna e si sentono 
valorizzati e protetti. E'un bello spirito di gruppo. Quindi anche 
stakeholder interni hanno contato. 
Serono brand is a 
value for phisiciants 
management 
interview 
La divisione farmaceutica ha mantenuto anche il brand SERONO, 
questo perché nelle aree biotech Merck non era riconosciuta dagli 
stakeholder. Nell'endocrinologia Serono ha 100 anni di storia, ma il 
mercato voleva che l'identità Serono rimanesse. 
Serono brand is a 
value for phisiciants 
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management 
interview 
 Contando 2008 e 2009, si è lavorato in modo equilibrato sulle due 
identità. Anche se è arrivata una piccola voce che forse il brand Serono 
sarà eliminata ma non lo so. Gli opinion leader continuano a chiamare 
Serono i prodotti. Fuori nel mercato viene ancora usato il brand 
Serono. Il processo è lento.  
Serono brand is a 
value for phisiciants 
management 
interview 
Serono è riconosciuta come specialista di nicchia delle 
biotecnologie a livello mondiale. 
Serono brand is a 
value for phisiciants 
management 
interview 
Abbiamo mantenuto anche il brand Serono perché per i medici 
riconoscevano un’immagine solida per prodotti biotecnologici. 
Serono brand is a 
value for phisiciants 
management 
interview 
Il mantenimento delle identità precedenti anche nel marchio è 
stata un'operazione che ha aumentato il valore percepita dalla classe 
medica. Serono ha una fortissima loialty interna e si sentono 
valorizzati e protetti. E'un bello spirito di gruppo. Quindi anche 
stakeholder interni hanno contato. 
Support of internal 
stakeholder 
employees 
interview 
Il primo sicuramente è stato la convention ad Hammamet di 
ottobre 2007. Un evento nato con l'obiettivo di permettere 
l'integrazione all'interno della Merck Serono Italia. Questo evento ha 
aiutato enormemente il processo e per una persona nuova 
dell'azienda (come me) è stato un modo eccezionale per sentirmi 
subito parte integrante del gruppo. Ho conosciuto tutti in pochi giorni. 
Lo spirito che aleggiava ad Hammamet era molto positivo. Quasi "una 
grande famiglia". 
A convetion as a 
symbol 
employees 
interview 
Può raccontare una sua esperienza (come fosse una storia) in 
azienda che Le sembra rappresentativa dell'idea che Lei ha dell'azienda 
stessa? L'esperienza che più facilmente racconto è la Convention 
Aziendale di Hammamet del 2008. Anche se ha coinvolto solamente la 
Sede è stato un momento di integrazione / coinvolgimento di tutti i 
dipendenti con un riscontro molto positivo. 
A convetion as a 
symbol 
employees 
interview 
Può raccontare una sua esperienza (come fosse una storia) in 
azienda che Le sembra rappresentativa dell’idea che Lei ha 
dell’azienda stessa? Sarò breve… A seguito del ritiro dal mercato di un 
medicinale di cui era titolare, l’Azienda, nonostante la crisi economica, 
ha ricollocato internamente il personale interessato.  
A product retire as 
a symbol 
management 
interview 
L'adozione di sistemi informativi sta avvenendo con il passaggio da 
Oracle a SAP. Il messaggio è molto forte. Servono realmente, ma il 
passaggio è stato non senza fatica. La domanda era perché cambiare? 
Poi la gente è stata collaborativa con gruppi di lavoro misto con 
persone dal marketing, ricerca, … 
Change in IS as a 
symbol 
employees 
interview 
Può raccontare una sua esperienza (come fosse una storia) in 
azienda che Le sembra rappresentativa dell'idea che Lei ha dell'azienda 
stessa? La volontà di scambiarci gli auguri di Natale organizzando un 
team building consistente in un corso di cucina presso la scuola 
Gambero Rosso. Associare i valori Merck (coraggio, trasparenza, 
responsabilità)….ai cibi. 
Christmas 
convention as a 
symbol 
management 
interview 
Anche mettere l'Headquarters a Ginevra è stato un messaggio 
chiaro. 
Headquarter 
placement as a symbol 
management 
interview 
 Tanto è vero che l'HQ della Divisione è stata spostata a Ginevra.  Headquarter 
placement as a symbol 
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management 
interview 
Un momento significativo è stato quando si è implementato un 
format standard per tutte le presentazioni, sarà banale ma ad esempio 
in Serono non c'era. LORO, anzi NOI, sono molto attenti alle 
procedure.  
One format as a 
symbol 
management 
interview 
Come episodi, dal momento in cui sono stati lasciati gli uffici di 
Milano era evidente il segnale. A Milano è rimasta solo la chimica. La 
divisione allergenica è riuscita a salvarsi dal trasloco creando un Spa 
che è stata aggregata alla chimica. 
The "move in" as a 
symbol 
management 
interview 
Tra la firma legale e l'acquisizione, c'è stato un momento in cui 
rimanevano due "NOI" separati. Il trasferimento è stato il vero 
momento determinante, per scegliere le procedure. 
The "move in" as a 
symbol 
management 
interview 
Un episodio rappresentativo è stato il trasferimento perché alcune 
persone sono state coinvolte subito però non tutti. 
The "move in" as a 
symbol 
management 
interview 
Quando hanno toccato con mano è stato quando c'è stato il 
trasferimento. Poi c'è stato un evento formativo per gli informatori 
scientifici. Si sono potuti confrontare per la prima volta (le reti si sono 
affiancate). L'oggetto era il cambiamento quindi tutti hanno realizzato 
che le cose cambiavano. 
The "move in" as a 
symbol 
management 
interview 
La struttura è aumentata in Italia di una quindicina di persone pur 
passando da tre a sei BU, quindi l'aumento di costi è stato contenuto. 
A larger structure 
management 
interview 
Merck ha ceduto i suoi due farmaci storici ad un'azienda 
giapponese (confermando che l'attenzione alla propria storia non 
impedisce il cambiamento) ma in Italia uno dei due prodotti è stato 
mantenuto perché è stato dimostrato con un business plan che nel 
nostro paese esistevano ancora opportunità di sviluppo. 
Attention to the 
past and anticipation 
of change 
management 
interview 
Non vogliamo dimenticare la storia da dove entrambi veniamo. Attention to the 
past and anticipation 
of change 
management 
interview 
Parole chiave sono: mantenere ma cambiare (il modello economico 
è cambiato dopo l’11 settembre e la crisi del 2009). Sembra in 
contrasto ma non lo è.  
Attention to the 
past and anticipation 
of change 
employees 
interview 
"chi siamo come organizzazione" in questo momento : 
affiatamento, voglia di stare insieme, familiarità 
Empaty 
employees 
interview 
Siamo una grandissima multinazionale. Se dovessi pensare a 
qualcosa che sintetizza penserei ad un elefante: grandi muscoli, grande 
longevità e capacità di resistere a lungo senza cibo (leggi acquisizioni, 
merge,… nel prossimo futuro), autonomia, lentezza 
Large group 
employees 
interview 
 Se dovesse definire "chi siamo come organizzazione" in questo 
momento quali termini utilizzerebbe e perché? Siamo un'azienda 
farmaceutica multinazionale facente parte di un gruppo dove il 
comparto farmaceutico è uno dei business, ma non l'unico.  Questo 
determina scelte strategiche che tengono in considerazione una 
gamma di fattori che regolano mercati diversi per genere e business, 
che possono reagire in modo differenti a momenti di crisi o di 
espasione economica.    
Large group 
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employees 
interview 
Può raccontare una sua esperienza (come fosse una storia) in 
azienda che Le sembra rappresentativa dell'idea che Lei ha dell'azienda 
stessa?Lavoro per un'azienda multinazionale e questo è sempre stato 
evidente.  Sono arrivato in Serono nel 2005 per ricoprire il ruolo di 
Regional Mktg Manager per le nazioni Italia, Grecia e Turchia. Nel 
corso degli anni i cambiamenti che sono avvenuti in azienda hanno 
influito notevolmente anche sul mio lavoro. Le scelte di modificare le 
Business Area (dopo l'acquisizione di Merck) mi hanno permesso di 
concentrarmi maggiormente sul business Italiano però i prodotti in 
Pipeline ed il Life Cycle Mgmt di quelli esistenti mi hanno permesso di 
poter dare il mio contributo al lancio mondiale di nuovi prodotti, 
nuove formulazioni di prodotti già in commercio, device e nuove 
indicazioni.  
Large group 
management 
interview 
Merck Serono è oggi un grande gruppo chimico farmaceutico e in 
questo momento di crisi il farmaceutico regge. 
Large group 
employees 
interview 
Sono in Merck Serono da dicembre del 2007 e mi occupo di 
marketing. Sono marketing manager dell'area oncologica da un mese e 
prima di questo ruolo sono stato product manager nelle aree 
dermatologia e neurologia. Provengo da Abbott nella quale mi sono 
occupato sempre di marketing farmaceutico per cinque anni. Quando 
sono arrivato in Merck Serono ho trovato molte differenze soprattutto 
dal punto di vista della gestione delle persone 
Merck gives more 
attention to people 
employees 
interview 
Il secondo evento riguarda il lavoro e nello specifico il modo in cui 
è stato gestito la dismissione di un prodotto. Il prodotto è stato 
sospeso dal commercio e una linea doveva essere chiusa. La gestione 
della comunicazione e l'attenzione al dipendente mi hanno colpito. 
Merck gives more 
attention to people 
employees 
interview 
Io ero parte di quella linea, ma ero tranquillo per il mio futuro. 
Quello che mi ha colpito è il modo in cui è stato gestito il processo di 
comunicazione e di ri-assegnazione dei job per la sales force. Credo di 
non essere il solo ad averlo notato all'interno di quel gruppo. 
Merck gives more 
attention to people 
employees 
interview 
Siamo una organizzazione ben strutturata, solida, che pone 
attenzione al benessere dei suoi dipendenti.  
Merck gives more 
attention to people 
employees 
interview 
Un aspetto che reputo molto importante è l'attenzione alle 
persone: questo è un altro carattere distintivo che non è facile trovare 
in altre aziende del settore. 
Merck gives more 
attention to people 
employees 
interview 
In Merck Serono ho trovato una maggiore organizzazione e un 
ambiente più sano, cioè più attento alle esigenze del dipendente, e più 
stimolante.  
Merck gives more 
attention to people 
employees 
interview 
Se dovesse definire “chi siamo come organizzazione” in questo 
momento quali termini utilizzerebbe e perché? Un’azienda coesa al 
raggiungimento di obiettivi sfidanti, nel rispetto degli individui e delle 
loro potenzialità.  
Merck gives more 
attention to people 
management 
interview 
E' maggiore l'attenzione al dipendente: questo è stato un forte 
cambiamento. Unito a questo si è passati da una priorità anche del 
profitto aziendale ad un approccio più manageriale. Si sta con i piedi 
per terra. La politica Serono era crescere a tutti i costi a 2 cifre, ora il 
messaggio è più equilibrato. 
Merck gives more 
attention to people 
management 
interview 
L’impronta dello stile di management era un po’ americano 
aggressivo marketing oriented ma con un atteggiamento etico. 
Merck has a 
management 
marketing oriented 
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but ethic 
employees 
interview 
Sono venuto a conoscenza dell'acquisizione quando ero in un'altra 
azienda e quindi al momento del mio passaggio in Merck Serono ero 
un po' dubbioso perché avevo già partecipato ad una acquisizione in 
Abbott. Ma posso dire adesso che lo spirito di squadra è molto più 
forte in Merck Serono e abbia consentito un'integrazione rapida e 
duratura. 
Team work 
employees 
interview 
Appena arrivata in azienda sono stata coinvolta nell’ambito delle 
attività propedeutiche al lancio di un nuovo prodotto.... è una grande 
sfida. Abbiamo organizzato incontri, studi, lavori individuali e 
approfondito ciascuno tematiche attinenti la propria attività ma che in 
qualche modo fossero utili allo scopo comune. E’ stato bello 
partecipare osservando come una piccola cosa fatta da ciascuno 
rappresentasse veramente un valore aggiunto per tutti. Sarà un 
successo anche se gli ostacoli e le difficoltà sono molte! 
Team work 
employees 
interview 
"chi siamo come organizzazione" in questo momento : 
affiatamento, voglia di stare insieme, familiarità 
We are a family 
employees 
interview 
Siamo un team: si lavora spesso in gruppi trasversali e collaborativi; 
Ognuno è orgoglioso della propria attività e la sponsorizza anche con 
vanità professionale. 
We are proud 
employees 
interview 
Sono aspetti che ho riscontrato da subito e che differenziano 
questa azienda da quelle che ho conosciuto: Attenzione al dipendente, 
Spirito di collaborazione, voglia di stare insieme 
We want stay 
together 
employees 
interview 
"chi siamo come organizzazione" in questo momento : 
affiatamento, voglia di stare insieme, familiarità 
We want stay 
together 
 
Table 1 – From Narratives to 1st order concepts  
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Table 2a – From 1st order concepts to identity description (part 1) 
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Table 2a – From 1st order concepts to identity description (part 2) 
 
 
Table 2b – From 1st order concepts to model variables 
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4.5.2 Evolution of organizational identities 
 
A first group of evidence from case study provides a description of multiple 
organizational identities evolution that can be explained analyzing the old 
identities of companies, the process of evolution and the new identities resulting. 
 
The old identity of Serono: a quick, specialized, leader-dependent company 
 
People used often the word ―quick‖ to define the organizational identity of 
Serono. Someone used a metaphor:  ―quick as a cat‖. ―Specialized‖ is another 
word frequently used. People underline this specialization in order to distinguish 
Serono from Merck that produce treatments with low price and high volume of 
sales. Serono is also ―ethic‖ because its patients are affected by ―heavy diseases‖. 
The leadership of Ernesto Bertarelli is recalled by many people. They link the 
possibility to be quick with his absolute power in the company. Serono was 
Bertarelli. ―When he came at office, he was at home‖. Many people used – 
referred to him - the Italian word ―padrone‖ that is usually used for the small 
companies owned by a family. Anyway, the sense of this word in not negative, it 
underlines that he decided quickly and, often, in the right way. Others words used 
by people are ―lean‖, ―short term oriented‖ and ―family‖. Serono was used to have 
a ―two digit growth‖ and before to be acquired was explicitly ready to buy others 
companies. A manager said: ―Few months before the acquisition Bertarelli invited 
us in Valencia and announced that he wanted to buy companies and he asked to us 
to say it to everybody in Serono‖. Serono had also multiple identities because of 
separation among different sites. People in marketing considered researchers or 
manufacturing workers ―not included when they said the ‗we‘ word‖.     
 
The old identity of Merck: an ancient, solid, managerial company 
 
In the case of Merck, the most used word has been ―solid‖ and it refers to ―his old 
history‖. Merck is also ―the German Merck‖ because exists ―the other Merck‖ (the 
American one). This link between nationality and solidity was very clear in 
people‘s tales. It means that ―Merck is reliable‖. An employee said: ―Now, in 
Merck, we do what we say‖. Merck is also ―a large company‖ in a market where 
size seems to be a source of competitive advantage. Large is also link to 
―procedure‖, bureaucracy. Merck ―has a managerial governance‖. In fact, ―the 
family Merck, is in the board but has no operative role‖. New managers, after 
acquisition, introduced themselves saying: ―We are managers but workers as 
everybody‖. The ―other side of the coin‖ is that ―Merck was slow‖. This slowness 
and bureaucracy was a problem in Merck-Pharma Italy that tried in many different 
ways to improve its market share in Italy. A manager that worked in Merck Italia 
said that, even if ―in Italy Merck identity has been deleted‖, they ―Tried to grow 
through sales force, acquisitions, co-marketing but nothing. Decisions making was 
too slow. We need a quicker model.‖.     
 
The process of evolution after the acquisition: surprise, ambiguity, symbols and 
transparency 
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According to theoretical framework, ambiguity has been indicated frequently by 
interviewed people. An employee said: ―We were attending a training course and 
people wanted to stop the course. The concern was the fact that shortly before 
Bertarelli said he wanted to buy companies, not to sell Serono. It was the 
opposite. We did not know „which Merck‟ was, German or American. Then things 
are clarified.‖. Surprise and scarce knowledge of the acquiring company were 
very diffuse among people. Few people knew Merck because it produced generic 
treatments not specialized like Serono‘s drugs. Many people, when they receive 
the news of acquisition ―with a simple e-mail!‖, thought that the acquiring 
company was the American Merck. ―So, we were very worried about our future.‖, 
but when it was clear that Merck was the German one someone said ―It was the 
better acquisition that we can have!‖.  Managers didn‘t know nothing about 
acquisition before it was signed but they agreed with this method: ―A well done 
operation!‖. They admire Bertarelli for his capacity to sell the company ―in the 
right moment‖ and ―at a excellent price for him!‖. The business was done 
―between Merck family and Bertarelli family‖. 
Ambiguity went on also after that news was clearer. The move in of Merck office 
from Milan to Rome was the most mentioned symbols of change. This choice 
removed also the main source of ambiguity that was arisen after the acquisition. 
―When we began to work side by side with Merck colleagues we realized that 
change has happened‖. Another clear sign of managerial strategy about 
integration was the choice to locate the headquarter of pharmaceutical business 
unit in the former Serono‘s headquarter in Genève. People consider the change 
management very transparent and rational. The choice of headquarter (in favor of 
Serono) or the choice to adopt SAP solution (already used in Merck) were 
decisions taken with mindfulness. The present CFO said that they used ―common 
sense‖ and ―rationality‖. He remembers that in a similar situation, that he lived 
when worked in an American tire producer, it happened the opposite. Also the 
adoption of SAP solution is an opportunity to make sense of new reality (see 
specific section of this Thesis) that is still in progress. ―First we aligned 
compensation and job description that were different‖ said the HR Director. So, 
gradually people in Serono had a lower level of ambiguity but, at the same time, 
Merck values were clearly imposed.   
 
The new (multiple) organizational identity of Merck-Serono: an “aggregation” 
strategy based on common values and local autonomy  
 
When people spoke about the new identity underline that: “Merck gives more 
attention to employees”. And again: “We are an organization well structured, 
solid, and cared about wellness of its employees”. An employee that worked on a 
product retired from the market said: “When the company retired the product, all 
people were re-allocated on different products with a transparent process”. The 
larger size of the group after acquisition was a positive message for the people: 
“we are a company … with high longevity, able to resist without food for a long 
period”. This capacity removes ambiguity in a period of crisis and it helps the 
sensemaking, providing one more justification for accept the acquisition. Other 
words used are “team work”, “stay together” and “proud”. The resulting identity 
has again the solidity and the history of Merck but tries to learn from Serono to be 
“quick like a cat”. The managerial response had the aim to “take the best of each 
company”. The example of information system integration is clear. It has been 
decided not immediately (implementation is still in progress) and the decision was 
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rational, not a must. The acquisition has been an opportunity to adopt the same 
software also in other Merck Divisions. “We took something from Serono and 
something from Merck”. Complementary of businesses and other conditions 
analyzed above suggested an “aggregation” managerial response to multiple 
identities. Identity plurality in each country was considered appropriate and 
designed linkages among them using “common group value” create appropriate 
synergies. It is one of the typologies that Pratt and Foreman describe (Pratt and 
Foreman, 2000): a hierarchy of multiple identities. People know that each country 
or department can have a specific identity but, if those identities conflict, group 
values give the guideline for behavior.  Local autonomy is one of the innovative 
managerial values. Before the acquisition Bertarelli was the entrepreneur, now all 
managers are required to be entrepreneurs. “Now the process is more evolved. 
Objectives are targeted on long term. Now we have a decisional corridor not so 
narrow. In Serono sometimes decisions were not clear because Bertarelli decided 
having partial information”. An organizational unit for business developed has 
been created: “This unit reports to me and we can look for agreements or co-
marketing or also local acquisitions. We have to use business plans and 
procedures but we have real autonomy”. This autonomy wasn‟t on a generic 
value, it actually founded confirm when Merck retired some old treatments but: 
“We demonstrated that in Italy one of those treatments had again sales 
opportunity and the Group let us autonomy in deciding to sale again that drug 
only in Italy”. A manager said that: “I think that in this company people are 
motivated by values in which people believe and that are positive. Top 
management underlines always this aspect. Their behavior is a coherent example 
of these values. This is the main difference between this job and previous 
experiences”. Also ethic is clear: “We are an organization ethic, responsible, 
values oriented …” and “We want to respect the rules of our market …”.  An 
official press news confirms this orientation: “Integration process begins: With 
the closing of the Share Purchase Agreement, the integration process will now 
move forward. Following the conclusion of the planning phase, 25 integration 
teams consisting of about 170 integration managers will rapidly implement the 
integration processes throughout the company. The project will be led by an 
Integration Steering Committee headed by Karl-Ludwig Kley, Vice Chairman of 
the Executive Board of Merck KGaA. „The aim is to achieve a clearly 
performance-oriented organization – a structure based on transparency, fairness, 
honesty and mutual respect‟ said Kley”. 
In sum, ―The cat had to grow and the elephant had to run‖. Now, the company 
thinks on a large horizon but it locally run quickly. 
 
4.5.3 Appropriateness of plurality  
 
According to the Pratt and Foreman‘s model, an ―aggregation‖ managerial 
response is the right solution if both plurality and synergy are appropriate. In this 
paragraph, I analyze evidences from case study that support appropriateness of 
identity plurality.  
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Powerful stakeholders‟ support to current identities 
 
Managers explained that: ―Marketing activities in pharmaceutical industry is 
based more on influencing physicians‟ advises than on final customer‖. Therefore, 
was important be coherent with physicians‘ expectation. ―Opinion leaders use 
again „Serono‟ for our products. In the market, the brand Serono is the most used. 
The process is very slow‖, said a manager. SERONO has a high reputation of 
niche specialist and Merck has a history of more than three centuries that is 
perceived as a symptom of solidity. Stakeholders believe in old identities (because 
specialism is based on people competences) but a larger size of the company (and 
the centuries of life brought by Merck) gives them confidence about future, 
especially during a so deep crisis. 
 
Various stakeholders legitimate current identities 
 
That business model based more on opinion leaders than on final customer 
provides another reason to consider plurality as appropriate. Serono produced 
treatments for heavy diseases, very specialized. It works in a ―niche‖ and its 
opinion leaders are specialized physicians different from those that can support 
Merck drugs (that have low price and larger volume). The sales force has different 
targets and reputation is a value to be conserved. This plurality has also an 
―internal‖ value: ―Using again old identities and the word Serono in new brand 
has been an operation that improves perceived value among physicians. Among 
employees Serono has a high internal loyalty, they feel to be protected and 
considered as a valuable resource. It is a wonderful sense of team. So, both 
internal and external stakeholder had a role in managerial response‖.  
 
 
Future strategic value of current identities 
 
A reason of present crisis in pharmaceutical market is the patent duration. A 
manager tried to explain it in the following way: ―Crisis break a ―fat cows‖ period. 
In Italy is easier realize cost saving on pharmaceutical expenses because they are 
clearly tracked from the beginning of the process to its end. Prices were too high 
but now … Small companies have been sold to larger groups. Large companies 
are closing R&D departments. Patents were more than 30 per year and now they 
are few units … Patent law reduced the period of exclusivity and in Italy 
bureaucratic procedures reduced them more and more… ―. In this context 
treatments with future value increase their present value. After the successful 
acquisition, Merck confirm this concept and diffused to the press the following 
news release: ―With the combined innovative power of two strong companies, we 
have the unique opportunity to create a superb union of pharmaceutical chemistry 
and biotechnology,‖ said Elmar Schnee, new Chief Executive Officer of Merck 
Serono S.A. ―We want to utilize the best of both companies. A total of 28 projects 
in clinical development, a combined R&D budget of approximately EUR 1 billion 
and the two key growth drivers Erbitux® for oncology and Rebif® for the 
treatment of multiple sclerosis, give us the best foundations for a successful 
future.‖ 
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Absence of strictness of resources constrains 
 
Among the rational reasons for the acquisition cost saving had not a primary role. 
An official presentation gave indication of improvement of profits: ―… 
•Significant value creation for shareholders: –Strong sales growth (around 10%) –
Immediately accretive to adjusted earnings after tax (and EPS)…‖. In addition, the 
CEO confirmed that cash flow use for acquisition has been rapidly recovered. 
Managers said also that the sanction that US agency assign to Serono had no role 
in deciding acquisition. On October 2005 Serono paid a fine of 704 million dollars 
and declared itself guilty and thereby avoid prosecution of litigation against the 
U.S. Department of Justice. It was accused about how sales of Serostim (an 
expensive drug based on growth hormone used to combat weight loss in AIDS 
patients) took place. The multinational was accused of having offered money and 
gifts to doctors and manipulating a test for measuring body composition, 
providing a medical diagnostic software not approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration in order to increase sales of Serostim. Serono has been excluded 
for five years, from U.S. federal health programs. Managers disagree about 
possible influence of that fine on decision to sell: ―I think that it (sanction) was 
not important for Bertarelli‟s decision. He understood only that Serono cannot 
grow anymore at two digits and so he preferred to sell it. He was very smart in 
selling at the right moment and he got a price that we didn‟t believe possible‖.  
Nevertheless, profitability of Serono and its cash flow were still interesting for 
Merck.  
 
 
4.5.4 Appropriateness of synergy 
 
Evidences from case study support also appropriateness of identity synergy as 
described in the following points.  
 
Two compatible identities 
 
The two companies have common values (attention to their own origins) but 
different and complementary identities (SERONO as high specialist, MERCK as 
chemical producer or generic low cost drugs). Many people have underlined two 
common aspects in Serono and Merck identities. Both the companies show a high 
attention to the past and to their own history, but also a capacity to anticipate the 
change. They seem to be in contrast between them but probably this capacity to 
look to the past and to the future at the same time is a winning strategy. People 
underline also that companies are complementary. The Serono‘s experience in 
pharmaceutical market is what Merck needed. At the same time, Merck is also a 
chemical company and the two businesses together resist better to cyclic trend of 
the markets. Another source of compatibility is the companies‘ nationality: Italian 
people consider German people reliable, solid and well organized. A manager 
said: ―When we received the news by e-mail, it wasn‟t clear who acquired us. If 
we were acquired by America Merck should be … It depends on nationality of 
acquiring company. Here, the approach has been soft, of sharing, a search of the 
best of each company‖. Serono needed to have more procedure in order to grow 
and Merck needed a higher entrepreneurial mentality in order to resist in a 
turbulent market.      
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High interdependence among the units embodying different identities in 
companies involved in an M&A 
 
As suggested by Pratt and Foreman, high synergy are required and ―managers may 
be forced to forge linkages between the two identities‖. Authors argued that ―By 
managing the conflict in this way, an organization also effectively preserves its 
‗response flexibility‘ by allowing different parts of the organization to maintain 
their own identities‖ (Pratt and Foreman, 2000). 
The example reported in Pratt and Foreman‘s paper is about a medical clinic 
where physicians and managers have different identities (professional or profit 
maximizing) but ―…both managers and physicians rely on each other for the 
ongoing survival of medical establishment‖. 
A manager seems to confirm that in Serono this condition is present while he 
explains why the sanction in US did not encourage Bertarelli in selling Serono: 
―… no I don‟t think it – the sanction – was important for the decision to sell the 
company. We produce treatments against heavy diseases (HIV, infertility, grow 
hormone deficit …) and people don‟t get those drugs without their physicians‟ 
advise. If you haven‟t that disease, that drug is dangerous … Also our researcher, 
our sales representatives and our marketing employees know that we are 
important for our patients. We must make profits also in order to produce 
treatments that safe their lives and research new treatment more effective…‖. 
Profit needs research, patients needs research, so they also ―need‖ profits. It is 
different for treatments sold in stores with low cost and no prescription. In that 
case, sometimes companies could try to sell more than how patient need.  
 
A high diffusion of multiple identities across the organizations involved in an 
M&A 
 
Multiple identities had a high diffusion among Serono but it still remain after 
acquisition. In the past, SERONO had weak links between researcher, marketing 
and manufacturing. The HR Director describes the present level of integration: 
―It‟s true that separation among sites is still high, May be, it depends on managers 
of these sites that prefer to be independent. They agree about a centralized 
administration, managerial control, pay roll or legal assistance. About HR 
management, they prefer to have a decentralized power. Anyway, we gradually 
have a shared agreement about that. It is better for people development also in 
different business units.‖. Different identities increase of course after the 
acquisition: Serono was focused on biotechnologies to treat heavy pathologies 
while Merck had chemical productions and ―blockbuster‖ drugs to treat diffuse 
diseases. ―To produce liquid crystal is different from producing drugs in a 
laboratory. It was an important source of change‖. These differences are 
mentioned also within the pharmaceutical business: ―Our treatments are for heavy 
diseases, nobody assumes them without physician advice. They are not drugs that 
you can buy at the store. If you haven‟t those diseases those it‟d be dangerous to 
take those treatments‖.  Even if people describe the sub-identity that they feel 
closer to them (department, Serono, Merck, site, …) a global identity is gradually 
built. A young employee said: ―I surprise myself saying „the color of Magnum 
Gold (an ice cream) is made with OUR pigments‟ and I realized that the sense of 
“WE” was changing in me‖.  
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4.6 Conclusion and discussion 
 
These findings suggest that all the conditions of the Pratt and Foreman‘s model 
are verified. Therefore, according to Pratt and Foreman, both identity synergy and 
plurality were appropriate and the better managerial response is an ―aggregation‖. 
Authors describe this managerial response as the choice to maintain both identities 
and forge links between them. They argue that these linkages ―can take at least 
two forms: (1) the creation of an identity hierarchy and/or (2) the creation of new 
beliefs‖. Again: ―Individuals can aggregate their identities by ordering them in an 
identity salience hierarchy‖. This salience is defined by Stryker as: ―the 
probability, for a given person, of a given identity being invoked in a variety of 
situation‖ (Stryker, 1968). So, this hierarchy is not rigid: an identity can be more 
salient in a specific situation. This hierarchy is the way to avoid role conflicts 
(Pratt and Foreman, 2000). Evidences from case study show that both Merck and 
Serono‘s identities were maintained but a common set of group value. Merck‘s 
managers adopted an aggregation response of aggregation where, after the 
acquisition, each identity is still alive but, at the same time, a clear group identity 
has been communicated. In this way, people follow their own identity but, if they 
face a conflict, it is possible to invoke the group identity that has a higher rank in 
the hierarchy. This managerial response has been appropriate and the acquisition 
has been perceived as a success. Another suggestion that emerges from this case 
study is referred to the different boundaries that the meaning assigned to the word 
―we‖ by the people. Many people used ―we‖ only referred to their site or 
department. In addition, the managerial response that I identified as ―aggregation‖ 
should be defined differently if I referred only to Italy (probably a ―deletion‖). 
Therefore, it is important that the boundaries of business are well defined in order 
to identify which managerial response has been implemented or should have to. A 
global strategy of ―identity aggregation‖ can sometimes need to ―delete‖ locally 
some identity.        
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5 Organizational identities evolution: sensemaking and 
causal maps. A case study of M&A in banking 
industry. 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Even if the opportunity and the possibility to manage organizational identity 
during the integration post acquisition has been argued by previous papers, the 
evolution of organizational identity remains a social process that takes place 
during the interaction among people. An acquisition creates a condition in which 
differences among identities are emphasized. This social process is based on 
sensemaking that can be defined as the capability to link daily activities with large 
patterns. The effectiveness of this process within an organization depends on the 
presence of ―common points‖ among cognitive maps of knowledge that each 
person develops. After an acquisition these ―common points‖ decrease because of 
a higher ambiguity. A managerial response that is based on clear communication 
and coherent managers‘ behaviour can reduce this ambiguity and improve 
sensemaking effectiveness. 
 
 
5.2 Theoretical background 
 
As shown more extensively in the next sections 6, the concept of sensemaking has 
been analyzed as a process of continuous social negotiation (Weick, 1995). 
According to Weick, sensemaking is ―the act of constructing interpretations of 
ambiguous environmental stimuli‖ (Weick, 1995). People need to reduce 
ambiguity and they socially look for a new equilibrium that is in continuous 
progress.  
Justification (a symbolic linkage among single interacts and underlying pattern), 
Commitment, Interpretation and Validation are phases of this process that has as 
output a collective structure based on a cognitive map. 
Cognitive maps were defined by Tolman (1948) and they are representations of 
our own knowledge that we edit from our organizational experience. They consist 
of ―the concepts and the relations a participant uses to understand organizational 
situations‖ (Weick, 2001). A specific form of cognitive map is represented by the 
causality maps. Causal maps link concepts with cause-effect relations. Tolman 
contrasted cognitive maps with strip maps that are sequences of information where 
each choice has an appropriate response. Differently, a cognitive map allows 
flexible behavior (Tolman, 1948).  
 
 
Use of cognitive maps for describing identities 
 
Many people have studied the analysis of cause maps. We can consider four 
groups of methodologies:  
 people who have limited their investigations to maps without loops (Simon, 
1957), estimating the parameters of the system of equations representing a 
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loopless cause map and solving the associated problems of estimation 
(Tukey, 1954; Blalock, 1969);  
 people who is interested in tracing the antecedents or the positive and 
negative consequents to some event or policy (Axelrod, 1976);  
 people who have looked at the ranking of the variables in a loopless cause 
map (Harary, Norman and Cartwright, 1965; Warfield, 1973); 
 people who have studied the problems of stability and instability introduced 
by the presence of positive and negative loops (Maruyama, 1963; Blalock, 
1969, 1971; Brown, Roberts, and Spencer, 1972; Roberts, 1973). 
 
Cognitive maps can become a collective cause map in three different ways: 
assemblage (Hall, 1984), composite (Eden et Al., 1981) and average (Bougon and 
Weick, 1977). 
Hall describes the case of five separate cause maps for five department of Saturday 
Evening Post. Maps were assembled among them because specific goals in one 
department became policy variables in others departments. So, a way to build 
collective structure can be ―identifies common elements in diverse cause maps …‖ 
(Weick, 2001). A composite causal map derives from a teamwork in which people, 
starting from their own maps, work together to share a collective map (Eden et al., 
1979). So, at the end, all people had the same map. The third form is the average 
map. It is presented by Bougon and Weick (1977), analyzing the case of Utrecht 
Jazz Orchestra. They asked to each of 19 members to assign causality relationships 
(zero, +1 or -1) and then generated a map based on the average (the algebraic 
mean) of answers. This map was different from each individual map but represent 
the most acceptable solution. 
Bougon, Weick and Binhorst (1977) described in an empirical study about the 
Uthrect Jazz Orchestra (UJO). Authors identified seventeen variables that all UJO 
musicians agreed could be referred to their experience. Then they focused on the 
14 variables that were homogeneous, and excluded others. “Each UJO participant 
was asked to specify (1) which variables influenced which other variables, (2) 
whether each influence relationship he had identified was positive or negative, (3) 
which relationships he was certain existed, and (4) which of the 17 variables he 
felt he could influence personally.” The participant filled the cells of a table during 
19 structured interviews. For every pair of variables members were asked, "Do you 
find that [variable Y] is of influence on [variable Z]?". They answered yes or no 
and, for yes-relationships, indicated the "nature of the relationship". A negative 
sign was related to a decrease in the related variable (inverse relationship) and 
vice-versa.  
Authors used a methodology that considers loops and they described it in the 
following way: “we developed exploits the fact mentioned earlier that the upper 
triangle of a standard input-output matrix corresponds to a graph without loops 
flowing in one direction, and that the lower triangle corresponds to another graph 
without loops flowing in the opposite direction. Thus, the flow of causality in the 
graph corresponding to the full matrix reconciles these two antagonisms. Either 
one flow dominates the other, and there will be a net flow of causality in its 
direction, or the two flows cancel each other, and there will be no net flow of 
causality. In the latter case all the variables have a like relation to each other; 
they are all equally cause and effect; they offer no basis for distinguishing one 
from the other; they therefore offer no criterion by which we can order or unfold 
the cause map.”. 
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Based on the upper and lower triangle flows each variable can be assigned a 
number, a criterion that was called “generalized indegree or generalized 
outdegree". The "indegree" is the number of paths leading to the variable from 
other variables; the "outdegree" the number of paths leading from it to other 
variables. Indegree and outdegree allow authors to construct a cause graph. The 
generalized indegree ranking criterion help to build an "average UJO cause map" 
as the algebraic mean of the signed links reported by the 12 participants.  
Then they plotted generalized outdegree rank against generalized indegree rank 
and noted that did not exist a linear association between indegrees and outdegrees 
(R^ is .03). These observations suggest that there may be an important asymmetry 
between variables as originators and the same variables as terminators of activity 
and that effects are more important than causes for sensemaking (Mead, 1934: 76). 
That suggestion implies that: “ …in the construction of their world the 
participants' perceptions are biased toward caused variables rather than toward 
causing variables. Put another way, participants may pay attention to variables 
that are heavily controlled by other variables on the assumption that they too can 
control these variables since they too are causal agents.”. 
The methodology used in that case allows to draw an average map and to measure 
the degree of similarity among maps of a group of people. This measure can be 
used as a proxy of sensemaking effectiveness. 
 
Use of cognitive maps in strategy development and communication. 
 
The second step of this research consists in measuring the similarity between 
people perception of the bank and the target identity included in change strategy. 
Therefore, can be useful a short review of studies about the use of maps in strategy 
development and communication. Cognitive maps have been well employed in the 
strategic management domain over many years (Ackerman & Eden 2005, Bryson 
et al 2004, Eden & Ackerman 1998). The article by Eden & Ackerman (1998) 
suggests what the various analyses described might imply for an understanding 
and evaluation of cognitive complexity. Eden argued that the development of 
strategy in organizations will be more effective if it is seen as predominantly a 
social rather than analytical process (Eden, 1992). In the late eighties a 
methodology called SODA (Strategic Options Development and Analysis) that 
use cognitive maps has been developed. The use of cognitive maps in formulation 
of IS strategy has been described by de Salas, Marshall and Young (2007). 
Authors describe the process: “Specifically, a set of interviews is carried out with 
the senior management team. These interviews are focused on the business 
environment of the organization, the strategic goals and business strategy. From 
this process, the management team is facilitated to identify the type of information 
systems required to enable and support the business strategy. Cognitive maps are 
prepared for each of the interviews, and then validated with each of the managers 
concerned. These individual cognitive maps are then merged by the researcher 
and are used in a facilitated group session with the senior management team to 
negotiate a shared understanding and shared agreement on the strategic goals 
and the supporting information systems. Cognitive mapping as a support tool for 
IS strategy is issues and problem focused” (de Salas, Marshall and Young, 2007). 
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5.3 Managerial response to ambiguity in organizational 
identities and its effects on effectiveness of sensemaking 
 
Causal maps can be used to represent general patterns that help sensemaking and 
influence the behavior of people and their decisions. The organizational identity 
can be considered as one of this patterns and it provide a guideline for decisions 
within an organization. Therefore, according to Weick approach, the effectiveness 
of sensemaking is linked to the degree of similarity among cognitive maps that 
represents the strategy elaborated by management and the average map resulting 
from an aggregation of individual maps. An acquisition causes ambiguity among 
people and improves plurality of identities. A managerial response to this plurality 
and ambiguity about identity will be effective only if it has effects on people 
perception. Therefore can be interesting address the following question: 
 
How a managerial response to ambiguity of multiple identities generated after an 
M&A can influence the effectiveness of sensemaking process? 
 
According to Weick, sensemaking is a continuous social process that allows to 
members to reduce environmental ambiguity. This approach consider sensemaking 
as a process without a single solution but as a process that bring people to share 
common point on their individual cognitive maps. Therefore, the effectiveness of 
sensemaking can be measured comparing cognitive maps and elaborating a degree 
of similarity. An acquisition is a source of ambiguity for organizational identities. 
People perception of new reality will be different if communication and behavior 
of management will not be clear and coherent. The managerial response must at 
the same time, reduce difference among cognitive maps of people and make the 
“average map” of people closer to the strategy cognitive map. On these bases is 
possible to formulate the following proposition:   
 
After an M&A, a managerial response that clarifies organizational identity 
perception, enhancing weaker relationships, improves the effectiveness of 
sensemaking process reducing the ambiguity in multiple identities. 
 
This proposition can be verified in a case study in banking industry applying a 
methodology based on cognitive maps. Maps can be used in order to: 
 measure and describe the level of effectiveness of sensemaking; 
 measure and describe the level of comprehension of corporate strategy. 
 
 
 
5.4 Methodology 
 
The idiosyncratic nature of organizational identity requires the choice of a case 
study methodology in order to answer to the research question of this section. 
The methodology is articulated in three phases: data collection (interviews to 
people), cognitive maps drawing, and measurement of network index. Each phase 
has been duplicated in order to underline differences between what happened 
before and after the acquisition. 
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Data collection (interviews to people and secondary data) 
 
The number of interviewed people has not a statistical meaning because the aim of 
this section is to test the use of cognitive maps as representation of sensemaking. I 
collected 32 interviews from people that have different roles and responsibilities 
within the bank. Each person has been interviewed about the identity of BNL 
before the acquisition and about the new identity after the acquisition. The strategy 
map has been built from the analysis of secondary data from press, internal 
documents or bank web site. 
 
Cognitive maps drawing 
 
In order to draw maps, I extracted concepts from the narratives to point the nodes 
of network. Then, if these concepts were described as linked among them by 
cause-effect relationships, I drew an arrow to represent them. I used a software (C-
MAP) that allows to map cognitive map and to elaborate differences between a 
couple of maps. It allows also building map in file sharing modality. This could be 
a good tool for using cognitive maps in order to facilitate sensemaking process. 
 
Measurement of network index 
 
Each cognitive map is made of concepts and relationships among them. In order to 
measure how the maps are different I follow the criteria used by Weick in the 
paper about the Utrecht Orchestra. 
I followed these steps: 
 from each map I elaborated a table  n x n where concepts are in the rows 
and in the columns; 
 each relationship between two concepts produce a value 1 on the box 
matching the row of the first concept and the column of the other or 0 
(zero) if no relationship was mentioned; 
 for each concept I elaborated the in-degree index (how many concepts 
were indicated as cause of it) and the out-degree index (how many 
concepts were indicated as effect of it); 
 for each couple of maps I elaborated the differences as addition of 
differences between each in-degree and out-degree; 
 drawing the networks of interviewed people (a network before acquisition 
and a network after acquisition) the value of differences gives the degree 
of closeness between maps; 
 networks‟ density give a measure of how maps are similar and this 
measure is used as a proxy of sensemaking effectiveness; 
 drawing of “average map” of people after the acquisition; 
 drawing of “strategy map”; 
 measurement of similarity degree between the “average map” of people 
and strategy map. 
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5.5 Research context   
 
BNP Paribas (www.bnpparibas.com) is a European leader in banking and financial 
services worldwide and one of the five strongest banks in the world according to 
Standard & Poor's. The group is present in over 85 countries with 155,000 
employees, including 123,000 in Europe. Holds key positions in three major areas 
of activity: Corporate and Investment Banking, Asset Management & Services and 
Retail Banking. Present throughout Europe in all its activities, France and Italy are 
its two domestic markets for Retail Banking. BNP Paribas also has a significant 
presence in the United States and strong positions in Asia and emerging countries.  
The acquisition of BNL represented a decisive step in the path of international 
development of BNP Paribas for which Italy is a second home market with new 
and significant growth prospects.  
BNL was founded in 1913, is a leading Italian banking group and the most famous 
brand in Italy. BNL, with approximately 900 stores in Italy, offers a wide range of 
products and services from more traditional to more innovative to meet the diverse 
needs of its customers (individuals and families, businesses and public 
administration).  
From the eighties, BNL story becomes dense difficulties with acceleration in 
recent years before the acquisition. There are many events that swing the fortunes 
of BNL, the boom in stock until the misadventure in Atlanta. On August 4, 1989 
the FBI raided the home of Atlanta's Banca Nazionale del Lavoro and brings to 
light an overdraft of more than two thousand million dollars paid to defense 
industries to provide weapons to Iraq during Saddam Hussein's war against Iran, 
number one enemy of the United States.  
The 1997 budget closed with losses of 2.865 billion. At that point, while managers 
cutted 6,000 redundancies among the staff to reduce the deficit, BNL bought 
Banco di Napoli. On 11 June 1997, the Treasury Minister Carlo Azeglio Ciampi 
signs the contract with which it is sold for just 61 billion of 60 percent of the 
capital to Naples Tour consortium INA-BNL. In late nineties, the San Paolo di 
Torino disburses 3.000 billion lire to buy the package of Bank of Naples from 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro. 
On May 2 in 2000, BNL paid dividends to its shareholders (114 pounds per 
ordinary share and 154 per share savings) through the 1999 budget that had seen 
the realization of "significant gains, including primarily for participation in the 
Banco di Napoli”. 
At that time, was among the shareholders, with a share of 14.72 per cent, Banco 
Bilbao y Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA), which is the second Spanish bank and the 
ninth in Europe. The same bank that five years later, in December 2005, is leading 
a new climbing to the National Labour: a story over the center of investigations by 
the judiciary for the involvement of Unipol and which claimed the highest chair of 
Via Nazionale, Antonio Fazio. The facts date back to 2005, a year marked by a 
tough battle, with several twists. These are the stages of a lost game, at least for 
most of the protagonists of the time. 
On 29 April 2004: shareholders signed an agreement (BBVA, Generali and Diego 
Della Valle). 
On March 18, 2005: Banco Bilbao announced an ops of about 6.5 billion on 100% 
of Via Veneto.  
On April 13 2005: Consob approved publication of offer document of BBVA on 
BNL. 
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On May 13: Green light from Bankitalia to OPS of BBVA. 
On May 16: Unipol announced to exceed 5% and up to the threshold of 10% in 
BNL. 
On May 21: The list led by BBVA with 48.21% of votes in the assembly gets eight 
councilors. 
On July 1: UNIPOL asks Bankitalia green light up to 15% and announced that it 
had options for up to 14.92%. 
On July 7: Giovanni Consorte is participating for the first time at an official 
meeting of Contropatto led by Francesco Gaetano Caltagirone. After the rumors, is 
the first formal act of a negotiation in progress. 
On July 15: Go ahead Bankitalia up to 30% for BBVA to 15% for Unipol. The 
Spanish are threatening legal action if Unipol will not launch a counter-takeover 
bid. 
On July 17: New Consorte-Contropatto meeting. 
On July 18: Unipol announced the mandatory takeover bid for BNL to 2.7 euros. 
The contropatto melts and sells shares to insurance company and its allies.  
On July 22: The BBVA prepares to join the Offer Unipol realizing a gain of 520 
million. 
On 13 September: Green light Consob publication of the prospectus. 
On December 15: Consorte is under investigation in Rome. 
On December 16: news about suspects about Governor Antonio Fazio. 
On December 19: The Governor of the Bank of Italy, now involved the 
investigation and under pressure unanimous of Italian Parliament, resigned. Even 
Ivano Sacchetti, vice of Consorte, is under investigation. 
On December 28: Even Consorte is forced to leave office by Unipol. 
On January 10, 2006: The Bank of Italy blocked the bid by Unipol. 
On February 3, 2006: BNP Paribas buys 48% of BNL by Unipol and its associates 
and subsequently launched a takeover bid. Following the conclusion of a takeover 
offer by BNP Paribas, BNL became part of a larger international group, considered 
one of the strongest in the world according to Standard & Poor's (AA December 
31, 2008). On September 20, 2007, effective on Oct. 1, was signed in Rome the act 
of placing the Italian operations of BNL in the field of "commercial bank" - retail, 
private and corporate - in favor of a subsidiary 100%, the which together will be 
renamed "Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA. The contribution also includes bonds 
issued by BNL and listed on the Bond Electronic Market. On September 25, 2007 
was subsequently signed the act of merger of BNL BNP Paribas, which will 
always have effect from 1 October 2007, at a time immediately following with 
respect to contribution. With the implementation of the transfer and merger is 
completed so the announced plan of reorganization and integration of activities 
with those of BNL by BNP Paribas. With a view to simplifying the structure and 
organization of the activities of BNP Paribas in Italy and in countries where BNL 
and BNP Paribas are present, the activities of BNL through its foreign branches in 
New York, London, Madrid and Hong Kong have been allocated directly to BNP 
Paribas. Some holdings, including those held in asset management companies, 
leasing companies in Locafit and BNL Vita, are directly held by BNP Paribas. 
Successful integration is now visible both in retail market (with the renewal and 
expansion of the range products) and in corporate front (starting from birth to five 
Trade Center in some of the main Italian cities and the opening of the Italian desk 
in France and some countries of the Mediterranean basin to support Italian firms in 
their internationalization process). 
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5.6 Findings  
 
Results of data analysis cannot be representative of a large organization as BNL 
because of the small number of interviewed people. Nevertheless, there is a 
“convergence” among people‟s perceptions. It makes possible an interpretation of 
the effects of this acquisition on organizational identity. Evidence from this case 
demonstrates that the managerial response to ambiguity generated after acquisition 
was a success, even if, in a so large organization, differences between commercial 
people and staff employees are possible. 
The sensemaking effectiveness shows an improvement (from 93,5% to 93,8%) 
and, at the same time, people comprehension and interiorization of strategy is high 
(91,2%). 
In the following paragraphs, I describe and analyze data in order to provide an 
interpretation of results. 
 
 
5.6.1 Before the acquisition 
 
The maps built from the interviews consist of relationships among 10 nodes that 
are concepts used by people to describe the organizational identity of the bank 
before the acquisition. These nodes are the following: 
 
 A bank owned by the State 
 Marketing weakness 
 No external benchmark / Captive market 
 Bureaucratic 
 Low motivation / low pressure 
 Bureaucratic approach to IS 
 Union strangeness 
 Large but not focused training 
 A static, old organization 
 A Corporate bank / large competences 
 
 
Each people used different words and gave not exactly the same meaning. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to clarify the general meaning that these concepts. 
 
A bank owned by the State 
BNL was owned by the State and therefore was influenced by politics. People 
made differences between the period before privatization and after it. After 
privatization, people perceived ambiguity and confusion. 
 
Marketing weakness 
BNL was focused on present customer more than on prospects. Therefore 
attention to marketing and communication were low. 
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No external benchmark / Captive market 
A bank owned by the State had large benefit in order to achieve important 
corporate customer (for instance movie industry). Therefore, managers were proud 
of sales and pained low attention to comparate their results with other banks. 
 
Bureaucratic 
Bureaucracy was a consequence of a statal environment where procedures were 
more important than objectives.  
 
Low motivation / low pressure 
This point is not so clear. Low pressure was a consequence of captive market. 
Anyway, some people link low pressure with low motivation; others link it with a 
favorable condition for working. 
 
Bureaucratic approach to IS 
IS were designed for accounting more than for supporting business. 
 
Union strength 
Unions had an important role in HR management negotiations. 
 
Large but not focused training 
Attention was paid to training but in a not focused way. These courses had high-
level teachers but used bureaucratic criteria for enrolling people.  
 
A static, old organization 
These conditions consolidated a static situation that someone called “old”. 
 
A Corporate bank / large competences 
BNL was organized as a complete bank with all corporate services well structured 
(sometimes overstaffed). 
 
5.6.1.1 Individual cognitive maps 
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5.6.1.2 Tables of indegree and outdegree index 
 
Concepts expressed by people with different words but with the same meaning 
have been grouped in wider words. Each relationship between two concepts 
produce a value 1 on the box matching the row of the first concept and the column 
of the other or 0 (zero) if no relationship was mentioned. 
For each concept, I elaborated the in-degree index (how many concepts were 
indicated as cause of it) and the out-degree index (how many concepts were 
indicated as effect of it). 
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5.6.1.3 Differences among maps 
 
The differences come from the addition of differences between each in-degree and 
out-degree for each concept. The value of this difference is in a range between a 
maximum of 180 (difference between a map with no relationships and a map with 
all relationships flagged in 9 rows and 9 columns times 10 concepts) and 0.  
 
 
 
5.6.1.4 Networks among people and its density 
 
All People are linked with others by a relationship. The intensity of these 
relationships is calculated as percent of deference taken from the table above on 
the maximum value (180). 
Network or global-level density is defined as the proportion of ties in a network 
relative to the total number possible (sparse versus dense networks). It is possible 
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to estimate the density of this network as a proxy of effectiveness of sensemaking 
(where the maximum of effectiveness should give a density of 100% because all 
people have the same map). In this network I founded a high density (93,5%). 
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5.6.2 After the acquisition 
 
 
The same methodology used for mapping the identity pre-acquisition has been 
used for the maps referred to the post acquisition situation built from the 
interviews. They consist of 10 nodes that are concepts used by people to describe 
the organizational identity of the bank before the acquisition. These nodes are the 
following: 
 Change towards a "commercial" bank 
 Focused training 
 Downsizing staff department 
 More pressure on commercial objectives 
 Attention to internal communication 
 Promotion investments 
 IT investments 
 Less power to Unions 
 Empowerment of managers 
 No more captive markets 
 
Each node has a meaning that can be explained in the following way. 
 
No more captive markets 
BNL lost its advantage that came from the statal ownership and it is now into 
competitive market.  
 
Change towards a "commercial" bank 
A compensation of that lost market must come from a stronger commercial 
capacity.  
 
Focused training 
Training has been reduced as volume, but focused on key people. Attention has 
been paid to communication skills at any level. 
 
Downsizing staff department 
BNP has central services in its headquarter in France. So, many central services 
have been closed or reduced.  
 
More pressure on commercial objectives 
In order to transform BNL in a bank with market orientation, people received more 
pressure. 
 
 
Attention to internal communication 
Communication is a central point in BNP strategy. Managers “put their faces” and 
they are transparent in communication. 
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Promotion investments 
Commercial effort has been supported with high and structured investments in 
promotion. 
 
IT investments 
IT investment improved in order to support the standardization of operation and 
the effectiveness of commercial agents. 
 
Less power to Unions 
The role of Unions are now more limited. 
 
Empowerment of managers 
“Now managers decide” said an interviewed employee. The real ambiguity was in 
the period between the first privatization and this acquisition.  
 
 
5.6.2.1 Individual cognitive maps 
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5.6.2.2 Tables of indegree and outdegree index 
 
Each relationship between two concepts produce a value 1 on the box matching the 
row of the first concept and the column of the other or 0 (zero) if no relationship 
was mentioned. 
For each concept, I elaborated the in-degree index (how many concepts were 
indicated as cause of it) and the out-degree index (how many concepts were 
indicated as effect of it). 
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5.6.2.3 Differences among maps 
 
The differences come from the addition of differences between each in-degree and 
out-degree for each concept. The value of this difference is in a range between a 
maximum of 180 (difference between a map with no relationships and a map with 
all relationships flagged in 9 rows and 9 columns times 10 concepts) and 0.  
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5.6.2.4 Networks among people and its density 
 
As in the previous paragraph, all People are linked with others by a relationship. 
The intensity of these relationships is calculated as percent of difference taken 
from the table above on the maximum value (180). 
Network or global-level density is defined as the proportion of ties in a network 
relative to the total number possible (sparse versus dense networks). It is possible 
to estimate the density of this network as a proxy of effectiveness of sensemaking 
(where the maximum of effectiveness should give a density of 100% because all 
people have the same map). In this network I founded a high density (93,8%). 
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5.6.3 Network density as a measure of effectiveness of 
sensemaking process: an interpretation of 
managerial response effects 
 
 
Drawing the networks of interviewed people (a network before acquisition and a 
network after acquisition), the value of differences indicates the degree of 
similarity between each couple of maps. Density of networks among people before 
and after the acquisition, defined as the average of similarity degrees among 
couples of maps, can be used as a proxy of sensemaking effectiveness. 
This measure of sensemaking effectiveness shows an improvement (from 93,5% 
to 93,8%). The interpretation of this result shows a complete reduction of 
ambiguity generated by the acquisition. 
 
5.6.4 Map similarity index as a measure of the 
effectiveness of managerial response  
 
 
Drawing the map of interviewed people perception after acquisition and a map that 
represent bank strategy, the degree of closeness between maps provide a proxy of 
how strategy has been correctly understood by people. 
 
5.6.4.1 Strategy map 
 
The strategy map has been drawn from the analysis of secondary data (internal 
house organ, interviews, presentations, …).  
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5.6.4.2 An “average map” of people perception  
 
Individual cognitive maps can become a collective cause map in three different 
ways: assemblage (Hall, 1984), composite (Eden et Al, 1981) and average 
(Bougon and Weick, 1977). Hall describes the case of five separate cause maps for 
five department of Saturday Evening Post. Maps were assembled among them 
because specific goals in one department became policy variables in others 
departments. So, a way to build collective structure can be ―identifies common 
elements in diverse cause maps …‖ (Weick, 2001). A composite causal map 
derives from teamwork in which people, starting from their own maps, work 
together to share a collective map (Eden et al., 1979). So, at the end, all people had 
the same map. The third form is the average map. As described above, it is 
presented by Bougon and Weick (1977), analyzing the case of Utrecht Jazz 
Orchestra. They asked to each of 19 members to assign causality relationships 
(zero, +1 or -1) and then generated a map based on the average (the algebraic 
mean) of answers. This map was different from each individual map but represent 
the most acceptable solution. 
In this case study “average map” is built using the average of individual values. 
So, a value close to 1 means that many people indicated that relationship and a 
value close to 0 that few people indicated that relationship. 
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5.6.4.3 Similarity index as a measure of the effectiveness of 
managerial response 
 
The similarity index is calculated as sum of differences (absolute values) of 
indegree and outdegree for each row and column. The resulting value is 91,2% (as 
percent of maximum value of differences) and gives the sense of a successful 
managerial strategy that took people towards the expected map.  
 
 
 
 
How bank achieved this good result and which relationships should be better 
clarified? 
 
In order to explain how managerial response adopted by the bank management re-
generated common points among individual maps in terms of concepts and 
relationships, it is possible to compare the intensity of stronger relationships on 
strategy map and on average map. 
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Relationships on strategy map and their intensities in average map 
Cause Effects Int. Explanations 
No more captive 
markets 
 
Change towards a 
"commercial" bank 
0,86 The end of advantages 
coming from the public 
“status” is clear to people. 
Glocal  
Company 
0,00 No one indicated the 
international dimension of 
the group. 
 
 
Change towards a 
"commercial" bank 
Attention to internal 
communication 
0,43 A clear consequence of new 
strategy. 
Promotion 
investments 
0,43 A clear consequence of new 
strategy. 
More pressure on 
commercial 
objectives 
 
0,57 
People have a clear idea 
about the necessity to 
improve pressure. 
 
Value to BNL 
history 
Attention to internal 
communication 
0,00  
No one indicated this 
strategy issue. Promotion 
investments 
0,00 
Focused 
 Training 
 
More pressure on 
commercial 
objectives 
0,29 Training is a confused point 
for people. 
Attention to internal 
communication 
0,43 People feel managers closer 
than before acquisition. 
Change towards a 
"commercial" bank 
0,57 People have a clear idea 
about the necessity to 
improve pressure. 
 
Relationships (not in strategy map) on average map and its intensity 
Cause Effects Int. Explanations 
 
 
Change towards a 
"commercial" bank 
 
 
Downsizing staff 
department 
 
 
0,86 
People in corporate staff 
underlined more the 
centralization of those 
services in France than the 
effort on commercial 
agencies.  
 
The use of cognitive maps can become an effective managerial tool because: 
 at beginning of integration process it can map people perception; 
 then it allows to focus managerial effort on concepts or relationship with 
lower perception; 
 during the whole process, it allows to monitoring the effectiveness of 
sensemaking process. 
This analysis shows that strong points in this sensemaking process are: 
 the necessity to replace the lost advantage of captive markets; 
 the consequences of that as necessity to invest on commercial people and 
structures 
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Weak points consist in two strategic issues not clear to people (internationality of 
the group and the will to underline the history of BNL) and a misunderstanding 
(people in central services suffers the downsizing of their services). 
 
5.7 Conclusions 
 
The proposition that I verified describing this case of acquisition argues that … 
after an M&A, a managerial response that clarifies organizational identity 
perception, enhancing weaker relationships, improves the effectiveness of 
sensemaking process reducing the ambiguity in multiple identities. 
I illustrated how, using cognitive map and network measurements, is possible to 
describe the initiatives that acquiring bank used during integration process and 
their effects on level of effectiveness of sensemaking. I also described how that 
bank could measure and monitor the level of comprehension of corporate strategy. 
Doing that, the bank can clarify strategic issues related to organizational identity 
that shows a weak level of comprehension. 
In addition, this section has three main outcomes that are more interesting than 
conclusion that can be elaborated on the specific case study (that has a clear 
limitation in the number of interviewed people with respect to the size of the 
bank). 
First, it explains why the evolution of organizational identity is a social process 
based on sensemaking and how appropriate managerial responses must be 
monitored and supported at social level in order to be effective. 
Second, it clarifies how cognitive maps can be a managerial tool to achieve that 
result. Cognitive maps allow representing the expected organizational identity in a 
form closer to the mental representation that people build about the new reality. 
Third, it demonstrates that sensemaking process can be measured in terms of 
effectiveness using network measurements. This result can be interesting for both 
academic and practitioners. 
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6 Effects of Information Systems adoption, implementation 
and assimilation on Organizational Identity during the 
integration process after a M&A 
 
6.1 Introduction    
 
The aim of this study is to illustrate how the adoption of new Information Systems (IS) affects 
sensemaking in the process of Organizational Identity (OI) integration after an M&A. Within a 
wider case study about an acquisition in chemical/pharmaceutical industry, we describe the effects 
of IS (SAP) adoption, implementation and assimilation on the organizational identity. We argue that 
after an M&A there are conditions for a mindful innovation with IT and therefore innovating with IT 
can be an effective way to enforce sensemaking process and, as a consequence, to influence the 
Organizational Identity evolution.  
 
6.2 Theoretical Background 
 
Existing studies illustrate how new IS bring about changes in group identity (Walsham 1998; Lamb 
and Davidson 2005), and how existing identities can be challenged by new IS (Barrett and Walsham 
1999). More recently, how the established patterns of identity enactment and inter-organisational 
practices are influenced by the appropriation of new IS has been studied (Gal U., Jensen T., 2008). 
Authors report on findings from three in-depth case studies in the architecture, engineering, and 
construction industry and provide a detailed account of this transformation. They underline the 
practice-based nature of organizational identity and the symbolic significance of IS, demonstrating 
that changes in identity are enacted as organizational practices and interaction patterns are 
transformed.  
 
The innovation process has been articulated in two steps (Rogers, 1995) and better specified in 4 
phases: comprehension, adoption, implementation and assimilation (Swanson, 1994). 
The concept of mindfulness has been analyzed referred to individual (Langer and Moldoveanu, 
2000) and referred to organizations (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). Weick and Sutcliffe identify five 
attributes of mindfulness: preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify interpretations, 
sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience and reliance on expertise over formal authority. 
This concept of mindfulness has been analyzed in its relationships with innovating with IT by 
Swanson and Ramiller with a focus on how those attributes of mindfulness change (Swanson and 
Ramiller, 2004). They also identify three endemic conditions that can on the contrary push firm 
towards a mindless innovation (limitation in attention, contextual insensitivity and institutional pre-
emption). Authors argue that there are circumstances in which mindlessness may be a good choice 
even if associated to some risks.  
 
 
6.3 Research question 
 
While the relationships between Information Systems and Organizational Identity have been studied 
in recent years, the role of IS in sensemaking process following an M&A received less attention. We 
focused our study on the following research question:  
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How Information Systems adoption, implementation and assimilation contribute to sensemaking in 
Organizational Identity evolution process following an M&A?  
 
6.4 Mindful innovation as source of sensemaking 
 
It is possible to draw some propositions about mindful innovation during the integration process 
following the acquisition. As argued above, a mindful innovation has a higher sensemaking as a 
consequence and has a deliberate strategy as a premise. Based on these findings it is possible to state 
that after an M&A, firms have organizational conditions that help a mindful innovation. This kind of 
innovation has positive influence on sensemaking process within the firm. So, innovating with IT 
after an M&A can support a positive evolution of Organizational Identity in the companies involved 
in.  
In the following pages we describe what happen in M&A context to each of the five mindfulness 
attributes of innovating with IT (Swanson and Ramiller, 2004) and the relationship between mindful 
innovation and OI evolution. 
     
First, when a firm is involved in an M&A it is concerned with the possibility of failure, because the 
difficulties of integration process are well known. With regard to IT innovation, preoccupation with 
failure can aid both acquiring and target companies to be selective in adoption also to underline its 
own organizational specificity. Managers of acquired company would have an opportunity to 
demonstrate their professionalism. The acquisition is perceived as a result of companies‘ capability 
to success in the market, so oppositions to innovation is less strong because also who disagrees with 
innovation recognizes that the solutions adopted by acquiring company allowed to it to have better 
performance. A firm involved in an M&A lives, during the integration period, a situation similar to 
HROs (High Reliability Organizations) that ―operate, in environment …, where to avoid failures in 
the face of shifting sources of vulnerability, complex processes are used to manage complex 
technology‖ (Weick et Al, 1999). 
 
Proposition 1: Firms engaged in innovation with IT after an M&A have a higher preoccupation with 
failure. 
 
As the mindful organization is interested in insignificant details in day-to-day operations (Swanson 
and Ramiller, 2004), after an M&A an acquiring company has a high interest in achieving some 
performance improvement in business processes of target company. New managers need to proof 
that their way to manage the target company will produce value. This sensitivity to operations 
depends on the perception of comparing procedure as an opportunity to improvement. Innovators in 
both acquiring and target company have respectively the possibility to discuss their present 
procedures and to innovate them.  
Anyway, a low decentralization of responsibility in implementation of innovation can be a risk for 
mindfulness after an M&A. As previous studies have demonstrated, a source of motivation to a 
mindless innovation can be a limited attention (Swanson and Ramiller, 2004). If the innovation 
responsibility is attributed to the same manager that deals the whole integration after the acquisition, 
it is possible that he can be less rational in his decisions because his attention is shared in several 
priorities.   
 
Proposition 2: Firms engaged in innovation with IT after an M&A have a higher sensitivity to 
operations. 
 
Third, a firm involved in an M&A is resilient and favors adaptation over routine. Managers of 
acquired company open a period in which they are disposal to recognize that their routines can be 
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discussed. A new way to prepare budget new procedures to evaluate investments modify primary 
routines and open to a more general review. The acquired company has the opportunity to innovate 
with IT as a follower of others (the acquiring) that have a grounded experience. Acquiring 
company‘s managers reported their experienced without risk of opportunistic behavior as it is 
instead possible for consultants. So, acquired company‘s managers can have a higher commitment to 
resilience because risk is lower and trust is higher. 
 
Proposition 3: Firms engaged in innovation with IT after an M&A have a higher commitment to 
resilience. 
 
Fourth, as mindful organizations, firms involved in M&A resist the temptation to use simplified 
interpretation of events. Managers in Target Company are opened to new and conflicting 
interpretations. The prevention of the ―not-invented-here syndrome‖ in period following to an M&A 
is easier because the companies‘ boundaries have been modified. If they are engaged in innovating 
with IT, especially in implementation phase, they will put a high attention to context. During the 
integration process, acquiring managers make a comprehension effort about the acquired company. 
Innovation with IT during this period can stimulate them to be opened to new implementations of 
their systems.   
 
Proposition 4: Firms engaged in innovation with IT after an M&A have a higher richness of 
interpretation. 
 
Fifth, as mindfulness organizations, firms involved in an M&A redesign the formal structure and the 
distribution of authority among its members. Each person is evaluated for its own experience and 
those experiences that have been underutilized can find new opportunities. Anyway, mindful 
organizations ―attend to the innovation with reasoning grounded in the firm's own facts and 
specifics‖. So, during an integration process after M&A, people‘s experiences can find new 
opportunities but they will be evaluated and compared with human resources working in acquiring 
company. 
 
Proposition 5: Firms engaged in innovation with IT after an M&A develop better expertise of 
people. 
 
The following table summarizes relationship between attributes of mindfulness and organizational 
identity after an M&A 
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Attribute of  
Mindfulness 
Reasons to be mindful after an M&A  
Preoccupation with  
failure 
 
 Firm involved in an M&A are concerned with the possibility of 
failure, because the difficulties of integration process are well 
known.  
 With regard to IT innovation, preoccupation with failure can aid both 
acquiring and target companies to be selective also to underline its 
own organizational specificity.  
 Managers of acquired company would have an opportunity to 
demonstrate their professionalism.  
 The acquisition is perceived as a result of companies‘ capability to 
success in the market, so oppositions to innovation is less strong 
because also who disagrees with innovation recognizes that the 
solutions adopted by acquiring company allowed to it to have better 
performance. 
 Firms live, during the integration period, a situation similar to HROs‘ 
normal environment  (High Reliability Organizations) that ―operate, 
in environment …, where to avoid failures in the face of shifting 
sources of vulnerability, complex processes are used to manage 
complex technology‖ 
Sensitivity to  
operations 
 
 An acquiring company has a high interest in achieving some 
performance improvement in business processes of target company.  
 New managers need to proof that their way to manage the target 
company will produce value.  
Commitment to  
resilience 
 
 Managers of acquired company open a period in which they are 
disposal to recognize that their routines can be discussed.  
 A new way to prepare budget new procedures to evaluate 
investments modify primary routines and open to a more general 
review.  
 The acquired company has the opportunity to innovate with IT as a 
follower of others (the acquiring) that have a grounded experience.  
Richness of  
interpretation 
 
 Managers in target company are opened to new and conflicting 
interpretations.  
 The prevention of the ―not-invented-here syndrome‖ in period 
following to an M&A is easier because the companies‘ boundaries 
have been modified.  
 If managers are engaged in innovating with IT, especially in 
implementation phase, they will put a high attention to context.  
 During the integration process, acquiring managers make a 
comprehension effort about the acquired company.  
 Innovation with IT during this period can stimulate managers to be 
opened to new implementations of their systems. 
Development of  
expertise 
 
 Firms involved in an M&A redesign the formal structure and the 
distribution of authority among its members.  
 Each person is evaluated for its own experience and those 
experiences that have been underutilized can find new opportunities. 
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These considerations suggest that after an M&A companies have a higher mindfulness in innovating 
with IT. We suggest that this mindfulness is a condition that improves effectiveness of sensemaking 
process and, therefore, it helps the evolution of Organizational Identity.  
 
The concept of sensemaking has been analyzed as a process of continuous social negotiation 
(Weick, 1995). The three premises of his constructionist approach are: (i) the identification of any 
given action is subject to infinite revision, (ii) the anchor point of any given interpretation relies on a 
network of interdependent and continuously modifiable interpretations and (iii) any given action is 
subject to multiple identifications, the relative superiority of which is problematic (Gergen, 1981). 
According to Weick, sensemaking is ―the act of constructing interpretations of ambiguous 
environmental stimuli‖ (Weick, 1995). People need to reduce ambiguity and they socially look for a 
new equilibrium that is in continuous progress. In the following figure, there is a simplified 
representation of the process of ambiguity reduction and sense making, analyzed in the following 
pages. 
 
 
 
Figure 11 Sensemaking process 
 
Justification: a symbolic linkage among single interacts and underlying pattern 
 
Weick considers that sensemaking in organizations means ―small structures with large 
consequences‖. In this sense, he elaborates the concept of ―committed interpretation‖ that is also 
used in the process shown above. Committed actions can be justified as macro necessities that, if 
invoked as justifications, are materialized (Weick, 2001). Reification is the clearest aspect of linkage 
between micro events (interact) and macro entities that is the theoretical background of Weick‘s 
vision of sensemaking. This linkage can be helped by symbols that are ―signs connected to 
meanings‖. A classification of verbal tools to invest experience to meaning uses three categories: 
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labels, metaphors and platitudes (Czarniawska and Jeorges, 1990). The knowledge of these symbols 
is a necessity in order to share meaning and, therefore, it contributes to explain the retrospective 
nature of sensemaking.   
These symbols become also ―the language of justification‖ and they are linked to underlying pattern 
through a process called ―documentary method‖ (Garfinkel, 1967). Author defines this method as 
follows: ―The method consists of treating an actual appearance as ‗the document of‘ as ‗pointing to‘, 
as ‗standing on behalf of‘ a presupposed underlying pattern. Not only is the pattern derived from its 
individual documentary evidences but also the individual evidences, in their turn, are interpreted 
based on ‗what is known‘ about the underlying pattern. Each is used to elaborate the other‖ 
(Garfinkel, 1967). According to Weick ―committed interact is the equivalent of the actual 
appearance or the document‖ and ―the justification is the equivalent of the underlying pattern that 
presupposes a macro context‖. Again ―The connection of a cryptic current interact with a 
presupposed pattern is the key interpretative procedure that reduces equivocality‖ (Weick, 2001). 
Two more aspects of justification have to be underlined: it is not a brief moment in sensemaking and 
it is not unique. We find justifications for our action in each interact we do and they could be 
different depending on the others. So, when we act, different justifications produce confusion after 
the decision and we try again to rationalize our choices in order to validate them. 
 
Commitment 
 
Human actions ―may become binding if … occur in a context of high choice, high irreversibility, 
and high visibility‖. In this case, subsequent events ―may be enacted in the service of justification‖. 
Therefore, ―justification can become an important source of social structure, culture and norms‖ 
(Weick, 1995). 
When justification is transformed from a self-justification to a collective intention, it may become 
organizational goals. These goals are so important that they are part of the definition of 
―organization‖ (see Daft and the definition of goal-directed organizations, Daft 1986). So, 
―commitment helps us to understand organizational life‖ (Weick, 1995). 
 
Interact as the “object of commitment” 
 
Justification become a collective intention only after interact. We can define interact as an action of 
person ―A‖ that evokes a specific action of another person ―B‖ and, if A‘s reaction to that action 
takes place, it is a ―double interact‖. This double interact is ―itself a committing context, because it 
contains all four variables that bind a person to action‖ (Weick, 1995). These four variables are 
volition, public action, explicit action and irrevocable action. Therefore, double interaction is the 
smallest unit that ―can dominate the actor‘s attention and draw justifications‖ and ―have a 
disproportionately large effect on meaning and interpretation (Weick, 1995). Weick argues that 
interact is the ―object of commitment‖. To do that, he refers to concept of collective structure that, 
according to Allport (1962) forms whenever there is a pluralistic situation in which in order for an 
individual (or class of individuals) to perform some act (or have some experience) that he desires to 
perform, it is necessary that another person perform certain acts. Including interacts, and not only 
acts, in justification, increases the possibility that justifications invoke roles and other social forms 
as the explanation of commitment.  
 
Interpretation 
 
Anyway, this effort to build a collective structure and to achieve a shared interpretation doesn‘t 
mean to look for ―the‖ solution. Instead, it means socially negotiating for finding some common 
points among the different interpretations (maps) that everyone continuously builds. Weick tries to 
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explain the sense of sensemaking using two analogies. First with the game of Mastermind, Weick 
suggests that ―Mastermind is precisely what sensemaking is not‖. In sensemaking, people cannot be 
sure there is a master code to be discovered. (Weick, 1995). Weick suggests that an analogy that 
better describes sensemaking is the activity of cartography (Weick, 1995). According to 
Monmonier, (Monmonier, 1991) ―There is some terrain that mapmakers want to represent, and they 
use various modes of projection to make this representation. What they map, however, depends on 
where they look, how they look, what they want to represent, and their tool for representation.‖ 
Therefore, a reason for preferring cartography as a metaphor is that the same area can be described 
using different maps and there is no ―right‖ solution. 
 
Validation 
 
The end, and the new beginning, of sensemaking cyclic process is the validation phase. The post 
decision validation is necessary because, also after that the decision is made, equivocality can be 
high. It depends on how many justifications the decision maker has given to that action. So, we 
make decisions basing on rationality and analyzing our informational system but also ―on the non-
rational basis of our motivational commitment to them‖ (Brickman, 1987). A justification with little 
intrinsic validity comes to be seen as more valid because powerful people believe in it and act on 
these beliefs (Snyder, 1984). The decision maker finds cues for new justification of future action in 
validation of past actions. So the cycle starts again.  
 
 
The output of the process: a collective structure as a cognitive map 
 
Weick suggests that the resulting images of reality will be social images because interacts – and not 
only acts – are rationalized. Social entities, like roles, are reified in justifications of interacts. Then 
interact is the object of commitment and reification is the content of interpretation. Weick defines 
―committed interpretation‖ the combination of interpretation and commitment. Interpretation is a 
social justification shared by group of people that build collective structures where social entities are 
reified. Anyway, this plurality of maps produces equivocality. ―To reduce equivocality, people do 
not need large quantity of information. Instead, they need richer qualitative information.‖ (Weick, 
1995). Richness pertains to the learning capacity of a communication (Daft and Lengel, 1986, p. 
560). In order to make sense of reality, people in organizations need to share at least some common 
points in this modifiable network of interpretations. This collective structure can be considered a 
cognitive map. A cognitive map is a representation of our own knowledge that we edit from our 
organizational experience. It consists of ―the concepts and the relations a participant uses to 
understand organizational situations‖ (Weick, 2001). A specific form of cognitive map is 
represented by the causality maps. Causality is one of the four epistemological primitives that we 
can obtain matching events basing on the time at which they occur and their classification. 
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Figure 12 Personal interpretation on Weick, 2001 
 
A pattern of causality occurs when two events have different classifications and happen at different 
times. According to Weick, other epistemological primitives are identity, correlation and seriality 
(Weick, 2001). Causal maps link concepts with cause-effect relations. Tolman contrasted cognitive 
maps with strip maps that are sequences of information where each choice has an appropriate 
response. Differently, a cognitive map allows flexible behavior (Tolman, 1948). Cognitive maps can 
become a collective cause map in three different ways: assemblage (Hall, 1984), composite (Eden et 
Al., 1981) and average (Bougon and Weick, 1977). 
Hall describes the case of five separate cause maps for five department of Saturday Evening Post. 
However, maps were assembled among them because specific goals in one department became 
policy variables in others departments. Therefore, a way to build collective structure can be 
―identifies common elements in diverse cause maps …‖ (Weick, 2001). A composite causal map 
derives from teamwork in which people, starting from their own maps, work together to share a 
collective map (Eden et al., 1979). So, at the end, all people had the same map. The third form is the 
average map. It is presented by Bougon and Weick (1977), analyzing the case of Utrecht Jazz 
Orchestra. They asked to each of 19 members to assign causality relationships (zero, +1 or -1) and 
then generated a map based on the average (the algebraic mean) of answers. This map was different 
from each individual map but represent the most acceptable solution. 
This continuous and symbolic process of sensemaking has the goal to reduce equivocality and it can 
be more or less effective. We suggest that innovating mindfully with IT (as in the case of M&A) can 
improve the effectiveness of sensemaking process for at least four reasons. In the following table, it 
is possible to find some linkages among contribution of IS adoption and implementation and 
sensemaking process (phases, sources of meaning, outputs). We argue that IS affects sensemaking 
process at least because they are (i) source of public interpretation, (ii) they allow a retrospective 
elaboration and (iii) they contribute to elaborate a collective structure defining roles and (iv) they 
contribute to define a common set of labels. 
According to Weick, it is possible to consider ―technology as equivoque‖ because new technology 
are source of stochastic, continuous and abstract events. Technologies are used to make automatic 
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some routines. Therefore, people have to treat tasks that are more complex and they have to face a 
new typology of unexpected events. Weick argues that a shift from structure (of knowledge) to 
structuration is required. Structuration is defined as ―production and reproduction of social systems 
through members‖. Within this structuration, process technologies are treated as an artifact and they 
become the content of interpretation (Weick, 1995). Therefore, technology can affect sensemaking 
because it is the result of three, not sequential, steps (committed interpretation, justification and 
validation).  
 
 
 
 
Phase 
 
 
Source for meaning 
Output  
(intermediate and 
 final) 
Role of IS  
adoption and  
implementation 
Justification 
Interacts (public, 
irrevocable, explicit, …) 
Common points on cognitive 
(causal) maps 
IS implementation 
team members 
interact in a public 
way 
Symbols (labels, metaphors, 
platitudes) 
ISs define common 
labels that are 
common symbols 
for justifications 
Underlying patterns 
(including organizational 
identities) 
In case of multiple 
Organizational 
Identities, a shared 
hierarchy of that OI 
helps decision 
maker   
Past events 
IS implementation 
team members 
share justification 
for past choices 
Interpretation 
Reification of social and 
organizational roles and 
causal relationships 
Collective structure 
IS solutions 
(especially ERP) 
defines roles‘ 
authority and 
causal relationships 
Common points on 
cognitive maps 
 
Motivations to act  
Interacts (public, 
irrevocable, explicit,…) 
(see above) 
Validation 
Interacts (public, 
irrevocable, explicit,…) 
Post decision justification 
Agreement of 
powerful members 
help post decision 
justifications 
Shared  
underlying  
patterns 
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Information systems have characteristics that give them a high symbolic value in people 
perception of change. They are based on procedures that describe daily work, they build a specific 
―language‖ in the company and sometime they give priorities that influence time management. For 
these reasons, a managerial choice to use the same application in the group has a high effect on 
people perception of haw change will happen. If managers decide it mindlessly (immediately, as 
an imposition and without contextualization) people perceived that new owners want to delete 
their identity. On the contrary, a mindfully choice (not immediate and contextualized) has the 
meaning of a change rational, that recognizes value of people and creates opportunities.  
Proposition 6: After an M&A, the mindful adoption of common IT solutions is perceived, by people 
working in the organization, as a will of identity integration and it reduces ambiguity and helps 
sensemaking process. 
After an acquisition, new threats generate ambiguity and new people are involved in social 
interaction. When people work mindfully on an IT innovation, during the implementation phase 
they share common points on their own map of reality. During implementation, people give 
justifications of their past action regarding IT tools. These justifications are public (within the 
project team) and irrevocable. IS implementation pertains the definition of roles and their levels of 
authority. Moreover, especially implementing ERP systems, people share causal relationships 
among activities. In this way and for these reasons, people can make a revision of their own map 
of reality and, sharing interpretations, reduce ambiguity. These reviewed maps ―are pragmatic 
images that provide temporary guides for action‖ (Weick, 1995) and the more people can share 
common points in the maps the more they can make sense of new reality. 
Sensemaking is also a retrospective process. According to Weick, ―Remembering and looking 
back are a primary source of meaning‖. A mindful adoption of IT after an M&A forces people to 
share past events and reasons that justified some choices. In order to obtain a committed 
interpretation, people search for a social justification of their action and make decisions basing on 
commitment (Weick, 1995). The effort to validate those justifications is spread on other actors. So, 
after acquisition people can find new social justification of their actions working with other and 
sharing retrospective analysis of reality.    
An old theorem suggests, ―if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences‖ 
(Thomas and Thomas, 1928). This interpretative approach intends reality construction as a process 
that is different from one group to another. The four key ideas of interpretative approach include 
that ―people are reflective and can verbalize the content of their interpretation‖ (Porac, Thomas 
and Baden-Fuller, 1989). After an acquisition, the implementation of common software is a source 
of common symbolic representation of reality. A classification of verbal symbols includes labels, 
metaphors and platitudes. An implementation team shares new common labels and creates 
understandable symbols for both acquired and acquiring company‘s social groups. Zollo and 
Singh, within their knowledge-based perspective on managing acquisitions, found that the level of 
knowledge codification has a strong and positive influence on acquisition performance. They 
suggest that ―... the effects of the process of knowledge codification, not necessarily its outcomes, 
are of strategic relevance‖. In that study the level of codification is measured also counting 
―conversion of information system‖ (Zollo and Singh, 2004). Translating tacit in explicit 
knowledge is also a way to create knowledge if it is followed by an ―internalization‖ phase 
(Nonaka and Konno, 1998).  
Proposition 7a: After an M&A, in firms that innovate mindfully with IT, implementation team 
members, sharing casual maps, retrospective knowledge and symbolic labels, reduce ambiguity, 
improve sensemaking and create linkages among daily activities and general patterns (including 
organizational identity). 
 
The team members had the opportunity to interact during the teamwork but also users can reduce, 
after the end of implementation, ambiguity about new reality using new IT solution. Even if 
without the interaction of team members they cannot share past events and make sense of 
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justifications, users have the possibility to understand causal maps, organizational roles and new 
labels. They also contribute to validate meaning if, during the assimilation phase, they can interact 
with team members in order to ask explications about the choices of the team. Also for users, IT 
solutions have characteristics that help sensemaking. They deal daily operations and link them 
with cause-effect relationships that recall general patterns. For example, the authorization level of 
each role clarifies the decentralization choice that managers have done after acquisition. These 
considerations make sense of wider concepts like autonomy that have links with organizational 
identity. 
 
Proposition 7b: After an M&A, in firms that innovate mindfully with IT, users of new IT solution, 
sharing casual maps and symbolic labels, reduce ambiguity, improve sensemaking and create 
linkages among daily activities and general patterns (including organizational identity). 
 
An M&A produces what Corley and Gioia (2004) call ―identity ambiguity.‖ In this condition, 
managers are stimulated to resolve the confusion about multiple possible interpretations of core 
and distinctive organizational features. Indeed, this ambiguity requires members to construct new 
shared interpretations (Gioia, 1986; Weick, 1979, 1995). Managers‘ initial response to identity 
threats is a sensemaking phase that takes to a revision of central and distinctive features of the 
organization (Ravasi and Schultz, 2006). Authors argued that managers look ―both inside and 
outside the organization searching for cues that helped them make sense of its identity‖ (Ravasi 
and Schultz, 2006). On the internal side, members of companies involved in acquisitions seemed 
to assign a considerable importance to ―cultural heritage‖ of the organization that are manifested in 
concrete practices and objects Ravasi and Schultz labeled this process reflection on cultural 
practices and artifacts. An IT application can be seen as a physical and linguistic artifacts. During 
the integration after the acquisition, people engaged in innovating with IT have the opportunity to 
reflect on these artifacts and share new interpretations of past events. This collective construction 
of new meaning reduce ambiguity and provides socially accepted justification of their own actions. 
The outcome of this sensemaking process was a revision of the official identity claims that can be 
supported in the following phase of sensegiving in the Organizational Identity evolution process 
(Ravasi and Schultz, 2006). 
 
6.5 Methodology 
 
The aim of this paper is to describe how IS adoption contributes to sensemaking in integration 
process after an M&A. In order to provide an answer to ―how-typology‖ research questions, a case 
study seems to be the more useful methodology. So, we analyzed the integration process in a 
pharmaceutical multinational that acquired an Italian company, focusing on the adoption of SAP 
(already adopted in acquiring company) in target company. According to Yin‘s approach, we 
prepared a case study protocol containing a detailed planning of research activities and tools (Yin, 
2003).  I conducted 5 interviews to project team members, 20 interviews to SAP users and 9 
interviews to top managers and classify results in the following table. 
 
6.5.1 Case study protocol 
 
In order to find empirical evidence of theoretical propositions elaborated in the paper, a semi-open 
interview has been designed. From each proposition, main concepts have been selected, described 
and one or more questions have been formulated. 
104 
These questions will be used during interviews to members of SAP implementing team or to users in 
two different periods: the first one during the implementation project phase, the second one during 
the assimilation phase.  
 
Design of questions about the five propositions that link concepts with mindfulness in innovating 
with IT. 
Concept Meaning Questions 
 
 
 
Preoccupation 
with failure. 
When a firm is involved in an 
M&A it is concerned with the 
possibility of failure, because the 
difficulties of integration process 
are well known. 
Was this project different because of acquisition?  
Did your participation to implementation team an 
opportunity to demonstrate your value to new 
owners? 
At the end of teamwork, did you feel to be more 
confident about the new reality? 
 
 
 
Sensitivity to 
operations. 
As the mindful organization is 
interested in insignificant details 
in day-to-day operations, after an 
M&A an acquiring company has 
a high interest in achieving some 
performance improvement in 
business processes of target 
company. 
Working to this project, what did you understand 
of Merck routines? 
Working on SAP implementation did your team 
modify any routine of SERONO? 
In which sense team work helped context 
comprehension? 
 
 
 
Commitment to 
resilience. 
 
Managers of acquired company 
open a period in which they are 
disposal to recognize that their 
routines can be discussed. 
Did you plan to change IT application before the 
acquisition? 
Did people within the team more resilient in 
changing than before the acquisition? 
In case of different routines which criteria did team 
adopt to solve the problem? 
 
 
 
Richness of 
interpretation. 
Managers in target company are 
opened to new and conflicting 
interpretations. The prevention of 
the ―not-invented-here 
syndrome‖ in period following to 
an M&A is easier because the 
companies‘ boundaries have been 
modified. 
Did people in the team accept some Merck solution 
also because those solutions had success? 
Did people in the team accept to use some Serono 
routines because they fit with specificity of Serono 
products? 
Did you change some idea about project during the 
team work? 
 
 
Developing of 
expertise. 
Firms involved in an M&A 
redesign the formal structure and 
the distribution of authority 
among its members. Each person 
is evaluated for its own 
experience and those experiences 
that have been underutilized can 
find new opportunities. 
Had someone the opportunity to demonstrate some 
new skills in the team?  
Which criteria were used in assigning roles in the 
team? 
Were some organizational role or routine modify by 
project‘s decisions? 
 
 
―An organization is mindful in 
innovating with IT when it 
Were decisions about IT innovation made 
considering Serono specificity? 
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Design of questions about the three propositions that link concepts with mindfulness. 
 
 
Proposition: 
After an M&A, the mindful adoption of common IT solutions is 
perceived by people working in the organization as a will of identity 
integration and it reduces ambiguity and helps sensemaking process. 
Concept Meaning Questions 
 
 
 
Mindful adoption 
―An organization is mindful in 
innovating with IT when it 
attends to an innovation with 
reasoning grounded in its own 
organizational facts and 
specifics.‖  
―…for true mindfulness such 
alertness must be joined to 
contextually differentiated 
reasoning.‖   
Were decisions about IT innovation 
made considering Serono 
specificity? 
Were decisions about IT innovation 
made with rationality? 
How the decision to innovate IT has 
been taken? 
 
 
 
 
Identity integration 
 
The organizational identity is 
―what we are as an 
organization‖. It is what is 
distinctive, endurance and 
central for the company. 
How do you define the way of 
merging identities used after the 
acquisition?   
In what Merck was rigid and in 
what resilient with respect to 
identities? 
How the choice regarding the SAP 
adoption change your opinion about 
Merck management? 
 
 
 
 
Ambiguity 
 
 
After an M&A ambiguity 
increases because of new roles, 
new labels and new processes. 
The revision of collective 
structure is most heavy than 
usual. 
After the acquisition, how did you 
perceive that something was 
changing? 
Working in the SAP 
implementation team, did you 
clarify something about new 
company reality? 
The adoption of SAP happened 
some months after the acquisition. 
What does it mean in your opinion? 
 
 
 
 
Sensemaking 
Sensemaking is a social 
process that provides a 
committed interpretation as 
output. Understanding macro 
reasons to act, people reduce 
Working in the SAP 
implementation team, did your 
preoccupation about future improve 
or decrease?  
After team work, do you feel the 
 
Mindfulness 
attends to an innovation with 
reasoning grounded in its own 
organizational facts and 
specifics.‖  
―…for true mindfulness such 
alertness must be joined to 
contextually differentiated 
reasoning.‖   
Were decisions about IT innovation made with 
rationality? 
How the decision to innovate IT has been taken? 
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ambiguity in organization 
comprehension. So, they act 
not only basing on rationality 
or time, but also on 
commitment.  
choices made by the team as yours? 
How team work has changed your 
vision of the company? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposition 
After an M&A, in firms that innovate mindfully with IT, 
implementation team members, sharing casual maps, 
retrospective knowledge and symbolic labels, reduce ambiguity 
and improve sensemaking creating linkages among daily activities 
and general patterns (including organizational identity).   
Concept Meaning Questions 
 
 
 
Causal map 
 
A causal map is a sort of ―net‖ 
that is not individual but 
socially negotiated. This 
structure has nodes and ties. 
Nodes are organizational 
roles, cultural artifacts, 
concepts. Ties are processes, 
hierarchy, weak links, cause-
effects links, … 
Working in the SAP 
implementation team, did you 
understand the content of 
activities and organizational 
roles? 
Working in the SAP 
implementation team, did you 
understand relationship among 
activities and organizational 
roles? 
Which criteria were used in 
order to justify those 
relationships? Did identity ever 
recall? 
 
 
 
Retrospective 
Sensemaking is 
retrospective because it 
concerns the possibility to 
locate simple daily acts in 
more general pattern and 
justify them in order to 
achieve a collective 
structure. These 
possibilities are higher if 
people share past events 
and justifications for past 
acts. 
Working in the SAP 
implementation team, did you 
better understand reasons of past 
choices?  
Did you have the opportunity to 
clarify to other members your past 
choices? 
Listening to tales of past events 
about Merck, did you feel it 
―closer‖?  
 
 
 
Symbolic labels 
 
 
The possibility to link daily 
activities to general patterns 
can be helped by symbols. 
They are classified as labels, 
metaphors and platitudes. 
Working in the SAP 
implementation team, what 
difference did you note between 
your and others‘ languages?  
Are some of new labels that you 
learned linked to organizational 
identity? 
Do you feel closer to Merck 
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identity using its ―language‖? 
 
 
 
Sharing 
 
The social negotiation of 
collective structure can derive 
from an assemblage of 
different maps, from explicit 
team work or from an 
average of individual maps.  
Working in the SAP 
implementation team, did you 
justify your opinion in a public 
way? 
When a conflict between different 
opinions has rose within the team 
how does the team solve it? 
How much have the choices been 
contextualized to Serono reality? 
 
 
 
 
Ambiguity 
 
 
 
After an M&A ambiguity 
increases because of new 
roles, new labels and new 
processes. The revision of 
collective structure is most 
heavy than usual. 
After the acquisition, how did you 
perceive that something was 
changing? 
Working in the SAP 
implementation team, did you 
clarify something about new 
company reality? 
The adoption of SAP happened 
some months after the acquisition. 
What does it mean in your 
opinion? 
 
 
 
Sensemaking 
Sensemaking is a social 
process that provides a 
committed interpretation as 
output. Understanding macro 
reasons to act, people reduce 
ambiguity in organization 
comprehension. So, they act 
not only basing on rationality 
or time, but also on 
commitment.  
Working in the SAP 
implementation team, did your 
preoccupation about future 
improve or decrease?  
After team work, do you feel the 
choices made by the team as 
yours? 
How team work has changed your 
vision of the company? 
 
 
 
 
 
Daily activities 
 
 
Sensemaking in 
organizations helps people 
to adopt behaviors coherent 
with strategic goals. These 
behaviors are concrete 
when people act. According 
to Weick, sensemaking 
concerns ―small structure 
with large consequences‖. 
Working in the SAP 
implementation team, did you deal 
specific activities that are part of 
your job? 
Working in the SAP 
implementation team, did you 
better understand activities of other 
jobs? 
Has the project of SAP 
implementation been the main 
opportunity that you had to deeply 
share your responsibility with 
others? 
 
 
 
 
Linkages to general 
patterns 
Behavior in organizations is 
leaded by rationality, 
conformity to rules, time 
(―garbage can model‖) but 
also by committed 
interpretations. These 
Working in the SAP 
implementation team, did you 
better understand general 
objectives that inspired the design 
of processes?  
Does organizational identity used 
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interpretations required to 
link daily activities to 
general patterns. 
Organizational identity can 
be considered as one of 
these patterns. They provide 
justifications for action. 
in team work to justify some 
choices? 
Working in the SAP 
implementation team, did you 
better understand reasons of same 
activities (how they are linked to 
general objectives)? 
 
 
 
 
Proposition 
After an M&A, in firms that innovate mindfully with IT, users of new 
IT solution, sharing casual maps and symbolic labels, reduce 
ambiguity and improve sensemaking creating linkages among daily 
activities and general patterns (including organizational identity).   
Concept Meaning Questions 
 
 
 
Causal map 
A causal map is a sort of ―net‖ 
that is not individual but 
socially negotiated. This 
structure has nodes and ties. 
Nodes are organizational 
roles, cultural artifacts, 
concepts. Ties are processes, 
hierarchy, weak links, cause-
effects links, … 
Working on the new SAP solution, did 
you understand the content of activities 
and organizational roles? 
Working on the new SAP solution, did 
you understand relationship among 
activities and organizational roles? 
 
 
 
Symbolic labels 
 
 
The possibility to link daily 
activities to general patterns 
can be helped by symbols. 
They are classified as labels, 
metaphors and platitudes. 
Working on the new SAP solution, 
what difference did you note between 
new and old languages?  
Are some of new labels that you 
learned linked to organizational 
identity? 
Do you feel closer to Merck identity 
using its ―language‖? 
 
 
 
Sharing 
The social negotiation of 
collective structure can derive 
from an assemblage of 
different maps, from explicit 
team work or from an average 
of individual maps.  
Working on the new SAP solution, did 
you feel closer to Merck? 
Do you think that implementation team 
adopted a standard Merck or 
contextualize its choices? 
 
 
 
 
Ambiguity 
 
After an M&A ambiguity 
increases because of new 
roles, new labels and new 
processes. The revision of 
collective structure is most 
heavy than usual. 
After the acquisition, how did you 
perceive that something was changing? 
Working on the new SAP solution, did 
you clarify something about new 
company reality? 
The adoption of SAP happened some 
months after the acquisition. What 
does it mean in your opinion? 
 
 
 
Sensemaking is a social 
process that provides a 
committed interpretation as 
Working on the new SAP solution, did 
your preoccupation about future 
improve or decrease?  
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Sensemaking output. Understanding macro 
reasons to act, people reduce 
ambiguity in organization 
comprehension. So, they act 
not only basing on rationality 
or time, but also on 
commitment.  
After SAP use, do you feel the choices 
made by the team as yours? 
When you talk about SAP 
implementation with team members 
did they justify and agree with the 
choices of the team? 
 
 
 
 
Daily activities 
Sensemaking in organizations 
helps people to adopt 
behaviors coherent with 
strategic goals. These 
behaviors are concrete when 
people act. According to 
Weick, sensemaking concerns 
―small structure with large 
consequences‖. 
Working on the new SAP solution, did 
you deal specific activities that are part 
of your job? 
Working on the new SAP solution, did 
you better understand activities of 
other jobs? 
 
 
 
 
Linkages to general 
patterns 
Behavior in organizations is 
leaded by rationality, 
conformity to rules, time 
(―garbage can model‖) but 
also by committed 
interpretations. These 
interpretations required to link 
daily activities to general 
patterns. Organizational 
identity can be considered as 
one of these patterns. They 
provide justifications for 
action. 
Working on the new SAP solution, did 
you better understand general 
objectives that inspired the design of 
processes?  
Does organizational identity used by 
team members to justify some choices? 
Working on the new SAP solution, did 
you better understand reasons of same 
activities (how they are linked to 
general objectives)? 
 
 
 
 
6.6 Research context 
 
In this case study a German multinational group acquires an Italian-Swiss company in order to 
develop its pharmaceutical business unit without effects on its chemical business. The acquiring 
group already had an Italian subsidiary in Milan that run business in pharmaceutical industry but in 
different therapeutic areas. After the acquisition, the Italian pharmaceutical subsidiary was 
integrated in the target company. At international level, it became the Pharmaceutical Business Unit 
using the two brands together. From the point of view of Organizational Identity, as described in 
findings section, we can recognize an ―aggregation‖ strategy at corporate level. According to Pratt 
and Foreman framework (Pratt and Foreman, 2000) an ―aggregation‖ managerial response means an 
effort in maintaining old identities creating at the same time a deliberate link between them. This 
kind of response is appropriate when appropriateness of both identity plurality and synergy between 
identities of merging companies are high. During the integration process following the acquisition, 
management decided to extend in the whole group a SAP application. We will study how this 
process had effects on creating a new organizational identity.  
 
Description of SAP implementation project in MERCK SERONO 
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The SAP implementation project has been a complete ERP project. Merck - Serono adopted the 
following modules: 
• FI – Financial Accounting; 
• CO – Controlling; 
• TR – Treasury; 
• AM – Assets Management; 
• PS – Project System; 
• PP – Production Planning; 
• MM – Materials Management; 
• PM – Plant Management; 
• SM – Service Management; 
• SD – Sales & Distribution; 
• HR – Human Resources Management; 
• QM – Quality Management. 
 
The start up of SAP took place in October 2010 after about 15 months of team work. The project 
was shared in two programs: Leonardo program and Da Vinci program. With the Leonardo program 
each country choose one erp system if they used more than one. In the Da Vinci program a complete 
SAP suite replaced systems worldwide. 
The organizational structure of this project had a high complexity with a global manager at 
corporate level, a Local manager for each country, a change manager for each country, training 
coordinators in each site and several key users. A Change Advisor Board had the responsibility to 
solve conflicts. 
A “template” was defined at corporate level and it has been customized at country level if necessary 
for specific regulatory rules or business specificities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.7 Findings 
 
In this paragraph, I describe evidence from interviews, in order to provide an empirical example 
with respect to propositions elaborated in previous paragraphs. 
While for proposition 6 I had interest in opinions of all interviewed people, for proposition form 1 to 
5 (attributes of mindfulness) and 7a (team members), due to a so complex structure of project, I 
grouped data in three points of view could be more interesting: 
 the opinion of technical team members; 
 the opinion of ―change management‖ team members; 
 the opinion of key users involved during implementation. 
 
Proposition from 1 to 5 are referred to mindfulness in innovating with IT. I collected interviews 
from members of implementation team in order to understand which of the five propositions are 
verified in this case. 
 
The opinion of Change Manager about mindfulness in innovating was the following:  
 
“… maybe the choice of SAP was already decided but for example 
other sw (for web sites) have been choose from Serono experience and 
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they do that considering SERONO specificity because  the regulatory 
environment is a strong constrain.  It was a decisions made with 
rationality but, according to Merck‟s culture, giving high attention to 
transparency of decision making communication.” 
 
Also Local Project Technical Manager confirmed that the implementation began after two years 
from acquisition but as a planned decision: 
 
“Merck decided that the project was shared in two programs: 
Leonardo program and Da Vinci program. They started immediately 
with the Leonardo program and each country choose one erp system if 
they used more than one. Then, in the Da Vinci program a complete 
SAP suite replaced systems worldwide.” 
 
Key users gave an interpretation of the period in which project has been launched as a message of 
mindfulness.  
 
The Proposition 1 states that firms engaged in innovation with IT after an M&A have a higher 
preoccupation with failure. 
 
The Change Manager of the project said that:  
 
“… this project was different because it was based on Merck culture 
with a constant reporting of activities … I didn‟d perceive it as an 
opportunity to demonstrate my value to new owners because all my 
jobs have the same characteristics of this one … even if I felt to be 
more confident about the new reality at the end of teamwork  because 
my skills are in communication field and in this project I knew all 
other process”. 
 
Also Local Project Technical Manager confirmed that this project has been felt as a part of 
integration process: 
 
“This project is a direct consequence of acquisition.” 
  
Key users underlined as ambiguity following the acquisition was already decreased at the moment of 
project kickoff. 
 
The Proposition 2 states that firms engaged in innovation with IT after an M&A have a higher 
sensitivity to operations. 
 
The Change Manager of the project said that:  
 
“Working to this project, I understand better MERCK‟s routines and 
their way of working even if the regulatory environment has a strong 
role …I worked with German colleagues for several weeks and I 
directly knew their way of working”. 
 
According to Local Project Technical Manager: 
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“My activity in the project team was an opportunity for me to know 
new management because I had a position at corporate level. I 
reported directly to Darmstadt. I knew better our business because we 
implemented a complete SAP suite in Italy. I learned new things about 
production. Also at relational level this project was important and it 
put together Bari, Ivrea and two sites in Rome. We implemented a 
complete ERP system that is validated on international standards, all 
thing followed procedures, so I knew better activities.” 
 
Key users were involved as knowledge owner of specialism; therefore, they did not underline 
specifically this aspect of innovation. 
 
The Proposition 3 states that firms engaged in innovation with IT after an M&A have a higher 
commitment to resilience. 
 
The Change Manager of the project said that:  
 
“Even if we didn‟t plan to change IT application before the 
acquisition (because Oracle was a good erp system), people in Serono 
were strongly engaged so they were resistant to change their belief. 
Anyway the appropriate management of acquisition contributed to 
make people resilient and again engaged with new reality” 
 
“… in case of different routines each Local team analyzed the group 
template and then the Global Advisor Board decided on some 
conflicts”. 
 
According to Local Project Technical Manager, people in Serono were already disposal to change 
but Oracle system was a good system: 
 
“From a technical point of view, also in Serono we had only an ERP 
system but we had not the IT organization that we have now. Now, 
many people that work on SAP system. We never planned to change 
Oracle because it was a good system. People that were reliable in 
Serono, are still reliable now. Anyway, after the acquisition there was 
a change and a higher reliability.” 
 
Key users gave a high importance to regulatory constrains as limitation to possible innovation of 
their processes. 
 
The Proposition 4 states that firms engaged in innovation with IT after an M&A have a higher 
richness of interpretation. 
 
The Change Manager and the Local Project Technical Manager partially confirmed a higher richness 
of interpretation even if regulatory constrains are very pervasive and both acquired and acquiring 
company consider themselves a leading company: 
 
“People in the team accept some MERCK solution only on rational 
bases, because both Serono and Merck people have a high self 
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confidence. Our specificity of SERONO was respected for the main 
reason that regulatory system is very pervasive in this business”.  
 
“I changed some idea about project during the team work: for 
example how to prepare training material or the steps to share with 
management.” 
 
And, again … 
 
“Italian sites had their autonomy, now SAP system helped to make 
processes similar. For instance, purchase process, in which each site 
had different procedure. After this project they use the same 
procedure. Requirement of Ivrea team, Bari team and Roma team 
were different. The adoption of SAP formally arrived some months 
after acquisition but it was sure also because Merck headquarter is 
close to SAP office in Germany.” 
 
The Proposition 5 states that firms engaged in innovation with IT after an M&A develop better 
expertise of people. 
 
According to the change manager that‘s true more for key users because cross-roles that work by 
projects have usually opportunity to be appreciate. 
 
“The choice of roles in the team has been shared between people and 
management and so especially key users were appreciated for their 
high skills.”  
 
Local Project Technical Manager describes a high structured project structure defined at corporate 
level: 
 
“Roles in project structure were assigned at corporate level: in each 
country a PM, a technical PM (my role), a local PM and a change 
Manager. When Group proposed this project to us we identified 
people that better can take each position.” 
Key users involved in project team underlined the care of people as a clear issue in Merck strategy. 
 
In sum, I can say that Merck innovated with mindfulness even if: 
 the choice of SAP as erp seem to be partially a pre-determined decision; 
 a so regulated industry forced  a customization of application at national level. 
 
The Proposition 6 states that after an M&A, the mindful adoption (of common IT solutions) is 
perceived, by people working in the organization, as a will of identity integration and it reduces 
ambiguity and helps sensemaking process.  
It has been partially confirmed by data. Some narratives explain why people agree or disagree with 
this statement. 
 
 
Mindfulness 
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About mindfulness, there are different perceptions between implementation members (―they 
already decided that SAP was the solution‖) and other people (that consider it as a rational and 
contextualized choice).  
 
“… maybe the choice of SAP was already decided but for example other 
sw (for web sites) have been choose from Serono experience and they do 
that considering SERONO specificity because  the regulatory 
environment is a strong constrain.  It was a decision made with 
rationality but, according to Merck‟s culture, giving high attention to 
transparency of decision making communication.” 
 
Other people didn‘t know the 2 phases of project: 
 
Merck decided to adopt SAP only two years later the acquisition 
because Italy is complex. Data migration will take place in June 2010. I 
think that they didn‟t say: this is my system, you must use it. The process 
was slow and rational.  
 
Not only SAP project helped the integration process: 
 
First, we aligned compensation and grading. Data migration from 
Oracle to SAP is planned for July. It was “un bagno di sangue”.Within 
the group Merck each country had a different erp. Therefore, they use 
this opportunity to choose only one system. We created task forces. This 
project will help weekly activities. 
 
This project was at International level, not only for Serono:  
 
We had different systems: Oracle and SAP. Actually, Merck had 
different systems in each country … with clear difficulties. With 
acquisition they change all system in SAP, including Serono. 
 
Identity integration 
 
As reported in previous sections, people perceived the identity management after the acquisition as 
a success.  
 
The way of merging identities used after the acquisition was a success, 
with a high level of engagement. MERCK was rigid with respect to 
identities in the use of co-branding in any publication. The choice 
regarding the SAP adoption changed my opinion about MERCK 
management because I had better understood a strong respect for 
employees even if with a high performance requirement.  
 
Ambiguity 
 
On the contrary, people felt that ambiguity was not so high because of the good integration 
management.  
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After the acquisition, I perceive that something was changing because 
we use more procedure, monitoring, structures. 
 
The adoption of SAP happened some months after the acquisition 
because the project was shared in two programs: it was planned since 
the beginning. Ambiguity was already decreased before project. 
 
It integration is still in progress, I expect difficulties at beginning but a 
gradual improvement. From my point of view, change should be easy. 
 
Key users underlined as ambiguity following the acquisition was already decreased at the moment of 
project kickoff. 
 
Sensemaking  
 
Sensemaking was helped by adoption because of common language but there are different 
positions about the role of people and IS in integration process. 
 
There were not so many different opinions: regulatory constrains was 
strong. I appreciate the attention to communication: redundant 
messages in order to reduce ambiguity). 
 
I think that it is a way to improve integration within the Group Merck. I 
am sure that a great effort will be needed but we will obtain high 
advantages. 
 
I think that standardization of IT can help us in using the same 
language in the Company. 
 
It has been difficult for our integration. This effort can help integration 
process. 
 
Someone underlines the role of people … 
 
The adoption of SAP will help integration but people make difference. 
 
IT can help but people are the real resource of our company. 
 
On the contrary, other people underline ―hard‖ issues: 
 
I think that information systems help to organize activities flows and 
play an important role in the integration process. 
 
IT integration (SAP, …) has a role in the integration process, also from 
a psychological point of view. 
 
IT integration (SAP, …) can help the company governance. 
 
About Proposition 6, I can conclude that people perceived the choice to implement SAP solution 
as a will to integration between Merck and Serono. People underlined how that choice was taken 
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with mindfulness because Merck managers paid attention to transparency and communication. At 
the same time they noted that Merck manage in a professional way all other issues linked to 
integration. 
 
In the Proposition 7a we stated that after an M&A, in firms that innovate mindfully with IT, 
implementation team members, sharing casual maps, retrospective knowledge and symbolic labels, 
reduce ambiguity, improve sensemaking and create linkages among daily activities and general 
patterns (including organizational identity). 
Narratives from interviews can be useful in order to verify if and how that theoretical proposition 
has been confirmed after this acquisition. 
 
Sharing knowledge 
 
The change manager said about justification of choices and conflict resolution: 
 
“The knowledge sharing has been important in order to build a team. 
Also social events were important. When a conflict between different 
opinions has rose within the team Global Advisor Board solved it.” 
 
About conflicts, Local Project Technical Manager describes an example: 
 
“In case of conflict, you gave your effort to achieve the best solution. 
For instance, in Bari we needed a specific interface, so we argue about 
this idea.” 
 
 
Casual maps 
 
The change manager agrees with the building of a cognitive map: 
 
“Working in the SAP implementation team, I understood the content of 
activities and organizational roles, because I worked in communication 
before this role, especially for medical environment”. 
 
Local Project Technical Manager describes his experience in Germany as an example of activities 
comprehension: 
 
“I better understood new organizational roles. I went in Germany 3 
weeks in order to know project structure. Project team is large, not only 
in terms of IT professionals but also in terms of business professionals. 
Sure! We were lucky! If the acquiring company was a larger 
multinational company, everything was different. This acquisition seems 
to be a merge” 
 
 
Retrospective knowledge  
 
The change manager agreed with the opportunity to share past events but underlined the presence 
of a high integration before the beginning of the project: 
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“Working in the SAP implementation team, I better understood reasons 
of past choices because, during the explication of template even if key 
users must define requirement before knowing it and I had the 
opportunity to clarify to other members your past choices because a 
business alignment was planned. I did it also in defining requirements 
… but, the integration was already high before the project.” 
 
Both Local Project Technical Manager and Key Users underline constrains coming from the 
Corporate (template) and from the regulatory environment:  
 
“They explained to us template and methodology. Reasons of those 
choices were not useful to know, because template and methodology 
were decided. The task of data migration was complex. We asked 
something about it but we followed the corporate template. We had to 
verify requirements of different sites and businesses. Italy runs a 
different business, so we discuss about it and they allowed to us to 
customize SAP.” 
 
 
Symbolic labels 
 
The change manager underlined the role of language and he clarified how the project changed the 
meaning given to ―Italian‖ country: 
 
“At the beginning, they use too many acronyms. Also the language 
generated difficulties because of German colleagues and Indian 
consultants with bad English. And I felt closer to MERCK identity using 
their acronyms. The common sense that German colleges gave to 
“Italian” has been replaced with a more respectable.” 
 
Local Project Technical Manager describes an example of words that can make easier the 
communication:  
 
“This project helped us to achieve a common language. We daily use 
word like “lot of production” that in Oracle is called “batch” and in 
SAP “lot”. Now, we have a common language.” 
 
Key users agree with the importance of a shared language: ―sometimes there were differences 
among different sites in Serono …‖. 
 
Ambiguity 
 
The change manager confirmed an ambiguity increase after the acquisition but also a quick 
reduction of it: 
 
“After the acquisition, I perceived that something was changing when 
some German people were sent to “understand” Serono. Working in the 
SAP implementation team, I clarified something more about both other 
departments and Corporate staff. The adoption of SAP happened some 
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months after the acquisition also because Merck had respect for Serono 
and they wanted to understand us and ambiguity was already reduced.” 
 
Ambiguity has been confirmed also by Local Project Technical Manager. He 
disagrees on the impact of project on that: 
 
“After the acquisition we perceived ambiguity. When project started, 
ambiguity was already decreased. The project helped this process. 
Now, ambiguity is low. Project worked as a confirmation. When you 
work on software, you deal daily activities.” 
 
 
Sensemaking 
 
The change manager speaks about his experience: 
 
“Working in the SAP implementation team I felt choices made by the 
team as mine even if template and regulatory constrains are strong. 
Anyway, Now, I‟m sure about their respect of people.” 
 
Local Project Technical Manager describes changes in his perception: 
 
“My vision of Group after this project is different: we feel closer to 
Merck. You think about owners: you keep in touch with German 
people (and no more Swiss …), you listen people speak German 
language (and no more French…). Bertarelli was a well-known 
manager and he was very involved in management. Now, people begin 
gradually to forget his role.“ 
 
 
Daily activities  
 
The change manager said was already involved in cross-project: 
 
“My role was already “cross” so I already knew others‟ activities. 
Anyway, working in the SAP implementation team, I better understood 
especially medical activities.” 
 
Local Project Technical Manager describes the impact on his colleagues‘ working life: 
 
“Now, people use SAP and if they call me to notice some problem. I 
try to explain the reasons why our choices were the best solutions. 
Anyway, some improvement is possible. We better understood cross 
processes: for instance, quality assurance module.” 
 
 
General patterns 
 
The change manager disagrees about identity recall and he said that the comprehension of new 
reality depends on the organizational role: 
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“I believe that identity has never been recall. Working in the SAP 
implementation team, I better understood general objectives that 
inspired the design of processes. That‟s true for a cross role like mine. 
For others it‟s true within the boundary of their business area and their 
supplier and customer (internal and external). Also other common tools 
like balanced scorecard were useful to share general pattern aim.” 
 
 
Instead, Local Project Technical Manager describes some effects on Serono perception:  
 
 
“This project allowed to us to question the myth that Italians “are 
always in late” and under-staffed. They were surprised that we 
respected all final deadlines even if intermediate deadline weren‟t 
respected. About identity, they were cooperative but the impact on 
people has been heavy. They used various tools to merge identities. The 
governance in Darmstadt is stronger than Geneve‟s one in Serono. It 
wasn‟t easy. Bertarelli was the owner and CEO. In Merck, managers 
and owners are different. Bertarelli was in Serono since he was a child. 
The former CEO remembered when Bertarelli played here. Bertarelli 
had a special relationship with this company.”  
 
 
In sum, we can say that proposition 7a is verified in this case of acquisition. More specifically, 
people agree about the improved effectiveness of sensemaking even if they underline how 
ambiguity was already reduced by a good integration strategy. Interviewed people agree with the 
important role of language in order to make collaboration easier. A lower level of agreement was 
shown regarding sharing causal maps and retrospective analysis. People indicated a pre-defined 
template and regulatory environment as two important constrains for sharing activities. Project 
team members received a lot of information but had little opportunity to negotiate. Finally, the 
opportunity to link daily activities to general patterns was perceived in different ways by ―cross‖ 
role and key user member of implementation team. 
 
Proposition 7b analyzes the same relationships of proposition 7a but it studies perception of users 
of new IT solution and not on perception of implementation team members. The kickoff of SAP 
has been delayed so it takes some months in order to collect perceptions of users.  
 
 
6.8 Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we argued that the evolution of organizational identity after an M&A could be 
supported by the adoption, implementation and assimilation of common IT solutions. In that context, 
firms involved in acquisition use mindfulness in innovating with IT, because their attributes are 
verified. Indeed, we suggest that firms engaged in innovation with IT after an M&A have a higher 
preoccupation with failure, have a higher sensitivity to operations, have a higher commitment to 
resilience, have a higher richness of interpretation, have a higher richness of interpretation. This 
mindfulness facilitates the sensemaking process because firms involved in the acquisition share a 
―collective structure‖ of new reality, a retrospective of the past events and share a symbolic 
representation of new reality. In a constructionist approach, the evolution of organizational identity 
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requires a social negotiation among members where sensemaking has a primary role. So, the 
integration process following acquisitions can be facilitated by adopting, implementing and 
assimilating common IT solutions with mindfulness.   
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7 Conclusions 
 
This study can contribute to explain what happens, from an organizational point of 
view, after an M&A. This kind of event is a source of multiple identities because 
people from different firms are merged in a new environment. This plurality of 
identities is considered in literature as a normal situation in any company. Theories 
about M&A suggest an ambiguous rate of success of this kind of operation. This 
ambiguity should produce an effort of acquiring company‘s management in order 
to choose an appropriate strategy about organizational identity. I verified a 
previous model about appropriateness of managerial response to multiple identities 
(Pratt and Foreman, 2000) with a case study in pharmaceutical industry. Results 
are interesting especially for the high capacity of that theoretical model to explain 
(in 2000) why the described acquisition has been a success. These results could be 
a reason to suggest strongly to management to plan a managerial response to 
multiple identities. Anyway, literature also suggests considering the evolution of 
organizational identities as a social, gradual, continuous process. For this reason, I 
proposed a methodology (in a case study about banking industry) that can help the 
monitoring of sensemaking process using causal maps. Finally, these two levels 
(deliberate strategy and social process of sensemaking) are ―linked‖ giving a 
theoretical interpretation of how information systems adoption can be a concrete 
way to support in a ―social‖ construction of the expected equilibrium among the 
multiple identities existing after an M&A.  
 
7.1 Limitations 
 
The described evidences of this study about appropriateness of managerial 
responses to multiple organizational identities after an M&A are very interesting 
because a framework elaborated in 2000 – as Pratt and Foreman‘s one - revealed 
its predictive capacity still now. Anyway, I have to underline how results of a 
qualitative study like this one cannot be generalized without a high attention to 
contextualization.  
Aggregation is one response typology on four of the model. So, similar studies 
should be conducted in order to make this analysis more complete. 
Another limitation in possibility of generalization is linked – as described in 
paragraph 7.3 – to reasons of acquisition. Several studies proposed classifications 
of M&As based on reason-why criteria. For instance, it is a trivial consideration to 
observe how managerial response in an M&A that finds its reasons in destroying a 
competitor is different from an acquisition that opens a new market in a country 
with a different culture. A wide research plan could match reasons for acquisition 
and the four managerial responses. 
Focusing on cognitive map part of this study, I want to emphasize its 
methodological interest. The relevance of sample used in this part of present 
reseach is inappropriate to make conclusions although specific for that acquisition 
even if it is a qualitative study. Nevertheless, methodology presented in that 
section has a high interest for both managers and researchers because it is easy to 
apply but very rich in term of strategy evaluation. 
 
7.2 Practical and theoretical implications 
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Also due to the high interest existing about M&A, this study can provide practical 
and theoretical implications for both scholars and practitioners.  
Practitioners and ―Change managers‖ could use results of this study in order to 
design a clear strategy to manage organizational identity in a deliberate way 
involving HR manager and doing an effort of coherence between brand evolution 
and its ―internal‖ consequences. A strategy that gives a role of managerial variable 
to organizational identity, that chooses new ―labels‖ that define ―what we are‖ of 
resulting company and that helps people to ―make sense‖ of these new labels, 
could reduce ambiguity and improve effectiveness of merge. They could also use 
cognitive maps in order to help sensemaking process and, for instance, organize 
meeting focused on the research of common points among different cognitive 
maps. 
 
7.3 Suggestion for future researches 
 
This study can contribute to stimulate researches about merger and acquisition 
from a point of view that considers them as a strategic situation where more 
organizational identities coexist generating ambiguity and asking an effort of 
sensegiving. Future researches could take at least three different directions in 
order to complete this research area. 
  
First, scholars could contribute to verify if the same framework, explaining what 
happen to organizational identity after an acquisition, can be modified when 
reasons for merge and/or identity strategy are different with respect to the case 
study here presented. Managers could use the resulting matrix (that matches 
reasons of acquisition with strategy of identities‘ merging) in order to classify 
their own case into a wide taxonomy and to choose the better strategy. They will 
be forced to recognize the actual reasons that led to acquisition and to decide the 
destiny of acquired and acquiring companies‘ organizational identities.  
 
Second, the relationship between identity at individual level and organizational 
identity can stimulate a multidisciplinary approach as happens in the studies about 
organizational learning. 
 
Third, the use of cognitive maps as a managerial tool that can help sensemaking 
could be studied in order to define the better process and to study their use as a 
qualitative tool for research. 
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